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1     INTRODUCTION 
 
In India, health care is still mostly financed through high out-of-pocket 
payments at the point of use. The consequences are a reduced access to care 
and high vulnerability (especially for low-income households), due to 
inadequate financial protection. Several studies show the impoverishing effects 
of health expenditures on poor households in India (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; 
Vaishavi and Dash, 2009; Gosh, 2010). Despite the fast growing economy, the 
major part of the country suffers from a poor standard of health care 
infrastructure and from an unequal distribution of access to health care. The 
Indian public health spending is very low for a country where a big part of the 
population depends on public health services. Total health expenditures amount 
to 4.1% of GDP, of which only 33.1% are governmental funding, while the 
main part is represented by out-of-pocket expenditures (WHO, n.d.). The 
results are a weak and obsolete public health care infrastructure, poor quality of 
preventive care and poor health status, especially for low-income groups 
resident in rural areas. 
In India, public spending on health care is divided between the central 
government and the single state governments. However, the Constitution (Part 
XI) assigns a predominant responsibility for the provision of “public health and 
sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries” to the single states. Public health care 
provision is mostly tax-financed and oriented toward universal health care. 
However, the financing of the public health system is very challenged, since 
more than 90 per cent of workforce and about 50 per cent of GDP are 
accounted for by the informal sector (GoI, 2012a). Furthermore, the financing 
of health care services is affected by a severe fiscal imbalance between the 
central government and the states, since the majority of tax-revenues 
(excluding sales tax) are collected at the central level. The Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare administers the major transfer of tax revenues destined to 
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the health care sector. Despite this mechanism, inter-state disparities in the 
capacity to collect taxes result in an evident inequality in the quality of public 
health services provided at the state level, since the states affected by fiscal 
disabilities (mostly those with poor health indicators) are left with large 
shortages of funding (Rao and Singh, 2005). The inadequate level of public 
health provision, especially in poorer states, forces the population to make use 
of private health care providers, which is one of the main causes of the high 
out-of-pocket expenditures, together with the non-availability of basic drugs at 
public facilities. 
After a very late first National Health Policy (NHP) in 1983, the Government 
of India (GoI) has initiated several national health programs having as main 
objectives the improvement of the health care infrastructure and extending 
access to health care to the disadvantaged groups. Recent programs are the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) and the National Urban Health 
Mission (NUHM), aiming at providing accessible, affordable and quality health 
services for the rural and urban poor, especially in states where the attainment 
of health goals has been very poor. 
The Indian Government has also implemented several health insurance 
schemes. The most recent one, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna (RSBY), 
was launched in 2008 by the Ministry of Labor and Employment of the 
Government of India, after a critical review of the existing governmental health 
insurance schemes (e.g. the Universal Health Insurance Scheme or “one rupee 
per day”-scheme), which had not shown particular success. The RSBY is based 
on a standard business model but created for a social sector scheme, with 
governmental subsidies. RSBY offers, in collaboration with several state-run 
and private insurers, free1 health insurance to below the poverty line (BPL)2 
                                                 
1 Beneficiaries only need to pay Rs. 30/year as registration fee, while central and state governments pay 
the premium to the insurer, which is selected by each state government on the basis of a competitive 
bidding. Travel expenses up to Rs. 1,000 (€16)/year or a maximum of Rs. 100 (€1.60) per visit are also 
financed through the scheme. 
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households for the coverage of hospitalization costs up to Rs. 30,000. 
However, the scheme outreach is estimated to be relatively low (around 28% of 
the total BPL households as of 2011) and the governmental budget allocation is 
still too low to allow the expansion of the scheme (Dror & Vellakkal, 2012).  
Furthermore, recent studies report that, despite subsidization, insurers involved 
in the scheme are experiencing increasing loss ratios, mostly due to the 
growing number of competing insurance providers within the scheme, which 
pushes for lower premiums (Koven et al., 2013; Krishnaswamy & Ruchismita, 
2011). The scheme, however, has a high potential to push for the improvement 
of the public health care infrastructure, through a healthy competition between 
private and public medical providers3, as each hospital is paid by the scheme 
per beneficiary treated. Therefore, both public and private providers have the 
incentive to attract and provide treatment to large number of beneficiaries. 
Another positive effect is provided by the use of a RSBY smart card-system, 
which makes health services cashless for insured, facilitates the monitoring of 
use and costs of services (preventing abuse and hazards) and also allows for the 
first time to officially identify individuals from nomadic and mostly rural 
groups.  
Further insurance schemes are offered for selected groups in India. Formal 
sector and state employees are covered by social health insurance schemes, 
respectively the Employee State Insurance Scheme (ESIS) and the Central 
Government Health Scheme (CGHS), which cover the most health care costs 
and offers unlimited access to medical services. The rural population and those 
working in the informal sector, instead, mostly rely on tax-financed public 
services (mostly concentrated in urban areas), which are for free or partly 
subsidized, or alternatively use very expensive private facilities (GoI, 2005a). 
A clear rich-poor division in the access to health care and in health care 
                                                                                                                                            
2 Target clients are identified through the official national BPL lists. This brings to the need of efficient 
compiling and continuous update of the BPL lists and of an attentive monitoring against fraud and 
corruption, which challenge the effectiveness and outreach of the scheme. 
3 RSBY-insured can get medical assistance from a range of medical providers (both private and public) 
selected by the government for the scheme. 
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financing mechanisms is identifiable in this scenario. Extending the RSBY 
scheme to the coverage of costs for outpatient care4 and of the costs of drugs 
would give poor families greater relief, since these costs are reported to be 
more prevalent than the costs for inpatient care and to create a huge financial 
burden for poor HHs (Dror et al., 2008). Furthermore, it would also reduce 
hospitalization claims in the long term, since it would allow treating illnesses at 
an early stage, thus improving the financial sustainability of the RSBY scheme, 
too. However, despite very desirable, the extension of the RSBY scheme will 
not be without challenges. Mostly, the financial feasibility of such coverage is a 
critical issue, since it would push premiums much above the premiums 
currently charged by insurance companies for the RSBY scheme. The 
capability of the government of financing such an ambitious national insurance 
plan scheme remains very doubtable, given the current difficulties in funding 
the basic inpatient care coverage and in a country where more than 90 per cent 
of the population is employed in the informal sector and where the tax system 
is wracked by tax evasion and corruption. Furthermore, the monitoring of the 
new scheme would be much more difficult than for the hospitalization costs, 
given the huge amount of expected use of outpatient care and the difficulty in 
identifying moral hazards, as compared to the more evident critical health 
status connected to a hospitalization. Nevertheless, despite all challenges, the 
RSBY scheme represents the first very relevant (though ambitious) attempt of 
the Indian government to solve the problem of inequality in access to health 
care within the country. Two experts of the German Health Practice Collection 
(GHPC) qualify the RSBY scheme as a “good or promising practice”, 
“primarily because of the staggering scale RSBY has achieved in a short period 
                                                 
4 RSBY is experimenting the extension of coverage to outpatient care (including consultation fees and 
drugs), complementing the existing inpatient benefits. Pilot implementations are being conducted since 
2011 in collaboration with the ILO and the ICICI Foundation for Inclusive Growth. GIZ has also 
supported these experiments as knowledge partner. Extending the scheme to the coverage of drugs 
costs could also lower the price and increase the availability of drugs in medical facilities, especially by 
supporting the distribution of (cheaper) generic drugs (GoI, n.d.). 
Furthermore, since 2011 the RSBY national health insurance scheme has also been extended beyond 
BPL to unorganized sectors such as construction workers, domestic workers and street vendors (Sen, 
2011).  
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of time and the innovative model India has chosen for its health insurance” and 
conclude that the RSBY model is “not necessarily better, but certainly a model 
to watch” (GIZ, 2011). 
Another approach for remedying to the unequitable distribution of access to 
health care are the several micro health insurance (MHI) schemes that have 
been implemented all around the country. Micro insurance (MI) is defined as 
“a mechanism to protect poor people against risk (accident, illness, death in the 
family, natural disasters, etc.) in exchange for insurance premium payments 
tailored to their needs, income and level of risk” (ILO, n.d.). MI operates with 
the same risk pooling mechanism as conventional insurance, but benefits, 
premiums and distributional mechanisms are especially designed to meet poor 
people´s needs. The term “micro” denotes, on one side, the features of the 
products (less expensive but also less comprehensive than standard insurance 
products) but also, on the other side, the very defined target clients of such 
schemes, which are normally members of a specific community (or small 
cluster of communities) being offered a tailored insurance product (through a 
bottom-up approach) especially meeting the specific needs of that certain 
community. Micro health insurance (MHI), in particular, provides the financing 
for essential health care services to individuals and families who are unable to 
afford or excluded from formal health insurance schemes and/or are not 
protected by social insurance schemes in their home country. MHI is currently 
implemented through several different models and provided by a variety of 
different entities (government, private insurers, NGOs, etc.). MHI is also the 
most diffused and requested type of MI in the globe (Roth et al., 2007). A 
particularly poor-oriented scheme is the community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) scheme, which is spreading all around India. CBHI is defined as “any 
not-for-profit insurance scheme aimed primarily at the informal sector and 
formed on the basis of a collective pooling of health risks, and in which the 
members participate in its management” (Devadasan et al., 2006). Such 
schemes use a pure bottom-up implementation model that allows tailoring 
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insurance plans to low-income people´s priorities and financial capabilities, by 
involving the target clients in the development of the products and in the 
management and supervision of the scheme. Such schemes have shown to be 
effective for reaching equality (Dror et al., 2006), improving access to health 
care (Dror et al., 2005) and providing financial protection (Ranson, 2002; Dror 
et al., 2009) to low-income groups in India. However, the outreach and 
financial sustainability of such schemes is still challenged. The small pooling 
of resources of low-income clients and the homogeneous distribution of risks 
don´t allow a financially sustainable risk-sharing mechanism. Furthermore, the 
Indian government hasn´t yet taken any position concerning the legal 
recognition of such schemes, which are currently operating in a legal vacuum. 
Because not officially registered, CBHI schemes do not have to comply with 
insurers regulations, such as minimum capital requirements, but are not 
allowed to get re-insurance, which would allow to protect the scheme from 
systemic risks (like epidemics) and other high-cost risks. 
Commercial insurers are also slowing entering the low-income insurance 
market and are currently the major global providers of MI products, showing a 
growing interest in this new market segment. The Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (IRDA) promotes the role of commercial insurers for 
creating inclusive insurance services in India and has introduced “social and 
rural obligations”, which define the minimum amount of policies within their 
portfolio that insurers are expected to distribute to the rural and social sector. 
Given their capital reserves and the technical know-how, private insurers have 
the potential to reach massification of micro insurance products. The 
inexperience with this new market and the lack of insurance-relevant data on 
the new clients represent a big challenge for insurers starting MI activities. 
Some shortcomings can be overcome through the so-called “partner-agent” 
implementation model, which implies a collaboration of commercial insurers 
(partner) with local organizations (agent), mostly NGOs or micro finance 
institutions (MFIs). This model is also officially recognized and supported by 
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the IRDA. However, the low quality of the health infrastructure all around the 
country highly reduces the attractiveness of the insurance products. 
The present thesis analyzes how ill-health affects developing communities in 
rural India and the way health insurance products can be developed and tailored 
to low-income individuals´ needs and limited financial possibilities. A 
community-based health insurance scheme implemented in three sites in two 
rural regions in northern India is used as case study for showing how bottom-
up participatory methods can be applied in developing communities for the 
development of customized health insurance products, allowing even illiterate 
and inexperienced individuals to manifest their preferences for health insurance 
plans. This scheme is particularly developed around Self-Help Groups (SHGs), 
a well-established informal microcredit system involving women from 
developing communities. Around 70 per cent of the households involved in the 
scheme were affiliated to a SHG through at least one family member, while the 
remaining 30 percent is obtained as a random sample from the non-SHG 
population. Targeting SHGs offers the advantage of working with already 
established and consolidated structures within the communities. Furthermore, 
the IRDA favors the use of selected intermediaries, including SHGs, for the 
implementation of MI in India.  
Next to community-based health insurance schemes, the role of commercial 
insurers in creating an inclusive insurance system for the low-income groups in 
India will be evaluated, given the growing relevance these actors are gaining 
within MI activities. Furthermore, the insurance authority promotes the role of 
the private sector for extending insurance services to the poor. In particular, the 
challenges for the effectiveness of MI implementation by private insurers will 
be identified and the efficiency of different distribution models analyzed 
(including a case study analysis), in order to understand the future prospects for 
the incorporation of low-income clients in the commercial insurance system. 
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  
The second chapter entitled „Economic consequences of ill-health for 
households in northern rural India”5 describes the relative importance of ill-
health compared to other adverse events, the conduits through which ill-health 
affects household welfare and the coping strategies used to finance these 
expenses. Cross-sectional data are used from a survey conducted with 5241 
households in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar in 2010 that includes a household 
shocks module and detailed information about health care use and spending. 
Results show that health related adverse events are the second most common 
adverse events (34%), after natural disasters (51%). Crop and livestock 
diseases and weddings affect each about 8% of households. Only a fourth of 
households report to have recovered from illness and/or death in the family (by 
the time of the survey). Most of the financial risk of ill health is related to 
health care expenditures, but indirect costs are not negligible. Close to half of 
health expenditures are made for chronic conditions. Households try to cope 
with health-related expenditures mostly by dissaving, borrowing and selling 
assets. Few households report having to reduce (food) consumption in response 
to ill-health. We conclude that ill-health events pose a substantial threat to 
household welfare in rural India. While most households seem to be able to 
smooth consumption in the short term, coping strategies like selling assets and 
borrowing from moneylenders are likely to have severe long-term 
consequences. As the use of health care appears to be related to high out-of-
pocket spending, introducing health insurance may contribute significantly to 
                                                 
5 This chapter is based on a joint work of the author of this thesis, Ellen Van de Poel (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam), Pradeep Panda (Micro Insurance Academy) and Frans Rutten (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam). The relative contribution of each co-author to this study is as follows: Pradeep 
Panda managed the data collection. I and Ellen Van de Poel conceptualized the study, conducted the 
analyses and wrote the text of the study. Pradeep Panda and Frans Rutten provided overall guidance, 
and critically reviewed the study.  
The results of this study have been presented at the Research Seminar of the Institute of Health Policy 
and Management (Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2010), at the 8th World 
Congress on Health Economics (Toronto, Canada, 2011), at the Health System Reform in Asia 
Conference (Hong Kong, 2011) and at the Research Conference on Microinsurance (Twente, The 
Netherlands, 2012). 
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alleviate financial hardship of families in rural India. However, since most of 
health-related costs in the communities appear to derive from chronic 
conditions, the sustainability of community-based health insurance schemes is 
very challenged, since it is necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of risk 
pooling, in order to be able to finance ill-conditions which requires continuous 
and long-term medical care within the community scheme.  
 
The third chapter entitled „Group health insurance choices in rural India“6 
aims at offering knowledge of communities´ preferences for health insurance 
packages in rural India and to show how the development of health insurance 
products can be aligned with low-income communities´ expectations. We use 
data from individual and group choice sessions (collected in 2009-2010) 
organized within three random-control trials for implementing community-
based health insurance in rural India. A revised version of the CHAT 
(Choosing Health plans All Together) decision tool was used to elicit 
individual and group preferences. CHAT is a game-like tool presenting 
different health insurance options within a limited budget and is used to 
facilitate group discussion. This tool allows even illiterate individuals, with no 
or little previous experience with insurance, to choose their preferred insurance 
plan (the tool will be explained in details in Chapter 3). The SHGs-members 
from the target communities were actively involved in the choice of the 
insurance packages that would be thereafter offered within the community-
based health insurance program. In general, this study showed that members of 
the targeted developing communities possess the ability of thinking in terms of 
“value for money” and trading in terms of number of benefits, coverage and 
premium. As foreseeable in low-income settings, the price was an important 
factor influencing the choice of packages in all trials. Peer influence among 
                                                 
6 The contents of this chapter are based on a study conceptualized by me in collaboration with the 
project members Ralf Radermacher (Micro Insurance Academy e.V.), Pradeep Panda (Micro Insurance 
Academy) and Christina May (Cologne University). The analysis and the writing of the study have 
been entirely conducted by me. I presented the results of this study at the Research Conference on 
Microinsurance (Twente, The Netherlands, 2012). 
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SHG members also played an important role in decisions (especially for less 
educated members), as well as solidarity with less-wealthy members. 
Possessing RSBY social insurance coverage, instead, was not found to 
influence the decision-making particularly, but this could depend on the fact 
that, at the time the CHAT sessions have been run, the RSBY scheme was still 
in the early stages of roll out in the regions targeted by the CBHI project. The 
CHAT process was positively received by the participants. Group sessions 
succeeded in stimulating discussions and deliberations. We also find some 
correlation between the level of responsiveness of the final community package 
(obtained from the choices made during the CHAT processes) to prospect 
clients´ perceived priorities (manifested mostly through the individual choices) 
and the willingness to enroll in the CBHI scheme.  
The information gained through the CHAT sessions is relevant for the 
development of insurance schemes that are more aligned with low-income 
people´s needs and expectations in developing communities.  
 
The fourth chapter is entitled “Insurance for the poor in India: The role of 
private insurers in the low-income market”7 and analyzes the challenges and 
prospects for commercial MI practices in India, in particular focusing on micro 
health insurance products. This study aims at identifying the role private 
insurers play for the development of inclusive insurance services for the low-
income segment of the population. In particular, the factors influencing 
insurers´ commitment toward MI will be analyzed, considering business ethical 
attitudes and the gains and risks for insurers entering the MI market. Findings 
show that the commitment of most of the insurers to MI is strictly connected to 
the need to comply with the rural and social sector obligations imposed by the 
insurance authority in India. Until recently, the selling of contracts to the social 
                                                 
7 The contents of this chapter are based on a study entirely conceptualized and executed by myself.  
I presented the results of this study at the Regionalsitzung des Promotionskollegs Soziale 
Marktwirschaft - „Kulturelle Diversität und Ordnungspolitik“ der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 
(University of Siegen, Germany, 2014). 
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and rural groups was done on a “just achieve targets” approach, showing little 
business interest for the low-income market. This is probably also connected to 
the incapability of writing MI on a profitable basis. The situation, however, is 
likely to change in the near future, since insurers are not looking anymore at 
the relationship between corporate success and social welfare as a zero sum 
game. The rural and social obligations have served to give impulse to insurers 
to extend their portfolio to the low-income market. Insurers have started to see 
a business case in MI and are more willing to invest in innovation. Instead, 
insurers´ commitment to CSR does not seem to be a solution for the creation of 
inclusive insurance services in India, since the majority of insurers keep linking 
CSR to philanthropic activities, thus distinguishing it from their core business 
activities. Among the different MI implementation models, the partner-agent 
model has the potential to both effectively serve the low-income clientele and 
to be the most cost-efficient model. 
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2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ILL-HEALTH 
FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN NORTHERN RURAL 
INDIA 
 
2.1 Background  
In India, as in many developing countries, the bulk of health care expenditures is 
financed through out-of-pocket payments (OOP) made at the point of use (World 
Bank, 2011). Especially in poorer states, including Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (two of 
the poorest rural states) there is an evident gap between the current public health 
spending and the amount necessary to offer adequate health services, putting in 
evidence a deep inter-state inequality in the quality of health care provided at the 
public level. The central government and several state governments have tried to 
remedy through several initiatives, as for example by developing own health 
insurance schemes. However, public spending for health remains very low all around 
the country. 
In the absence of appropriate pre-financing mechanisms such as health insurance, 
households confronted with ill-health are exposed to catastrophic expenditures or 
decide to forego essential medical treatment altogether. Illness is found to be one of 
the main reasons for falling into poverty in India (Krishna, 2004; Van Doorslaer et al., 
2006). Ill-health can have economic implications through multiple channels. Health 
care use involves both direct costs for doctor fees, tests and drugs, but also indirect 
costs, including transportation and foregone earnings for patients and their family 
members. While the latter costs are often not explicitly investigated, they have been 
shown to be not negligible (Ramaiah et al., 1998; Babu et al., 2002; McIntyre et al., 
2006; Dror et al., 2008). Households without formal insurance often resort to 
alternative coping strategies, such as borrowing and selling assets, to finance health-
related expenditures (Sauerborn et al., 1996; Pal, 2002; Peters et al., 2002; Flores et 
al., 2008; Binnendijk et al., 2011; Shahrawat et al., 2011). While health payments 
financed through these strategies are not at the expense of current consumption, they 
do entail long-term sacrifices.  
While some papers have documented the degree of catastrophic spending and 
impoverishment related to ill-health (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Flores et al., 2008; 
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Shahrawat et al., 2011; Binnendijk et al., 2011) there is – to the best of our knowledge 
– no evidence on the relative importance of ill-health as compared to other adverse 
events8 and very limited evidence on the conduits through which ill-health affects 
households’ living standards in India (Dror et al., 2008; Binnendijk et al., 2011; 
Flores et al., 2008). This study adds to the existing literature by comparing health 
shocks with other adverse events in terms of prevalence, cost, severity and recovery in 
rural India. Furthermore, this study aims at shedding light on the way ill-health affects 
households´ welfare in the target communities, by identifying the types of health-
related expenditures that place the largest economic burden on households and by 
analyzing the strategies households employ to finance these expenditures and their 
long term consequences. As most of the households´ economic risk deriving from ill-
health appears to be related to OOP spending, authors make policy recommendations 
for alleviating economic hardship of families in rural India. 
2.2 Methods 
The data derive from a randomized controlled trial of Community-based Health 
Insurance (CBHI) in three sites in rural India, precisely Kanpur Dehat and Pratapgarh 
districts in Uttar Pradesh, and Vaishali district in Bihar.9 The CBHI schemes are 
targeted at SHGs, which form a well-established informal micro-credit system 
throughout most of India (Reddy et al., 2005).  A SHG typically consists of 12-15 
women who pool resources and jointly decide on loans.10 Baseline household data 
have been collected in 2010 for 5214 households (1751, 1541 and 1922 households in 
Kanpur Dehat, Pratapgarh and Vaishali respectively), representing 29880 
individuals.11 Data were collected from the entire population of households affiliated 
with SHGs (through at least one member), and from a random sample of the non-SHG 
population in each of the three sites. Sample weights have been constructed to adjust 
                                                 
8 Tesliuc and Lindert (2002); Kenjiro (2005); Dercon and Hoddinott (2005); Heltberg and Lund (2009); 
Wagstaff and Lindelow (2013) provide evidence for other countries. Ill-health appears to be one (in 
some cases the most) prevalent and costly shock in the studied countries, respectively Guatemala, 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Laos. 
9 More information on the project and the procedure of random sampling can be found in Doyle et al. 
(2011). 
10 Some SHGs grouped themselves into SHGs Federations, which are formal institutions (registered as 
societies) and show several benefits, such as strong political influence, development of economies of 
scale and access to greater capital (Wilson et al., 2006; Deshmukh et al., 2003). 
11 Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are amongst India’s most populated, poorest and least urbanized states, and 
in so far as SHG households are typically poorer and less educated than the general population, our 
analysis focuses on a relatively marginalized population in rural India (Panda et al., 2013). 
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for the oversampling of SHG-related households. Ethical clearance was obtained from 
the ethics committee of the University of Cologne, Germany, before the start of the 
study. 
The survey contains a retrospective household shocks module, which asks households 
about different kinds of “adverse events” that they have been confronted with in the 
year preceding the survey (natural disaster, storage/crop/livestock disease, job loss, 
drop in sale price of agricultural products, increase in agricultural input price, conflict, 
wedding, illness or death), how these affected them and how they coped with them. 
Notwithstanding that such retrospective tools can suffer from reporting bias, they 
provide useful information on the relevance and consequences of various threats to 
household welfare in the absence of panel data. However, such tools have not often 
been used in this context (Wagstaff et al., 2013). As some of the reported threats, such 
as weddings, obviously do not come unexpectedly, we prefer referring to adverse 
events as opposed to “shocks” in the remainder. 
Since the baseline data were also used as input for the calculation of insurance 
premiums (for the CBHI scheme), they contain many details on ill-health conditions, 
health care seeking behavior, costs and financing of health care12. For each illness 
episode (or pregnancy) of each household member (30 days recall for outpatient care 
and 12 months recall for inpatient care), we know symptoms, volume, location and 
detailed costs of health care use and financing mechanisms. Annual hospitalization 
costs have been divided by 12 to be comparable to other monthly health expenditures. 
Health care spending can be categorized along two dimensions: (i) the type of care 
(outpatient for chronic/acute conditions, inpatient care and maternity care), and (ii) 
the type of expenditures (fees, additional costs for drugs and tests, indirect costs 
related to travel and food of the patient and accompanying persons and productivity 
loss of the patient and/or accompanying persons). It should be noted that chronic 
conditions in this context relate to conditions that are reported to have been ongoing 
for 30 days or more, and can therefore also include more acute conditions that are not 
appropriately treated and therefore persistent. Furthermore, costs of chronic diseases 
are likely to be underestimated, since we only possess in-depth cost information for 
                                                 
12 Concerning the financing mechanisms, it must be noted that –unfortunately –the retrospective shocks 
tool and the health care survey section differ quite substantially in terms of the sequencing and 
alternative coping responses provided and, perhaps most importantly, the type of health events 
concerned (the shocks section includes deaths within the household among the health shocks).  
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the last visit, while 31% of respondents reported to have received medical help more 
than once during the last month.  
We have also tried to investigate heterogeneity of results across the type of ill-health 
condition (communicable versus non-communicable), using a classification based on 
symptoms (obtained through the ICD10 codes developed by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2010).  
Regarding household characteristics, we construct variables related to demographics 
(the proportion of elderly over 65 years old, of children under the age of 13 and of 
women between 13 and 49 years old), indicator variables for SHG membership, 
scheduled caste/tribe status, Hindu religion and location. We hypothesize that, next to 
economic characteristics, social characteristics, such as scheduled caste/tribe status 
and religion, are important cultural indicators in these contexts and can influence the 
way ill-health events are correlated with households´ economic status. Desai and 
Dubey (2011) show how caste affiliation determines households’ economic situation, 
community participation and access to education and health care. Several other 
studies also refer to caste status and/or religion, next to welfare status, as factors 
influencing health care access and financing (Sugathan et al., 2001; Pal, 2002; 
Flores et al., 2008; Binnendijk et al., 2011).  
Household socioeconomic status (SES) is measured using a principal component 
score, obtained from HHs´ assets ownership and dwelling characteristics (Filmer et 
al., 2001), which is used to divide the population in wealth thirds. We prefer this to 
household spending data, as it is less likely to be affected by ill-health and 
consumption of health care. As households reported to mostly sell agricultural items 
to finance health expenditures, we have excluded these items from the principal 
component analysis. Socioeconomic inequalities (in incidence of household shocks) 
are measured by a corrected concentration index (CI) for binary outcomes, as 
suggested by Erreygers (2009).13 A CI is derived from a concentration curve which 
plots cumulative shares of the variable of interest ‘y’ against cumulative shares of the 
population ranked by socioeconomic status. The CI lies between -1 and +1, with 
                                                 
13 Recently, Erreygers (2009) has shown that the standard concentration index, when applied to 
bounded indicators (such as binary variables) does not satisfy the mirror condition and suggested a 
correction. 
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greater values indicating greater SES inequality. Positive values indicate that “y” is 
more concentrated among the wealthier households and vice versa. 
Probit models are used to investigate determinants of coping strategies and the choice 
of moneylender among those households that borrow in response to ill-health. 
 
2.3 Results  
2.3.1 Household shocks module 
The communities in the three different sites appeared quite homogeneous concerning 
most of the socio-economic characteristics and the prevalence and distribution of ill-
health events (Table 2.1). The majority of households were of Hindu religion and 
belonged to scheduled castes/tribes or other backward castes. Average per capita 
expenditures was higher in Kanpur Dehat, but a larger share of households fell in the 
upper wealth quintile in Pratapgarh. In the latter site, households appeared to suffer 
more from chronic illnesses, while acute illness episodes were more common in the 
former. Average self-reported household size varied from three in Vaishali to six in 
Kanpur Dehat. A household was usually composed of the head of the house (in the 
majority of cases the male adult member), his spouse, their children and the parents of 
the male component. Around 20% of households were headed by women, generally 
widows. 
Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics from the retrospective shock module. Health- 
related adverse events were the second most common adverse events (34%), after 
natural disasters (51%). Crop and livestock disease and weddings each affected about 
8% of households; all other events were infrequent (and therefore not discussed 
hereafter).14  
                                                 
14 To investigate the idiosyncrasy of events, linear regressions were estimated of the specific shock 
indicator on a set of village dummies. In general, all shocks appear quite idiosyncratic, with village 
effects never explaining more than 7% of the variation. Natural disasters are typically more 
concentrated within villages.  
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Table 2.1 - Summary statistics on the household level for the pooled sample and across sites. 
Notes: Standard deviations between brackets for continuous outcomes. 
Variables 
Pooled 
sample 
Pratapgarh Kanpur 
Dehat 
Vaishali 
Number of households 5215 1542 1751 1922 
Household size 4.21 (4.37) 4.52 (4.45) 6.03 (4.77) 3.31 (4.00)
Lower wealth third 0.33 0.31 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47)
Middle wealth third 0.33 0.28 (0.45) 0.35 (0.48) 0.29 (0.45)
Upper wealth third 0.33 0.41 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 0.38 (0.49)
Per capita expenditures (in INR)  1128 (665) 1793 (1653) 1205 (947)
Share of health spending on total HH spending 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.20 
Number of chronic illnesses (in last 30 days) 0.92 (0.96) 1.29 (1.05) 0.76 (0.86) 0.76 (0.88)
Number of acute illness episodes (in last 30 days) 1.10 (1.06) 1.08 (1.11) 1.24 (1.12) 0.98 (0.95)
Number of hospitalizations (in last 12 months) 0.16 (0.42) 0.14 (0.38) 0.16 (0.43) 0.19 (0.44)
Number of pregnancies (in last 12 months) 0.17 (0.40) 0.15 (0.39) 0.18 (0.40) 0.18 (0.41)
Proportion of children 0.31 (0.23) 0.29 (0.21) 0.27 (0.22) 0.37 (0.23)
Proportion of elderly 0.04 (0.12) 0.04 (0.12) 0.04 (0.13) 0.03 (0.11)
Proportion of women at reproductive age 0.27 (0.16) 0.31 (0.17) 0.27 (0.16) 0.28 (0.16)
Caste of household head (1/0)     
Scheduled caste/tribe 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.31 
Other backward caste 0.56 0.48 0.55 0.63 
General caste 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.06 
Religion of household head (1/0)     
Hindu 0.90 0.86 0.92 0.92 
Muslim 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.07 
Other 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Affiliated to a Self-help Group (1/0) 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 
 
Adverse health events were equally distributed across socioeconomic status 
(insignificant CI in Table 2.2), which is likely to be related to the rather little variation 
in SES in the sample. This is true for all other events, except for natural disasters that 
appeared more likely to hit better-off households. The pro-rich concentration of 
natural disasters might derive from the fact that households need to own sufficient 
land in order to be affected by a natural disaster. Crop/livestock diseases might be 
more related to the quality of inputs, and therefore less concentrated with high SES. 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2.2 show average and expected costs associated 
with different adverse events. Ill-health and/or deaths costed about 6 times household 
monthly food spending. Weddings appeared to be most costly15, followed by natural 
disasters, but these switched rankings when considering their expected costs. Even if 
some discrepancies emerged in the ranking of the different adverse events when 
considering self-reported costs and severity, the latter confirms that health-related 
                                                 
15 Bloch and Rao (2002) find that dowries amount to six times average incomes among pottery families 
in South Karnataka. 
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events were perceived as being less severe than weddings (58%) and natural disasters 
(53%). Only a fourth of households reported to have recovered from illness and/or 
death in the family (by the time of the survey). Slightly fewer households recovered 
from natural disasters (21%), and very few households were able to recover from 
weddings (12%).  
 
Table 2.2 - Descriptive statistics of household shocks. 
Notes: Probability of shock occurring, concentration index and standard error, average and expected 
cost (in multiples of household monthly food spending), perceived severity and recovery. 
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multiples of monthly 
food expenditures 
Illness or death 0.338 0.003 0.022 5.79 1.955 0.367 0.246 
Natural disaster 0.511 0.198 0.042 17.1 8.737 0.534 0.212 
Crop, livestock disease 0.076 0.01 0.015 5.445 0.413 0.374 0.304 
Job loss/no salary 0.023 -0.025 0.01 7.145 0.163 0.329 0.457 
Fall in sale price 0.023 0.011 0.007 6.111 0.142 0.501 0.354 
Rise input price 0.013 0.006 0.005 13.833 0.178 0.254 0.205 
Conflict 0.013 0.009 0.004 5.167 0.065 0.253 0.084 
Wedding 0.076 0.013 0.013 41.203 3.114 0.582 0.12 
 
Generally, spending savings and working more hours were reported as the most 
relevant coping strategies, followed by borrowing money from a moneylender (Figure 
2.1). Reducing food consumptions was only reported by a minority of households, 
suggesting that – at least in the short run – most households were able to smooth 
consumption. 
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Figure 2.1 - Distribution of the most dominant coping strategies for various adverse events. 
Notes: Bars represent the proportion of households confronted with a specific shock that have used a 
specific coping strategy. 
 
 
Table 2.3 provides some further insight into the determinants of the use of the 
different coping strategies by households hit by adverse events. Disease and/or death 
and weddings were more likely to lead households to borrow from a moneylender 
(marginal effects of 0.061 and 0.202 respectively) than natural disasters. Interestingly, 
the only threat that was more likely than natural disaster to lead to a reduction in food 
consumption was crop/livestock disease. Results also illustrated that especially poorer 
households were more likely to work more (7 percentage points), borrow from 
moneylenders (13 percentage points) and reduce food expenditures (6 percentage 
points) as compared to those in the upper wealth third. 
Having described the relative importance of various adverse events threatening 
household welfare and the main coping strategies employed to deal with these events, 
the next section provides a more in-depth analysis of the various costs households 
have to deal with in case of ill-health. 
 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
natural disaster
crop, livestock disease
job loss/no salary
fall in sale price
rise input price
conflict
wedding
illness or death
do nothing spend savings use insurance
sell assets work more send children away
send children to work help from family & friends borrow from money lender
borrow from bank/SHG religious help help from NGO
buy less food reduce non-food expenses
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Table 2.3 - Determinants of coping strategies for various household shocks (marginal effects from probit regression). 
Notes: Data on shocks level. Coping strategies are not mutually exclusive. Results are only shown for coping strategies with a baseline probability higher than 0.05. Natural 
disasters are the omitted shocks category. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering of observations on household level. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. 
 
  
Do 
nothing 
Spend 
savings 
Sell 
animals/land/ 
assets 
Work 
more 
hours 
Send 
children 
to work 
Assistance 
from 
relatives 
Borrow 
from 
money 
lender 
Borrow 
from 
bank/SHG 
Buy less 
food 
Reduce 
non-food 
expenses 
Proportion elderly 0.06 0.08 0.012 -0.09 -0.028 -0.043 0.06 -0.049 -0.074 -0.033 
Proportion children -0.022 0.077 -0.039 -0.025 -0.064** 0.048 0.164** -0.016 0.035 -0.009 
Proportion reproductive age -0.052 0.071 -0.006 0.198* -0.028 0.08 0.06 -0.008 -0.053 -0.104 
Scheduled caste/tribe -0.013 -0.041 -0.003 -0.04 -0.003 0.001 0.026 0.015 -0.041 -0.028 
Hindu 0.005 0.029 -0.002 0.021 -0.024 -0.045 0.027 0.036* 0.071 0.059 
SHG -0.013 -0.045* 0.002 -0.02 0.01 0.009 0.005 0.040** -0.014 -0.003 
Pratapgarh 0.092** 0.192** -0.055** -0.023 0.004 0.058* -0.197** -0.001 -0.108** -0.133** 
Vaishali -0.128** 0.164** -0.032* -0.173** -0.054** -0.037 0.324** -0.003 0.021 0.147** 
Middle wealth third 0.045** 0.009 0.024 -0.057 0.001 -0.054** -0.081** 0.025 -0.025 -0.015 
Upper wealth third 0.021 0.105** 0.050** -0.069* -0.012 -0.034 -0.131** 0.049** -0.057* -0.034 
Crop, livestock disease 0.111** -0.113** 0.008 -0.07 0.018 -0.024 -0.03 -0.003 -0.145** -0.02 
Illness or death -0.026 -0.042 0.013 -0.049 0.014 0.028 0.061* -0.025* -0.014 0.025 
Job loss/no salary -0.009 -0.189** -0.004 -0.127 0.057 0.037 -0.046 0.096** 0.139* -0.055 
Fall in sale price -0.015 -0.144* -0.008 0.027 0.059 0.014 0.003 -0.005 0.233** -0.243** 
Rise input price -0.034 -0.023 -0.009 0.087 -0.028* -0.034 0.002 0.021 0.169 -0.232* 
Conflict -0.064** 0.275** -0.050** 0.279** -0.092** -0.214** -0.051** 0.295** -0.230* 
Wedding -0.043* -0.04 0.031 -0.03 0.039* 0.137** 0.202** -0.005 -0.042 -0.077 
Baseline probability 0.120 0.430 0.069 0.551 0.050 0.135 0.322 0.067 0.302 0.486 
Observations 5426 5426 5426 5426 5364 5426 5426 5426 5426 5426 
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2.3.2 Household health care-related expenditures 
2.3.2.1 Costs composition 
Table 2.4 shows the prevalence and composition of the several types of monthly 
household health-related expenditures. 
Among those households that have incurred health expenditures, spending on 
outpatient care for acute and chronic diseases was quite common (58% and 49% of 
households respectively), while spending on hospitalization and maternity care was 
more rare (15% and 12% households respectively). Note that these shares, presented 
in the first column, add up to 134%, which indicates that quite some households 
incurred more than one type of health expenditures. In particular, around 30% of 
households incurred health expenditures for outpatient care for both chronic and acute 
conditions.  
Outpatient care for chronic and acute conditions each took up about 43% of total 
household health spending, while hospitalizations and maternity care represented 
about 9% and 5% of the health care budget respectively. Direct costs have been 
classified into ´medical fees´ and ´medicines and laboratory costs´, while indirect 
costs have been classified into ´transportation and food costs (for patient and 
caregiver)´ and `productivity losses (based on self-reported information) for the 
patient and caregiver´. The bulk of expenditures on care for chronic diseases (74%) 
were related to additional medical services, mostly drugs. Also for outpatient 
spending on acute conditions about half of the costs were related to drugs and tests, 
while only a third was spent on doctor fees. Concerning hospitalizations, the medical 
fees were much more important (67%), while medicines and test costs represented 
13% of total costs. The shares of indirect costs (transportation and food, as well as the 
loss of productivity) were highest for maternity care (61% and 23% respectively), 
which is likely to be related to the relatively low user fees associated with maternity 
care (mostly for free in public facilities). The shares of non-medical costs were about 
10% each for outpatient care and hospitalizations.  
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Table 2.4 - Distribution of households’ health-related expenditures across the type of care
Notes: Composition of monthly average household health expenditures (in INR). We include interests that had to be paid on loans taken to finance health care 
related expenditures in the productivity losses. On average, these represent 8.5% of foregone earnings. 
ªamong those households reporting any kind of health expenditures bshare of total household health expenditures of the specific type of care ᶜUsing the 2010 
exchange rate. 
 
  Proportion of householdsª 
Proportion of 
household 
health 
spendinga 
Direct costsb Indirect costsb 
Medical 
fees 
Medicines and 
laboratory 
Transportation and 
food costs for patient 
and caregiver 
Productivity 
losses for patient 
and caregiver 
Outpatient care for chronic diseases 49% 43.9% 
Average Proportion of total costs (%) 12% 74% 9% 5% 
Average spending (INR) 118 1220 159 100 
Average spending in (USD) ͨ   (2.66) (27.50) (3.58) (2.25) 
Standard deviation  257 2825 630 435 
Outpatient care for acute conditions  58% 42.7% 
Average Proportion of total costs (%) 33% 51% 9% 8% 
Average spending (INR) 112 338 67 66 
Average spending (in USD) ͨ   (2.52) (7.62) (1.51) (1.49) 
Standard deviation 208 1404 275 237 
Hospitalization  15% 8.8% 
Average Proportion of total costs (%) 67% 13% 12% 8% 
Average spending (INR) 978 212 158 110 
Average spending (in USD) ͨ   (22.05) (4.78) (5.82) (2.48) 
Standard deviation  1208 559 320 229 
Maternity care  12% 4.6% 
Average Proportion of total costs (%) 15% 2% 61% 23% 
Average spending (INR) 56 2 96 42 
Average spending (in USD) ͨ   (1.26) (0.05) (2.16) (0.95) 
Standard deviation 198 9 179 137 
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Loss of productivity represented a rather small proportion of the costs associated with 
outpatient care for chronic (5%) and acute (8%) conditions and for hospitalizations 
(8%).  
We have also investigated heterogeneity of results across the types of ill-health 
conditions. Reported symptoms of both acute and chronic conditions were categorized 
into communicable and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) using ICD10 codes 
developed by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2010). Among the 63% of 
illness episodes which we were able to classify we found a higher prevalence of non-
communicable diseases (85%) than communicable diseases (15%). Households´ 
average monthly costs related to non-communicable diseases (Rs. 1573) were higher 
than those related to communicable diseases (Rs. 1261). In particular, additional 
medical costs for NCDs were the largest cost component (Rs. 923 per household per 
month). These results might suggest a growing (economic) burden of NCDs in rural 
India.  
2.3.2.2 Coping with health expenditures 
Having established the various costs associated with ill-health, we now want to 
investigate how households finance these costs in order to better understand the 
potential long-term consequences. Figure 2.2 shows the relative importance of 
different coping strategies for different types of care and reveals that, particularly for 
hospitalizations, households resort to a combination of multiple financing 
mechanisms. Remarkably, over 80% of households that have been confronted with a 
hospitalization in the past year have borrowed money to cope with these expenditures. 
Other types of health care expenditures were typically financed through savings and 
loans and to a lesser extent by selling assets and cutting/delaying payments. Those 
households that did sell assets mostly sold agricultural equipment and grain (58% of 
total cases), followed by household items (16%), livestock (11%) and jewelry (9%). 
Households that reported to cut back on spending mostly did this for food-related 
spending (68%). 
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Figure 2.2 - Relative importance of coping strategies for financing health-related expenditures by 
type of care.  
Notes: Bars represent the proportion of households confronted with a specific type of health care use 
that have used a specific coping strategy. Note that households can employ more than one coping 
strategy. 
 
Confirming earlier results, we find that cutting or delaying payments was only 
reported by a minority of households and most often in relation to hospitalizations 
(21.10%). Comparing average amounts obtained through each of the coping strategies 
revealed that selling assets on average contributed Rs. 1298, followed by borrowing 
and delaying payments (both Rs. 1064), receiving money (Rs. 962) and using savings 
(Rs. 533).  
Table 2.5 explores the factors correlated with various financing mechanisms – much 
like in Table 2.3 but with data shaped on illness level rather than on shocks level. 
Households appeared more likely to need alternative financing sources for inpatient 
care, which is probably related to the fact that hospitalizations come quite unexpected 
and are generally more expensive. A hospitalization increased the probability of 
having to borrow by 0.36 percentage points, which is a dramatic effect, considering 
the baseline probability of 0.39. Hospitalizations were also more likely to lead to a 
reduction in consumption (marginal effect of 0.1). As expected, wealthier households 
were more likely to use savings and less likely to borrow money to finance health-
related costs, while households affiliated to SHGs were slightly more likely to borrow 
money, probably due to their easier access to credit from the micro-credit network. 
The geographical indicators (Pratapgahr and Vaishali) remained very significant, even 
after controlling for all other covariates, indicating that there were indeed substantial 
differences in the ways people cope with health care expenditures across locations. 
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Households in Pratapgarh were, for example, more likely to rely on their savings and 
on the support of their relatives for covering health-related expenditures and less 
likely to borrow from moneylenders, sell assets or reduce food and non-food 
expenditures. This is likely to be related to their higher SES. 
Table 2.5 - Determinants of coping strategies for various types of health care. 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regression. Data on illness level. Coping strategies are not 
mutually exclusive. Maternity care is the omitted health care use category. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering of observations on household level. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
 
Variable 
Borrowing Spend savings 
Selling 
items 
Money from 
friends 
and relatives 
Cutting back
on spending 
or delaying 
payments 
outpatient chronic 0.013 -0.001 0.005 -0.029** 0.030 
ooutpatient acute -0.166*** 0.061* -0.013 -0.022* -0.013 
inpatient 0.360*** -0.050 0.078*** 0.012 0.100*** 
proportion elderly -0.153 -0.002 -0.002 0.015 0.009 
proportion children -0.018 -0.007 -0.002 0.035 0.037 
proportion reproductive age 0.068 0.010 -0.031 -0.023 0.045 
scheduled caste/tribe 0.015 -0.035 -0.022 0.008 -0.006 
hindu -0.019 0.012 0.006 0.003 -0.000 
SHG 0.038** -0.020 0.000 -0.003 0.012 
Pratapgarh -0.129*** 0.252*** -0.152*** -0.007 -0.092*** 
Vaishali -0.013 0.118*** -0.179*** 0.029*** 0.021 
middle wealth third -0.056* 0.040 0.028 0.028** -0.014 
upper wealth third -0.190*** 0.123*** 0.016 0.026** -0.001 
Baseline probability 0.39 0.59 0.09 0.03 0.09 
Observations 8540 8540 8540 8540 8540 
 
The welfare implications of borrowing to finance health expenditures depend to a 
large extent on the interest that has to be paid back, typically correlated with the type 
of lender. The average interest rate (on a monthly basis) among all loans taken is 
3%.16 Borrowing from moneylenders was at an average interest rate of 5% while 
SHGs only charged around 2% per month. In our data households mostly borrowed 
money from friends or neighbors (41%) and from moneylenders (26%).  
Using probit models for the choice of lender (presented in Table 2.6), we also found 
that hospitalizations were more likely to push households to borrow from 
moneylenders (as compared to maternity and outpatient care). Households affiliated 
to SHGs were much more likely to use the SHG informal credit system to finance 
                                                 
16 Households were asked “On every 100 rupees you borrowed, how many extra rupees do you pay 
back?”.  
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health costs. However, the saved amount of a SHG was usually not so capacious to 
cover repeated or very high health expenditures, which is why many SHG members 
have, nonetheless, often needed to recur to other financial sources. 
2.3.2.3 Foregone care 
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis has not considered those households that 
were not able to cover health expenditures and therefore decided to forego using 
health care. While foregoing health care saves health care costs in the short run, it can 
lead to very severe health and productivity/income losses in the long run (Sauerborn 
et al., 1996). In our data 18% of respondents reported to have foregone care (when 
needed) at least once in the 30 days preceding the survey. This is likely to be an 
underestimation, given that there may be a lot of unperceived need in this context. 
Most of the episodes of foregone care were related to chronic conditions (54%) and 
acute episodes of illness (34%). The main (reported) reasons for not seeking health 
care were the high costs of medical care (52.4%) and the inaccessible price of drugs 
and medical tests (35.9%). 
Table 2.6 - Determinants of HHs´ borrowing behavior. 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions on each of the main borrowing types. Data is at illness 
level. Regressions are only run on the sample of illnesses for which money was borrowed. Models 
account for clustering of observations on the household level and sample weights. Maternity care is the 
omitted health care use category. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Variable Relatives 
Friends, 
neighbours SHGs 
Money 
lender 
Doctor or 
hospital 
outpatient_chronic -0.049* 0.002 0.012 0.045* -0.006 
outpatient_acute -0.079*** 0.095*** -0.016 -0.029 0.026* 
inpatient 0.065** -0.177*** 0.006 0.124*** -0.122*** 
proportion elderly -0.122 0.193 0.076 -0.113 -0.074 
proportion children 0.029 -0.076 0.012 -0.017 0.037 
proportion reproductive 0.040 -0.075 0.024 -0.065 0.091** 
scheduled -0.004 -0.043 -0.017* 0.032 0.025* 
hindu -0.034 0.035 0.016 -0.025 -0.027 
SHG -0.031 -0.047* 0.077*** 0.038* -0.009 
Kanpur 0.141*** 0.260*** 0.025* -0.302*** -0.055*** 
Allahabad 0.088*** 0.291*** 0.070*** -0.417*** -0.017 
medium wealth third -0.001 0.006 -0.009 -0.002 0.010 
upper wealth third 0.018 0.027 0.005 -0.055* 0.018 
Observations 3406 3406 3406 3406 3406 
Baseline probability 0.18 0.41 0.06 0.26 0.05 
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2.4 Discussion  
As compared to other countries in South East Asia, India’s health care system is 
characterized by very high out-of-pocket payments, and consequently low financial 
protection and access to care (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Dror et al., 2008; Binnedijk 
et al., 2011). In this context, ill-health can pose severe economic threats to 
households, many of which already suffer from economic hardship. 
This paper shows that ill-health is the second most common threat to households’ 
welfare in rural Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, next to natural disasters, but while the latter 
are more likely to hit richer households, health related shocks are more equally 
distributed across socioeconomic status. The high prevalence of health shocks 
emerged in our study is in line with the results from other developing countries (Van 
Doorslaer et al., 2006; Flores et al., 2008; Vaishavi et al., 2009; Shahrawat et al., 
2011; Binnendijk et al., 2011).  
Households employ a wide variety of coping strategies, but only a quarter of them 
report to have been able to recover from the health-related expenditures. Interestingly, 
weddings are the most costly events for households, but these obviously do not come 
unexpected. 
Our analysis also highlights the importance of expenditures on chronic conditions and 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Close to half of households’ health expenditures 
are made for chronic conditions, and 74% of these are made on drugs. The ‘chronic 
emergency’ in the developing world is increasingly recognized, with NCDs expected 
to account for two-thirds of the disease burden in 2030 in middle-income countries 
(Nikolic et al., 2011) and to cause yearly economic losses in the magnitude of 4% of 
these countries’ GDP (Bloom et al., 2012). Mahal et al. (2010) use Indian national 
data for the year 2004 and estimate that India´s GDP would have been 4-10% higher 
without the existence of NCDs. Our findings on households´ health expenditures are 
consistent with those of Dror et al. (2008), studying health care costs in five resource 
poor locations in rural India and finding a ratio of direct to indirect cost of illness of 
67:30 (compared to our 66:34). The authors also confirm our findings concerning a 
high prevalence of costs for outpatient care, with acute illnesses representing 37.4% 
of total costs, followed by 32% for chronic illnesses, while hospitalizations 
represented only 11% of total costs. 
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Loss of productivity represents the smallest costs component for our target 
communities, indicating that households are able to secure household income when 
confronted with ill-health, at least in the short term. It should be noted that loss of 
productivity did not take into account the welfare losses of women not being able to 
perform domestic duties. Rugalema (1999) found that indirect costs related to women 
are higher than those for men within the same household. Furthermore, given the 
difficulties for respondents in estimating income losses (especially for agricultural 
production), it is possible that these are underestimated in our data. 
Households use a variety of strategies to cope with health-related expenditures, 
especially in the case of hospitalizations. The most important coping strategies are 
using savings, selling assets and borrowing, all of which entail important long-term 
consequences for households’ welfare. Selling productive assets represents one of the 
most corrosive coping strategy in developing countries, as it compromises the ability 
to generate income in the future (Sauerborn et al., 1996; Dercon et al., 2005). 
Moneylenders can offer seemingly attractive long-term financing with frequent 
payment of interest, leaving the borrowers unable to repay the principal amount 
borrowed.17 Furthermore, the loan is often combined with mortgage on land or other 
properties. Our findings are similar to those obtained by Binnendijk et al. (2011) from 
rural communities in Orissa, India. Their study also reports a high prevalence of using 
savings and borrowing money (especially for coping with hospitalization costs) as 
coping strategies.  
Few households report having to reduce (food) consumption in response to ill-health, 
suggesting that - at least in the short run - households are able to smooth consumption 
in the event of ill-health.  
There are some limitations to our analysis. Most importantly, the cross-sectional 
nature of the data does not allow deriving any causal relations. Second, much of the 
analysis on shocks and coping strategies rely on self-reported data which might be 
prone to reporting bias. Third, since our data are collected within a rather specific 
                                                 
17 We do not possess detailed information on the time needed by households to repay the loan. On 
average people report of repayments amounting to 7.6% of the amount borrowed. However, 
considering that the monthly interest rate amounted to 2 to 5% and that most of the people reported 
being able to make repayments only for “what they can, when they can” (65%) or by supply of labor 
(16%), we can assume that loans are not quickly paid back. 
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(and homogenous) population, there are some limits to the generalizability of our 
results.  
2.5 Conclusions  
This paper concludes that ill-health poses an important economic threat to relatively 
poor households in rural northern India and that, while households seem to be able to 
find ways to finance health-related costs in the short term, there are important long 
term implications for households’ welfare. Furthermore, a substantial share of 
households forwent seeking health care, which has severe consequences on the 
productivity capacity and on the health capital of community members in the long 
term. The emerged importance of expenditures on chronic conditions suggests that 
‘health shocks’ should not only be thought of in terms of acute unexpected illness 
episodes, but also in terms of the onset of a chronic disease which requires (expected) 
spending over a long period of time. Retrospective survey tools like the one presented 
in this paper might therefore not get complete information on the way ill-health 
threatens households economically.  
As most of the economic risk from ill-health appears to be related to OOP spending, 
introducing health insurance, that pre-finances these expenditures and pools risks 
within the community, may contribute significantly to alleviate economic hardship for 
families in rural India. The importance of care for chronic diseases, however, 
represents a big challenge for the sustainability of community-based health insurance 
schemes, since it is necessary to ensure a sufficient degree of risk pooling. 
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3 GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE CHOICES IN 
RURAL INDIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In India, we assist to an increasing awareness of the value of insurance as poverty 
reduction tool, which brought the Indian Insurance Regulatory Agency to define the 
Micro-Insurance Regulations (IRDA, 2005). Community-based micro insurance 
(CBHI) schemes have emerged to compensate to the still non-inclusive insurance 
market and to the missing outreach of national social insurance schemes in some poor 
communities around India. CBHI schemes aim at creating an inclusive insurance 
model that works at a grassroots level, by generating and distributing insurance 
products that are tailored to poor people´s needs and offered at a considerably smaller 
premium than normal insurance plans. Recent studies have shown the effectiveness of 
such schemes in reaching equality (Dror et al., 2006), improving access to health care 
(Dror et al., 2005) and providing financial protection (Ranson, 2002; Dror et al., 
2009). The effectiveness of such a bottom-up approach is based on identifying the 
essential attributes for an affordable insurance package that fits people´s preferences 
and needs. Giving consumers greater voice in the benefit design and allowing them to 
identify their preferred health insurance package, within the constraints of their 
limited resources, could facilitate their inclusion in insurance schemes. Recent studies 
have shown that the responsiveness of health insurance to target clients´ priorities 
would increase the willingness to join the insurance scheme (Schone and Cooper, 
2001; De Allegri et al., 2006) and that a “one size fits all” model would be inadequate 
for implementing health insurance in developing communities, since medical needs 
and availability of medical services differ across locations (Dror, 2007). A context-
specific product is, thus, a key element for the effectiveness and success of 
community-based health insurance programs. 
The almost totality of research on consumers´ preferences for health insurance plans 
has been based on data from rich countries (e.g. Biddle et al., 1998; Nganje et al., 
2004; MacNeil et al., 2011). The current amount of research on low-income 
individuals´ preferences for health insurance benefits is very limited (Danis et al., 
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2002; De Allegri et al., 2006; Danis et al., 2007; Dror et al., 2007; Onwujekwe et al., 
2010).  
The study presented in this chapter explores the process of decision-making for the 
choice of group health insurance products for individuals with low ability to pay and 
inexperience with insurance mechanisms. The aim of this study is to offer knowledge 
of Indian rural communities´ preferences in order to align the development of health 
insurance programs with communities´ expectations. 
The reminder starts with a presentation of the data and methods used for this study, as 
well as the description of the local context. This is followed by the results from three 
different choice processes conducted in three sites in rural India and by an analysis of 
the determinants of individual and group insurance choices. Thereafter, I present an 
evaluation of the tool used to elicit preferences and some insights into the link 
between insurance preferences and CBHI enrolment. Finally, I discuss results and 
draw conclusions. 
3.2 Data  
The data used for this study have been kindly provided by the project partners of the 
EU-financed project “Developing efficient and responsive community based micro 
health insurance in India“, aiming at implementing randomized controlled trials of 
CBHIs in three sites in northern rural India with relatively similar socio-economic 
profiles18.  
Extensive information on socio-economic characteristics, ill-health conditions, health 
care use and expenditures are derived from a household survey conducted in the three 
sites in 2010 and covering 5215 households, for a total of 29,880 individuals. 
Information was collected about inpatient care (12 months recalling period), 
outpatient care (30 days recalling period) for chronic diseases or acute episodes of 
illness, and maternity care.  Spatial data have been used to offer insights into the 
distribution of health care facilities across the project regions. Preferences for health 
insurance plans are obtained from three choice processes conducted before the first 
year of implementation of the CBHI-scheme in the three project sites and involving a 
                                                          
18 More information on the project can be found in Doyle et al. (2011). 
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total of 150119 individuals (all women belonging to a SHG). A revised version of the 
CHAT (Choosing Healthplans All Together) decision tool was used to elicit 
individual and group preferences. The CHAT sessions have been run after an 
insurance awareness campaign had been conducted in the targeted sites. 
Further information about the reasons for the choice of the insurance packages and the 
satisfaction with the CHAT processes 20  has been gained using quantitative exit 
questionnaires on a sample of about 20% of CHAT participants. The responses from 
qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted by the qualitative research team on a 
sub-sample of CHAT participants and facilitators have been used for an in-depth 
understanding of the decision-making process and for gaining a further feedback on 
the CHAT tool. Data on CBHI enrolment for the first year of implementation of the 
scheme are then used to trace a path between the individual and group preferences 
elicited in the CHAT sessions and the willingness to enroll in the CBHI scheme. 
3.3 Health care scenario and local context 
The project sites are located in Uttar Pradesh (Pratapgarh and Kanpur Dehat districts) 
and in Bihar (Vaishali district). The project is locally coordinated by local NGOs 
(respectively BAIF in the Pratapgarh district, Shramik Bharti in the Kanpur Dehat 
district and NIDAN in the Vaishali district).  
The public health care system in India is organized at different levels, from the 
national to the state, regional, district, sub-divisional (or Taluka), community (through 
Community Health Centers - CHCs), Primary Health Centers (PHCs), Sub-Centers 
(SCs) and village level. The system is coordinated by the Union Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare (UMoHFW) at the national level, while at the state level the 
organization of the health system is regulated by the State Department of Health and 
Family Welfare of each single state (in conformity with the central government). At 
the state level, we do not find a uniform organization around the country. In some 
                                                          
19 These individuals have been selected among the whole project target-population and will be offered 
the chance to join the community-based insurance scheme during the first year of implementation. For 
research purposes, the whole population will be step-wise integrated into the scheme, in order to 
guarantee the presence of a control group during all the years of implementation of the scheme.  
20 Respondents were asked whether the project staff was able to explain the different insurance choices 
presented on the CHAT board (from very bad to very good) and to list the most and least enjoyable 
activity and the most and least convincing activity within the project. Next to the CHAT, many other 
activities involved the targeted communities, including watching an ad-hoc produced movie and taking 
part in game-like exercises during the awareness campaign. Respondent also reported the reasons of 
their evaluation of the project activities. 
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states, including Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, there are regional, zonal or divisional set-
ups between the state-level and the district-level organization of health services. The 
district-level organization represents a connection between the state level and the 
peripheral level in the attempt, on one side, to unify the control of health care 
programs within a district unit and, on the other side, to adapt the state organization of 
health care to local needs. The network of PHCs and SCs is the primary provider of 
health care services in rural areas. Within the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) 
the village-based Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been introduced in 
the health care provision system in rural areas. ASHAs have a fundamental role in 
filling the gap in health care provision between the health centers and the villages and 
are responsible for advising village populations about sanitation, hygiene, 
contraception and immunization, as well as for providing medical assistance for minor 
health problems. 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar are among the worst performing states of India in terms 
of health care provision and health indicators, largely due to inadequate health care 
services in rural areas. The main health challenges are a high level of infant, child and 
maternal mortality rates, which are among the highest in India, as well as the 
extremely high proportion of malnourished children younger than three years old 
(GoI, 2012b). The two states are listed among the nine particularly disadvantaged 
states in India, referred to, in GoI terminology, as Empowered Action Group (EAG). 
As two of the 18 states with the weakest health outcomes and infrastructure in India, 
UP and Bihar have been targeted for the NRHM, aiming at the catch up of lagging 
states with the more advanced states. The main objective is increasing public spending 
on health in order to improve health care provision in rural areas. However, 
governmental statistics report that as of 2012 both states still presented a relevant 
shortfall of health care facilities and medical staff, compared to the governmental 
requirements. In particular, it was reported a shortfall of sub-centers (33.9% in UP 
and 47.7% in Bihar), of PHCs (28.6% in UP and 39.6% in Bihar) and CHCs (60.7% 
in UP and 90.9% in Bihar) (GoI, 2012c). Studies show an astonishing use of private 
care for both outpatient and inpatient services in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Raza et al. 
(2013) show that in 90% of cases patients in rural areas seek care for acute illnesses 
by private providers, in 84% of the cases for chronic conditions and in 81% of 
hospitalization episodes. The authors also show that non-degree allopathic providers 
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account for a substantial proportion of private care (61% for acute cases and 35% for 
chronic illnesses).  
In general, we find poor health care access in all of the three sites of implementation 
of the CBHI scheme. The majority of people first refer to persons with no formal 
medical training, such as local medical practitioners (LMPs), faith and traditional 
healers, when first seeking health care. Very few households reported holding any 
form of private health insurance. A more significant proportion of persons reported 
having at least one household member enrolled in the RSBY governmental scheme. 
This scheme, covering hospitalization costs only, was in the early stages of roll out at 
the time of survey and the figures are likely to be much higher now. RSBY enrolment 
is particularly high in the Vaishali district, possibly due to differing roll out patterns 
across the two states. Spatial data collected within the CBHI project report the 
presence of both public and private providers (including unqualified providers, 
traditional and spiritual healers) at all the three project sites. However, unqualified 
private providers have been found to be more prevalent than qualified medical 
practitioners. Concerning medical facilities, the Pratapgarh site is relatively better 
served than the other two sites, since all project villages are all in the vicinity (less 
than 10 Km) of CHCs and private medical facilities (nursing homes and clinics) are 
also present in the nearby Mahua town. Access to public and private medical facilities 
is, instead, relatively limited at the Kanpur Dehat site. A common finding in the three 
sites was the overburden at public facilities, where each CHC with the capacity of 10-
20 beds was found to serve more than 100,000 people, against the delivery norms set 
by the government within the NRHM (GoI, 2005b). Furthermore, very few private 
facilities provided hospitalization services. Due to the low quality and limited 
capacity of the governmental medical centers, plenty of unqualified doctors (or 
“quacks”) were found to work in several of the study area. 
According to households’ self-reported information on expenditure levels, Pratapgarh 
is the poorest of the three implementation sites (with average consumption 
expenditures per person per annum averaging at Rs. 16,233) and including the largest 
percentage of the population living below the absolute poverty line, defined as an 
income per person per day of $1.25. Regarding education, only around half of adults 
in the three sites have attended school, with on average 8 years of education, 
indicating high rates of drop out after only primary education. The majority of adult 
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men work in agriculture, either owning own land or working as laborer. A reasonable 
percentage is also working in small businesses, consisting of small roadside stalls, or 
undertaking small manufacturing / repair work. The majority of adult women work at 
home.  
Monthly family spending on health corresponds on average to six times monthly food 
expenditures and only around one fourth of the population are able to recover from 
the financial catastrophe created by an ill-health event (as showed in the previous 
chapter). Despite hospitalization being the most costly health care service, costs for 
outpatient care for acute or chronic conditions are more frequent and represent the 
main health-related cost (on average 86% of monthly health expenditures). Medical 
fees represent the main part of health care expenditures, but costs for transportation 
and illness-related lost earnings are also not negligible. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 
present the distribution of health care-seeking events among age groups on the 
merged population in the three sites and differentiated by gender. Health care-seeking 
events are mostly distributed between the age 15 to 55 years old. We do not find 
notable differences in the level of distribution of episodes between male and female 
individuals. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Distribution of health care-seeking episodes among age groups in the total 
population. Data from baseline household survey (pooled sample of the three sites). 
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Figure 3.2 - Distribution of health care-seeking episodes among female and male individuals. 
Data from baseline household survey (pooled sample of the three sites). 
 
3.4 Study design and methodology 
The low financial possibilities of developing communities make it necessary for them 
to rationalize and prioritize. Understanding people´s preferences is, thus, necessary for 
an effective health insurance implementation, tailored to people´s needs and priorities. 
Setting people´s priorities has been the objective of a large amount of empirical 
research, by using methods which investigate the relevant parameters people take into 
account when confronted with scarce resources and with the need of prioritizing, for 
example in regard to health care provision (Hope et al., 1998; Singer et al., 2001; 
Sabik & Lie, 2008). Making health services more “person-centered” has been 
enhanced by a relevant amount of research (Bridges et al., 2007). Instead, still a 
limited amount of studies analyze people´s preferences for health insurance, most of 
them limited to the description of the choosing behavior between pre-packaged 
products in developed countries. Even more limited is the amount of information 
available on developing communities´ preferences. Regarding India, in particular, 
very few studies investigate low-income people´s preferences (e.g. Danis et al., 2007; 
Dror et al., 2007). 
Discrete choice methods are commonly used to establish people´s preferences. Within 
discrete choice analysis, respondents are presented with a number of alternatives and 
asked to express their preference. Each alternative is described by a number of 
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attributes or characteristics, among which the monetary value. Thus, when individuals 
make their choice, they implicitly make trade-offs between the monetary value and 
the other attributes among the alternatives in the choice set.  
Within the CBHI project “Developing efficient and responsive community based 
micro health insurance in India“, (mostly) illiterate and innumerate persons in rural 
India were involved in the choice of a health insurance package for the own 
community by using a discrete choice method. For this aim, a revised version of the 
CHAT (Choosing Healthplans All Together) decision tool (described in details in the 
following section) was used. Furthermore, the use of local facilitators, who know the 
local language and customs, and the use of visual aids enabled also illiterate 
individuals to participate. Community participation in defining the insurance package 
has shown to be a strength for the success of CBHI programs (Bennet et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, studies show that involving prospective clients, even with low-income 
and no experience with insurance, in the packages design does not compromise the 
judiciousness of rationing choices (Dror et al., 2006). Most importantly, we can also 
assume that the derived health insurance plan will respond to clients´ priorities and, 
thus, increment the willingness to join the insurance scheme (Danis et al., 2007; De 
Allegri et al., 2006). 
3.4.1 The CHAT tool and the package design 
The CHAT tool is a game-like exercise facilitating group discussion and presenting 
different health insurance options within a limited budget (Goold et al., 2005; Danis et 
al., 2002). The tool was first developed by a research team of the National Institute of 
Health in the USA and was then readapted and applied to the Indian scenario for the 
EU-India Economic Cross-Culture Program (ECCP) project “Strengthening Micro 
Health Insurance Units for the Poor in India” in 2005-2006, involving the MIA and 
several partners. 
The design and process of the CHAT tool have gone through several stages since its 
inception. In its inception, the CHAT board was in a circular form (Danis et al., 
2007)21. Individual benefits were offered and each benefit was categorized as small, 
medium and high insurance coverage. The name and value of the benefits were 
written below each benefit in local language. The community was choosing its 
                                                          
21 See Figure 3.3 in Appendix. 
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preferred benefits and coverage by sticking corresponding colored stickers on the 
preferred options on the board. However, it was realized that it was very difficult for 
respondents (especially for the less educated ones) having to choose both between the 
benefits options and among the multiple coverage alternatives for each benefit option. 
A new version of the CHAT board with single choice benefits was then developed by 
the MIA. Through several surveys conducted by the MIA in different project areas, it 
emerged that people’s ability to pay and the frequency and type of health problems 
were quite homogeneous within a particular community (MIA, n.d. a). Thus, the needs 
for health insurance benefits and the amount of premium people are able to pay can be 
considered to be very similar for most of the households within a certain community. 
Offering a combination of the most required benefits with different caps and within 
the limit of people´s ability to pay seemed to be the most adequate solution. The final 
version of the CHAT board includes different packages (where the benefits and caps 
of each package are predetermined and the total price already calculated) presented on 
a board as columns of a rectangular chart. Respondents only need to use one sticker 
for the choice of the preferred package. The advantage of this tool is its simplicity of 
presentation, which incorporates complicated actuarial calculations into simple visual 
options. The benefit options and their costs are finalized on the basis of local needs, 
frequency of illness and the health care facilities available. This revised version of the 
CHAT tool was used to elicit the people´s preferences presented in this study. 
Within the CBHI project the benefit package options have been designed at the so 
called “benefit options workshop” (one in each site), an interactive exercise involving 
the project staff and people from the to-be-insured population in each implementing 
site (MIA, n.d.b). Using information obtained from a baseline survey (frequency of 
illnesses and costs, health seeking behavior and reasons), simple graphical 
presentations were used for a structured discussion. Members of the community were 
given an easy-to-understand overview of the incidence and cost of several ill-episodes 
reported in the survey (differentiating by gender, age and visited provider) and 
presenting the importance of additional costs, such as drugs, tests and transportation. 
Rather than using (possibly flawed) survey-based willingness to pay (WTP) data to 
set a priori premium levels, the packages are designed in a group setting in which an 
Excel-based calculator22 is used. Any combination of caps, exclusions and coverage 
                                                          
22 Figure 3.7 in Appendix presents a spreadsheet of the calculator. 
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types can be entered into a simple front-end spreadsheet. The premium23 necessary to 
sustain this package is automatically calculated and immediately displayed. 
Participants are free to adjust caps, exclusions and coverage areas as they wish. All 
adjustments are automatically priced by the calculator, so that participants can 
immediately see, and learn to understand, how the premium moves up or down as 
benefits are adjusted. At the end of the workshops participants agreed on the packages 
to be offered in the CHAT board. A limitation in the design of the package is the fact 
that (for practical reasons) only representatives of each community were involved in 
the design of the packages at the workshops. Therefore, there is the possibility that 
some representatives might have forward-spaced personal interests over community 
interests. This could be detected during the exit-survey and when observing enrolment 
rates. 
The participants of the CHAT exercises are women residents in the selected sites and 
belonging to pre-existing SHGs. They have been presented with a range of health 
insurance packages and asked to choose the favorite one for the own family and for 
the SHG they belong to. The decision-making process within the CHAT eliciting 
method (Figure 3.8 in Appendix) consists of two rounds (CHAT1 and CHAT2), 
including one individual and two group sessions, conducted in each site using the 
corresponding CHAT board developed during the benefit options workshop. During 
the individual session (CHAT1), participants are asked to choose benefit packages 
that meet their and their families´ needs, while in the group sessions participants are 
led to group discussions that should result in a SHG agreement for the choice of the 
benefit package meeting the needs of the whole group. During the decision exercise, 
project facilitators randomly assign to the participants health events cards illustrating 
examples of illness episodes. These examples are used to explain the effects of the 
different benefit choices relatively to these events, to make sure that the participants 
fully understood the CHAT options. CHAT1 includes one individual and one group 
session taking place on the same day. Afterwards, participants are given a CHAT 
board to be taken home. From this point, they are given two weeks time to discuss the 
different alternatives with their family. After that, CHAT2 takes place and SHG 
                                                          
23 The pure risk premium (per person per year) is calculated using the basic formula:  
Pure risk premium =(average expenditures per episode) * (incidence rate) 
assuming a Poisson distribution of incidence and truncating frequency-distributions of expenditures for 
including thresholds and caps in the insurance coverage. 
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members are asked to take part in a second group session24, where the SHG has the 
opportunity to choose a group insurance package for the second time. The package 
finally offered to the community is then identified as the package chosen by the 
majority of SHGs in each site. This way, three final packages will result at the end, 
each offered in the relative site. 
3.4.2 Data analysis approach  
The preferences elicited in the three sites during the CHAT sessions are modelled 
using multinomial logistic regression25, estimated using Stata11 statistical software. In 
order to control for household characteristics which could possibly influence the 
decision process, variables related to demographics (the number of household 
members, the proportion of elderly over 65 years old, of children under the age of 13 
and of women at reproductive age - between 12 and 49 years old), indicator variables 
for scheduled caste status (capturing the social and economic position of the 
household in the community) and for the measure of women´s autonomy26 within the 
household have been constructed. Household socioeconomic status (SES) has been 
measured in terms of monthly non-health expenditures per family member. Further 
information is captured by variables indicating respectively the proportion of health 
expenditures (per family member) on total expenditures, the ability to finance past 
health expenditures27 and whether the household had foregone seeking health care in 
the past for financial reasons28 . Household´s health morbidity is captured by the 
monthly average number of outpatient visits, of hospitalizations, pregnancies and the 
presence of chronically-ill individuals in the households29. Furthermore, I control for 
                                                          
24 In the following, choices elicited during this second group session (CHAT2) will be referred to as 
“final group choices“, since these choices will determine the final community package. 
25 Multinomial logit methods are very commonly used in health economic research and as discrete 
choice modelling for the choice of health insurance plans. This method is based on the restrictive 
assumption of individuals´ homogeneous tastes for the common attributes of the alternatives included 
in the choice set. The Hausman-McFadden test has been used to test this assumption. Furthermore, the 
homogeneous SES and health insurance needs in the three sites would also support this assumption. 
26 This is obtained using a principal component score from analysis of variables representing the 
decision power of women inside the household regarding: the use of earnings, buying food, the 
purchase of major goods, selling household items, children education, health care, family planning and 
whether women need permission from male members to work outside the home, to go to the local 
market, to the local health center, to relatives or to the next village. The use of this variable is meant to 
assess the relevance of women´s decision power in the choice of the health insurance package.  
27  For this scope a dummy variable has been constructed based on retrospective self-reported 
information. 
28 Using a dummy variable based on self-reported information concerning past episodes of foregone 
health care. 
29 This is measured by a dummy variable. 
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RSBY social insurance enrolment (which is relevant to assess whether the RSBY 
distracts the interest for the CBHI insurance plans including hospitalization coverage). 
Finally, given the low average literacy rate of the participants, it is relevant to control 
for peer in-group influence on the choice of the insurance plan within each self-help 
group. For this scope, two variables have been created that assert, respectively, the 
correspondence between each individual´s choice and the choice of the eldest member 
of the group (since eldest members´ opinion is very respected in the communities) and 
between each individual´s choice and the choice of the most educated member of the 
group (which is usually the one in charge of administrative responsibility within the 
group and thus very respected). In order to assess the effect of the group process on 
preferences, the Wilkoxon signed-ranks test is used to test whether the number of 
benefits included in the group choices differs significantly from the number of 
benefits included in the individual choices.  The qualitative information obtained 
during the semi-structured interviews and coded by the qualitative research team 
using Nvivo8 tool (in order to identify the recurring paths in the choice process) have 
been compared with the findings from the quantitative analysis (mix-methods 
approach) in order to enhance and validate the results. 
3.5 Results 
This section will first present the outcomes of the CHAT sessions in each project site. 
Afterwards, the results from the regression models are showed and discussed, in order 
to gain insights into the communities´ preferences for health insurance plans and the 
factors influencing the choice process. Findings from the quantitative exit-
questionnaires and from the qualitative semi-structured interviews are then integrated 
and compared to the results of the quantitative models. 
The three trials offer different insights into the decision-making process, since the 
options offered are different in each site. In the first trial (Pratapgarh district), 
individuals are asked to choose among packages that differ in price, type of benefits 
and coverage caps, but all within a relatively low range of prices, compared to the 
packages offered in the other two trials. This trial will help us understand how 
individuals traded in terms of number of benefits, coverage and premium, when  the 
price difference is relatively small. 
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In the second trial (Kanpur Dehat district), instead, individuals are asked to choose 
among packages including exactly the same type of benefits. Differences in price 
derive from the different coverage caps of the benefits. The CHAT outcomes with 
such a spectrum of alternative choices will help understanding how individuals weight 
between “quality” and price of each package30. Since all packages are very similar 
(only the coverage caps differ), we expect that the price will play an important role in 
the decision, especially for less wealthy participants. Looking at the group choices 
will help understanding how solidarity with memebrs with lower ability to pay could 
influence group choices.  
In the third trial (Vaishali district) a completely new set of packages is offered in the 
CHAT sessions. Next to pure health insurance packages, packages including a 
combination of life and health insurance benefits were offered. Given the relatively 
higher price of these combo-packages, it is foreseeable that most of the participants 
will concentrate their choice on cheaper packages. This experiment can show the level 
of solidarity within group members (since only wealthier individuals can afford the 
most inclusive packages) and how individuals deal with a wider range of offers, when 
products differ in price, type of benefits, level of coverage and also type of insurance. 
3.5.1 First trial – Pratapgarh district 
The packages: In the first trial (Pratapgarh district) four different packages have been 
offered, including different combination and number of benefits, with different caps 
and for different prices (Figure 3.4). Benefits included in the packages ranged from 
hospitalization costs to cesarean delivery, family support and transportation during 
hospitalization. In this trial, packages do not include coverage of outpatient care costs 
and are therefore relatively cheaper, compared to the packages offered in the other 
two trials. The exclusion of outpatient care from the benefits is due to a missing 
agreement with local medical practitioners regarding the cost of outpatient visits for 
insured individuals. The benefit has been excluded during the benefit options 
workshop, since it would have otherwise increased the price of the packages notably. 
 
                                                          
30 A higher insurance coverage is considered to be more valuable than a lower insurance coverage in 
terms of protection from risks. It will be observed whether individuals choose following the value-for-
money principle (more protection for a higher price) or only decide according to the price of the 
packages.  
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Figure 3.4 - CHAT board at Pratapgarh district (English version) 
 
The package choices: Table 3.1 presents the results from the CHAT sessions. During 
the individual session, we observe a concentration of choices for package 4 (71%), the 
most expensive and inclusive one. As second choice, the majority selected package 2 
(48%), including the same number of benefits as package 4 but with lower caps and 
for a lower premium. In the group choices participants showed again a net preference 
for package 4 as first choice (91% of SHGs chose it in CHAT1 and 100% of SHGs 
chose it in CHAT2) and for package 2 as second choice. We can therefore affirm that 
“value for money” (more risk protection for a higher price) has been the preferred 
strategy of the majority of participants. The relatively low price of the packages 
offered in this trial has permitted to choose packages that are more inclusive.  
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Table 3.1 - Description of packages and choices in the first trial (Pratapgarh district). 
 
Package1 
(blue) 
Package2 
(yellow) 
Package3 
(red) 
Package4 
(green) 
Premium (INR) 157 162 176 176 
Number of benefits 3 4 2 4 
Sum covered (INR) 8100 8300 9800 11200 
(Premium/Sum covered)  1.94% 1.95% 1.80% 1.57% 
CHAT1-individual choice 
    
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 8.36 12.01 8.62 71.02 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) 12.53 47.52 22.45 17.49 
CHAT1-group choice 
    
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 2.16 7.06 - 90.78 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) 2.35 82.16 6.27 9.22 
CHAT2-group choice 
    
      Frequency 1st choice (%) - - - 100 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) - 97.65 2.35 - 
 
Determinants of individual choices: The results from multinomial regression (Table 
3.2)31 report some correlation between some HH characteristics and/or health care use 
and the insurance choices. Using package 4 as reference category, we find that 
households with a higher number of chronically ill members are less likely to choose 
package 1 (the cheapest and less inclusive) over package 4. This is probably due to 
the higher risk exposure of chronically ill individuals. However, a higher proportion 
of children in the household and a higher frequency of hospitalizations and 
pregnancies seem to improve the likelihood of choosing package 2. Households 
reporting a better ability to self-finance health expenditures are also more likely to 
select package 2, probably depending on their perceived lower risk exposure. A 
higher frequency of hospitalizations within the HH members seems to increase the 
likelihood of choosing package 3. A correlation between the choices of the eldest 
members of the group and the other group members is observed relatively to the 
choice of package 4 (also chosen as community package). We find that possessing 
RSBY health insurance has no significant effect on choices. Insights from the exit 
questionnaires and from the qualitative interviews will be use to get more insights into 
the individual decision-making process during the CHAT sessions. 
                                                          
31 The Table presents the Relative Risk Ratios (RR). A RR < 1 means that the controlled variable is 
negatively influencing the probability of selecting a certain package over the package used as 
reference. A RR > 1 means that the controlled variable is positively influencing the probability of 
selecting a certain package over the package used as reference. 
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Table 3.2 - Relative Risk Ratios from multinomial logistic regression on the package choices for 
the first trial.   
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Variable Package1 Package2 Package3 Package4 
non-health expenditures per-family member  0.999 0.999 1.000 
 years of education 0.920 1.008 1.056 
 number HH members 1.027 0.985 1.080 
 proportion of children in the HH 1.107 12.307** 10.644 
 proportion of elderly in the HH 7.678 0.023 13.288 Base 
proportion of women in reproductive age in the HH 4.064 1.240 3.544 Outcome 
scheduled HH 0.516 1.160 1.220 
 women autonomy inside HH  0.928 0.987 1.003 
 same choice eldest SHG member (yes/no) 1.015 0.153* 0.107* 
 same choice most educated SHG member (yes/no) 0.315 1.034 0.014** 
 proportion of health exp on tot expenditures 6.007 0.724 2.085 
 HH average number pregnancies 0.044 41.477** 8.280 
 HH average number outpatient visits 1.220 0.691 1.271 
 HH average number hospitalizations 0.066 85.554*** 92.526*** 
 chronic ill individuals in the HH (yes/no) 0.264** 1.489 0.783 
 HH could afford to finance health care mostly-
completely (yes/no) 1.051 1.560** 0.895 
 HH has foregone seeking health care (yes/no) 1.755 0.679 1.434 
 RSBY-insured (yes/no) 0.881 1.471 3.479   
 
Preference transitivity between individual and group choices: While individual 
choices were partially distributed on the four packages, during the group sessions 
preferences were gradually aligned and more people were willing to choose more 
expensive and more inclusive packages. This shift of preference could indicate that 
group sessions have stimulated discussions and deliberations. Finally, during the final 
group session (CHAT2) all SHGs chose the same group package (package 4), which 
is also the final community package. Thus, the community package captures the 
totality of final group preferences. This gives hope concerning people´s willingness to 
enroll in the CBHI scheme. Using Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, we find that, in 
general, the number of benefits included in the package chosen for the group 
significantly exceeds the number of benefits included in the package chosen for the 
own household. This preference transitivity can be interpreted as a willingness to 
align individual and group interests, since individuals were willing to shift their 
preferences after consulting the other group members and considering other members´ 
needs.  
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Reported reasons for the choices: Around 20% of CHAT participants have been 
asked to report the reasons32 for their choice. After CHAT1 most of respondents 
(63%) choosing package 4 reported having been influenced by SHG members (leader 
or most educated ones) or by other women from the village for the choice of the 
individual package; 30% reported wanting to buy the best package with the most 
benefits. The main part of individuals choosing other packages were also influenced 
by other women´s choices or have chosen the package they thought to be the best. 
Only few reported that the price was the main issue in choosing the package, probably 
because packages are all relatively less expensive, compared to the other trials. After 
the final group session (CHAT2), 75% of respondents reported to have been 
influenced by other SHG members in choosing the group package. However, this 
might also mean that discussion has stimulated reflection and change of opinions. 
Fifty Percent of individuals choosing the cheapest package reported that the price was 
the main influencing factor, followed by peer influence in the group. The qualitative 
semi-structured interviews show that, in general, individuals weighted both cost and 
benefits when making choices. In fact, package 4 (the most preferred one) contains 
the same benefits of package 2 but a higher coverage cap for a little difference in 
price. From the reported information, it emerges that the premium was not the 
fundamental factor influencing the choice, since all packages were quite affordable 
and prices differences between packages not huge. It also emerged that the opinion of 
most educated SHG members was listened to by other less educated women. 
However, the facilitator of the CHAT session (belonging to the project staff) reported 
that this was not widely observable and that, instead, each one´s opinion was taken 
into account for the group choice. In general, interviewed women expressed 
satisfaction with the final group choice and with the community package. While all 
women were satisfied with the choices, some women expressed dissatisfaction with 
the benefits included in the packages (for example the coverage of cesarean delivery 
only). 
Comparing the ratio premium/sum covered (Table 3.1) for each package can help 
analyzing the judiciousness of the choice made. Package 4 seems to be a judicious 
                                                          
32 A list of different possible reasons has been presented to respondents, who were asked to select the 
most important one. 
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choice, since it is the most advantageous one, when looking at the ratio (1,6% vs. 2% 
for package2). 
3.5.2 Second trial – Kanpur Dehat district 
The packages: In the second trial (Kanpur Dehat district) five different health 
insurance packages have been offered, all including the same benefits but with 
different caps, defining different coverage levels (Figure 3.5). Higher coverage caps 
imply a higher premium. The benefits include the coverage of costs for outpatient care 
from selected medical practitioners, hospitalization costs, transportation and family 
financial support during hospitalization. 
Figure 3.5 - CHAT board at Kanpur Dehat district (English version). 
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Table 3.3 - Description of packages and choices in the second trial (Kanpur Dehat district). 
 
package1 
(blue) 
package2 
(yellow) 
package3 
(red) 
package4 
(green) 
Package5 
(orange) 
Premium (INR) 192 221 243 270 290 
Number of benefits 4 4 4 4 4 
Sum covered (INR) Outpatient 
+ 3175 
Outpatient 
+ 4200 
Outpatient 
+ 5225 
Outpatient 
+ 6250 
Outpatient 
+ 7275 
(Premium/Sum covered*)  (6%) (5.3%) (4.7%) (4.3%) (4%) 
CHAT1-individual choice 
    
 
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 99.66 - - - 0.34 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) - 92.95 3.03 - 4.03 
CHAT1-group choice 
    
 
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 100 - - - - 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) - 90.36 2.71 - 6.93 
CHAT2-group choice 
    
 
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 100 - - - - 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) - 100 - - - 
 
The package choices: The packages and the distribution of choices among the 
different packages are presented in Table 3.3. The outcomes from the individual and 
group sessions are rather homogeneous, compared to the other two trials. Almost all 
individuals (99.7%)33 selected package 1 as first choice for the own family and the 
totality of groups selected the same package for the own group during the group 
sessions. Package 2 is the favorite one as second choice, both as individual and as 
group choice. Individuals showed a net preference for lower premium packages for 
their own family and for the group. Given the homogeneity of choices, we are not able 
to model the outcomes. Both individual and group decisions are concentrated on one 
package. We do not observe any preference transitivity from individual to group 
sessions. 
Reported reasons for the choices: In the exit questionnaire, 50% of respondents 
reported that the cheaper price was the main reason for choosing package 1; 50% 
reported having consulted other SHG members and other women in the village before 
choosing. Regarding the group decisions, the main reported reason for the choice was 
again the cheap price. The second main reason was that other SHG members liked 
that package. Few participants reported having asked NGO staff for orientation. From 
the qualitative interviews it emerges that, despite the final choices were concentrated 
                                                          
33 The outlier data might depend on a reporting error, since only one single individual was reported 
deviating from the unanimous package selection. However, this result is not influencing the outcomes 
in a relevant way. 
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on one single package, discussions and deliberations have taken place before the 
official choice was made. During these pre-discussions some individuals were willing 
to choose more expensive packages but changed their mind after considering the low 
ability to pay of other group members. The level of health morbidity was also taken 
into account during the decision-making. Women tell that there was no dominant 
opinion in the group and that, instead, every single opinion was listened to (in 
particular that of less wealthy members). Some women reported choosing the 
cheapest package because still uncertain concerning the functioning and effectiveness 
of the CBHI program. They, thus, rationally decided to opt for the cheapest package 
and to try to enroll into the project with the least cost possible. 
When considering the ratio premium/sum insured (Table 3.3), it emerges that the 
choice made by participants was not the optimal one, since package 1 is the one with 
the highest ratio of all packages. Thus, we can infer that affordability has been the 
main factor influencing decisions. Since we do not observe any difference in the 
choices across different socio-economic groups, we can affirm that solidarity with less 
wealthier members in the group might have played a determinant role in group 
decisions. 
3.5.3 Third trial – Vaishali district 
The packages: In the third trial (Vaishali district), six different packages have been 
offered, three including only different combinations of health insurance benefits and 
three including a combination of health and life insurance - specifically targeted at the 
breadwinner of the household and limited to a maximum of two HH members (Figure 
3.6). The health insurance benefits comprise the coverage of testing, imaging, 
outpatient care (at selected medical professionals), hospitalization costs and daily 
financial support during hospitalization. The level of insurance coverage has been 
fixed using caps. Cheaper packages include fewer benefits.  
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Figure 3.6 - CHAT board at Vaishali district (English version). 
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The package choices: Looking at the individual choices in Table 3.4, we observe 
more variability in the choices compared to the other two trials. Package 2 (slightly 
more expensive than the cheapest package but including more benefits) was the 
package selected by the majority of people as first choice, both in the individual and 
in the group sessions. Many of them have then selected package 1 (the cheapest one) 
as second choice.  
For most of the participants the size of benefits and the value for money (within 
affordability) have played an important role in choosing the package. Some 
individuals had opted for higher cost packages for their own family, but have moved 
their choice toward cheaper packages in the group sessions. 
 
Determinants of individual choices: We use package 2 (Table 3.5) as reference 
category in the multinomial regression models. We find that more women autonomy 
and a higher frequency of hospitalizations within the household increase the 
probability of choosing package 2 over package 1 (which in fact does not include 
coverage for hospitalization or financial support during hospitalization). Larger 
families are more likely to choose package 3 (the most inclusive health insurance 
package) over package 2, showing a higher risk aversion. However, demographic HH 
Table 3.4 - Description of packages and choices in the third trial (Vaishali district).  
*without outpatient care 
 
Package1 
(blue) 
Package2 
(yellow) 
Package3 
(red) 
Package4 
(green) 
Package5 
(orange) 
Package6 
(purple) 
Premium (INR) 187 197 236 287 297 336 
Number of benefits 3 4 5 4 5 6 
Sum covered (INR) 
Outpatient 
+ 500 
Outpatient 
+ 600 
Outpatient 
+ 2400 
Outpatient 
+500 
+ (max 
75,000) 
Outpatient 
+600 
+ (max 
75,000) 
Outpatient 
+2400 
+ (max 
75,000) 
(Premium/Sum covered*)  (37%) (33%) (9.8%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.4%) 
CHAT1-individual choice 
    
  
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 17.9 38.3 14.4 17.4 10.3 1.9 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) 33.21 35.63 17.72 8.58 2.99 1.87 
CHAT1-group choice 
    
  
      Frequency 1st choice (%) 3.79 56.15 9.41 18.06 10.93 1.67 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) 27.62 36.87 21.55 7.28 6.68 - 
CHAT2-group choice 
    
  
      Frequency 1st choice (%) - 84.22 13.96 1.82 - - 
      Frequency 2nd choice (%) 12.75 56.45 19.73 7.28 3.79 - 
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Table 3.5 - Relative Risk Ratios from multinomial logistic regression on the package choices for the third trial.  
***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Variables Package1 Package2 Package3 Package4 Package5 Package6 
non-health expenditures per-family member  1.000 
 
0.999 1.000 1.001* 0.999 
years of education 1.091*** 
 
0.977 1.082 0.992 0.951 
number HH members 1.140 
 
1.151* 1182* 0.950 1.123 
proportion of children in the HH 0.643 
 
0.893 0.932 4.831* 2.930 
proportion of elderly in the HH 0.263 base 0.656 0.112 0.127 0.000*** 
proportion of women in reproductive age in the HH 1.873 outcome 1.167 0.582 1.534 26.575 
scheduled HH 0.918 
 
0.753 1.847 3.690* 0.805 
women autonomy inside HH  0.847** 
 
0.897 0.842** 0.907 0.913 
same choice eldest SHG member (yes/no) 0.836 
 
0.759 0.793 0.355 20.033* 
same choice most educated SHG member (yes/no) 1.375 
 
1.598 0.196 0.336 12.053* 
proportion of health exp on tot expenditures 0.913 
 
0.367 0.170* 1.704 0.252 
HH average number pregnancies 0.749 
 
0.170 0.046* 0.217 87273.9* 
HH average number outpatient visits 1.273 
 
0.754 0.608 1.008 0.178 
HH average number hospitalizations 0.117* 
 
0.921 1.900 1.084 0.000 
chronic ill individuals in the HH (yes/no) 1.544 
 
1.346 1.957* 0.753 2.704 
HH could afford to finance health care mostly-completely (yes/no) 0.955 
 
0.897 1.226 0.994 2.401** 
HH has foregone seeking health care (yes/no) 0.793 
 
1.224 0.587 0.979 0.127** 
RSBY-insured (yes/no) 1.335   1.661 1.572 0.583 1.992 
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characteristics, HH financial status and health care use are not significantly 
influencing the choice of package 3. A correlation between individual choices and the 
choices of the most educated members relatively to package 2 (also the final 
community package) was observed. Women autonomy, a higher frequency of 
pregnancies within the HH and a higher proportion of health expenditures on total 
expenditures tend to increase the probability of choosing package 2 over package 4 
(which additionally includes life insurance coverage but fewer health insurance 
benefits), while the presence of chronic-ill HH members increases the probability of 
choosing package 4 over package 2 (probably because HHs perceive more need for 
life insurance coverage). A higher level of household expenditures per person (used as 
proxy for family welfare) and a higher proportion of children in the household 
increase the probability of choosing package 5 (including both life and health 
insurance coverage) over package 2. Given the very high price of package 5, family 
wealth plays an important role in the decision of choosing this package. Strangely, 
belonging to scheduled casts seems to increase the probability of choosing package 5. 
When moving to the most expensive package, we find that households who reported 
having been able to self-finance health care mostly or completely in the past (usually 
better-off families) and reporting more frequent pregnancies are more likely to choose 
package 6, while families reporting having foregone seeking health care (usually 
poorer households) and with a higher proportion of elderly members are less likely to 
choose this expensive and inclusive package. Some correlation can also be observed 
between individual choices and eldest members´ choices for package 6.  
Preference transitivity between individual and group choices: While individual 
choices were more widely distributed on the four packages, preferences gradually 
concentrated on package 2 in the group sessions. Wilcoxon signed-ranks test reports 
that the number of benefits included in the choice for the group exceeds significantly 
the number of benefits included in the individual choice (z=-2.84; p<0.05). This can 
be interpreted as a willingness to align individual and group preferences after group 
deliberations and discussions.  
Reported reasons for the choices: The responses from the exit questionnaire show that 
the size of benefits and the affordability of the products have been relevant factors 
influencing choices. Among the respondents choosing package 2 (the second cheapest 
package) during the individual session, 36% reported that the main reason was its 
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cheap price. The package includes more benefits than the cheapest one and for a small 
difference in price. A relevant group of participants (44%) reported to have been 
influenced by other women in the village and/or SHG leaders and/or most educated 
women in the group. Further reasons for choosing this package were the number of 
benefits included and because it was considered to be the best, in terms of value for 
money. The main reason reported by those choosing the cheapest package was the 
cheapest price (67%). People choosing the most expensive packages reported 
considering their choice as the best option. Strangely, few people reported that the 
cheap price was the main reason, probably meaning the value for money.  
In the group rounds of CHAT, most of the individuals who had opted for more 
expensive package as individual choice have then opted for cheaper packages for the 
whole SHG. Most of the individuals (72%) choosing package 2 reported having been 
influenced by other SHG members, 17% reported that the price was an important 
factor in the choice, while 7% report choosing the package that was considered the 
best or containing more benefits. Individuals choosing other packages reported 
looking at the price and having been influenced by other SHG members’ choices. 
Qualitative interviews report that participants weighted both costs and benefits when 
making choices. In fact, package 2 (the most preferred one) contains several benefits 
for a relatively low price. Women reported that the price was a determinant factor 
influencing choices and that the opinion of other SHG members was listened to, 
especially that of the leaders and trusted members. However, each one´s opinion was 
taken into account in the discussion. Some women reported that father-in-laws 
influenced the choice during household internal discussions. Possessing other 
insurance policies was also reported influencing the choice: Women tried to choose 
the package with less overlapping with the other insurance policies and offering the 
best range of complementary benefits. In general, all interviewed women reported 
satisfaction with the final group choice and with the community package. 
When considering the ratio premium/sum insured (Table 3.4) we can observe that 
group choices tend to move toward more “value for money”. Many of the choices, in 
fact, transited from package 1 (the cheapest) in the individual session to other more 
expensive packages (with a better price/value ratio) in the group sessions.  
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To conclude this section dedicated to the analysis of the CHAT outcomes, Table 3.6 
presents an overview of the three final community packages and the relative price 
ranking within the set of choices offered in the CHAT tool in each site. 
Table 3.6 - Comparison of benefits included in the three community packages and price 
ranking within the range of packages offered in the relative CHAT board. 
Benefit/Site Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 
Hospitalization X X  
Family financial support during hospitalization X X X 
Delivery X   
Transportation during hospitalization X X  
Outpatient care at selected providers  X X 
Testing   X 
Imaging   X 
Price ranking most 
expensive 
cheapest 2nd cheapest 
 
Figure 3.9 and 3.10 summarize the self-reported reasons for individual and group 
choices in the three sites after merging all responses from the exit questionnaires. 
Figure 3.9 - Self-reported reasons for individual choices of the pooled sample (N=184) of 
respondents of the exit questionnaire (20% of CHAT participants in each site). 
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Figure 3.10 - Self-reported reasons for group choices of the pooled sample (N=201) of 
respondents of the exit questionnaire (20% of CHAT participants in each site). 
 
3.6 Evaluation of the CHAT tool 
Within the exit questionnaire, around 20% of CHAT participants were asked to 
evaluate the project activities they were involved in, including the CHAT sessions and 
other several activities used during the insurance educational phases of the project 
(aimed and creating awareness on the risks and effects connected with ill-health and 
on the functioning and usefulness of health insurance as safety net). Such activities 
included theater shows, movies, treasury pot (a game-like description of the insurance 
mechanisms), songs, meetings and talks.34 Respondents identified the most and least 
enjoyable activities and the most and least convincing activities, giving reasons for 
their evaluation. Some questions in the questionnaire were specifically investigating 
the CHAT procedures. The questionnaire also investigated whether the women were 
able to discuss the CHAT options with the other family members during the two 
weeks break or to indicate impediments to that. Figure 3.11 (A to D) illustrates the 
merged responses from the three sites. The CHAT process was neither among the 
activities mostly selected as “enjoyable” (less than 5%) nor among the “least 
enjoyable” (ca. 12%) ones (Figure 3.11 A and B).  
 
                                                          
34 In order to make the informational process as easier to understand as possible, several entertaining 
activities have been used, so that community members would be more willing to participate. It is quite 
predictable that more entertaining activities will be considered more enjoyable that the CHAT sessions, 
which require more commitment and concentration from the participants than game-like activities. 
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Figure 3.11 - Self-reported evaluation of the project activities (in percentage of total responses on 
a subsample of 20% of CHAT participants).  
Notes: The quadrants report the distribution of responses concerning the selection of the most 
enjoyable activity (A), the least enjoyable activity (B), the most convincing (C) and the least 
convincing one (D) 
 
For the effectiveness of the scheme, it is very relevant to understand how convincing 
the CHAT method has been and what aspects of the process did not meet participants´ 
expectations. Again, the CHAT process was not one of the most selected activity 
neither as “most convincing” (less than 5%) nor as “least convincing” (ca. 12%). 
Respondents defining the CHAT process as the most convincing activity selected 
“used good examples”, “activities are repeated” and “gave clear explanation of the 
benefits” as explanation for their evaluation.35  Respondents evaluating the CHAT 
process as the “least convincing activity” reported as reasons (in order of prevalence) 
that “the activity was not repeated”, “the activity was boring”, “did not involve men” 
and “used bad examples”. Interestingly, there is an evident correspondence between 
the most enjoyable and convincing activities, since most of the individuals (87.89%) 
                                                          
35 Within the questionnaire several alternatives where presented indicating possible reasons for the 
evaluation of the different activities. Reasons included: “Used good examples”, “activities were 
repeated”, “one-on-one interaction with the staff”, “gave clear explanation of benefits”, “involved 
men”, “fun”, “addressed specific doubts”, “gave clear explanation of the scheme structure” and “other” 
(offering the chance to present further reasons not included). 
A 
 
 
 
B 
C D 
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have identified the same activity as both “most enjoyable” and “most convincing”, 
while most of the activities defined as “least enjoyable” were also classified as “least 
convincing”. We could suppose that the enjoyability of the activity might have 
influenced the general perception of the same activity.  
Around 70% of respondents in each site have reported that the project staff was able 
to explain the benefits options in a good or very good way, and 80% reported that the 
project staff had been friendly or very friendly with them. The rest of the respondents 
have given a neutral evaluation of the project staff, so that no negative feedback was 
received concerning the way the project staff conducted the CHAT activities. 
Concerning the participants´ ability to discuss the CHAT options with their family 
during the two weeks break offered between CHAT 1 and CHAT 2, only few 
respondents (ca. 9%) reported having found some problems. The most prevalent 
reported reasons were that the family members were against the insurance scheme, 
that they somehow did not possess a CHAT board (even if the project staff had 
distributed one to each CHAT participant) or that they were too busy with other 
activities and could not find the time to discuss the CHAT options.  
These questionnaires allowed to get a relevant feedback on the CHAT process and 
gave inputs for improving the tool before the following project phases are 
implemented. 
3.7 Correspondence between CHAT choices and enrolment 
decisions 
This section analyzes the correspondence between the participants´ willingness to 
enroll in the CBHI scheme (after the CHAT process) and the original individual and 
group choice made by each participant, in order to understand whether the 
responsiveness of the final community package to personal preferences could increase 
the willingness to enroll.  
Figure 3.12 in Appendix shows the patterns of preferences from the original 
individual choice to the final group choice in the first trial (Pratapgarh district). 
Individual choices were distributed among all four packages offered, but were 
particularly concentrated on package 4 (71.2%). Choices from the first group session 
(CHAT 1) are represented in the third level of the three-graph and connected to the 
respective previous individual choice. Most of the participants of the first group 
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sessions (66.32%) have followed the path “package 4/package 4” (in the 
individual/group sessions respectively). The second most followed path has been 
“package 2/package 4". We observe a convergence toward package 4 in the group 
sessions. In the final group sessions (CHAT2) all paths converge to package 4, which 
is then also selected as final community package. When linking enrolment decisions 
with individual and group choices, we can observe that not only those individuals for 
whom the community package satisfies the personal preferences have decided to 
enroll in the CBHI scheme. Also 37% of the participants choosing package 1 as 
personal preference, 58% choosing package 2 and 55% choosing package 3 in the 
individual sessions have nevertheless enrolled. Looking at the first group sessions, 
33% of participants choosing package 2 have enrolled, but none of the participants 
choosing package 1. The total enrolment rate in the first site for the first 
implementation year has been 42%, despite the final package responded to all final 
group preferences. The majority of the enrolled individuals had selected package 4 as 
individual preference (65%), 16% had chosen package 2, 11% package 3 and 8% 
package 1. Thus, it seems that people whose individual preference was satisfied with 
the final community package were more willing to enroll.  
In the second trial (Kanpur Dehat) the paths of choices along the different CHAT 
sessions are more concentrated (Figure 3.13 in Appendix). Individual choices are 
concentrated on package 1 (99.7%). All individual choices converge to package 1 in 
the first group sessions (third level of the three-graph), which is also the unanimous 
choice in the final group sessions. In this site, 43% of participants have thereafter 
enrolled in the scheme. All enrolled individuals had chosen package 1 as individual 
choice. Further analysis is necessary in order to investigate the reasons behind the 
non-enrolment of the remaining CHAT participants.36 
In the third trial (Vaishali), presented in Figure 3.14 in Appendix, paths of choices 
along the different CHAT sessions are quite heterogeneous37. Individual choices are 
distributed among all packages offered, with more concentration on package 2 (38%). 
During the first group sessions around 25% of participants shift their preference 
                                                          
36 However, this analysis is out of the scope of this study. Some insights on enrolment are presented 
later on, extracted from an exit-questionnaire on a sub-sample of CHAT participants. The detailed 
analysis of the factors influencing CBHI enrolment is the scope of other studies within the CBHI 
project. 
37 For reasons of space, Figure 3.14 has been truncated after the first group sessions. The missing paths 
to the final group sessions are discussed in the text. 
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toward package 2. Choices converge even more toward package 2 in the final group 
sessions, where around 35% of respondents deviate from their previous group choice 
and toward package 2 as final choice. Looking at the enrolment rates, 39% of the 
enrolled people had chosen the community package as individual preference. 
Furthermore, 54% of enrolled individuals had chosen the final community package in 
the first group session (CHAT 1) and 79% in the final group session. However, only 
52% of individuals choosing package 2 as own personal preference have thereafter 
enrolled, despite the responsiveness of the community package to their own 
preferences. Here again, an in-depth analysis of the factors influencing the decision to 
enroll is necessary.  
The exit questionnaire also inquired respondents concerning the reasons for enrolling 
(or not enrolling) in the CBHI scheme, selected among a given list of reasons 
including: “Low price”, “trust in local NGO”, “insurance will help protect us from 
health risks”, “the head of the HH wants to join the scheme”, “the SHG members have 
a lot of health problems”, “NGO staff told us to join” and “other”. Almost 60% of 
enrolled respondents (71.48%) reported that the low price was the main factor 
influencing their enrolment (Figure 3.15 A). Around 20% believed that the scheme 
would help protecting by health risks, while for other 20% the trust in the local NGO 
convinced them to enroll. The main reported reason for non-enrolling was the size of 
the insurance premium (almost 60% of respondents), followed by a missing 
agreement with the SHG during the choice of the packages (ca. 15%) and the 
insufficient number of benefits in the packages (ca. 12%). 
Figure 3.15 - Self-reported reasons for joining (A) or not joining (B) the CBHI scheme in percent 
of total responses on a subsample of randomly selected 20% of CHAT participants. 
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3.8 Discussion 
The CHAT sessions have shown to be an effective method for eliciting low-income 
communities´ preferences. However, the exclusion of male community members in 
the choice of the insurance package within the CHAT sessions might represent a 
limitation. The selection of self-help groups as target groups for the CBHI project and 
for the CHAT sessions has been motivated by the advantages of working with already 
formed and consolidated groups within the community, but also by the desire to 
follow the guidelines of the IRDA, which only allows and recognizes the use of 
selected intermediaries (among which self-help groups) for the implementation of MI 
in India (see IRDA Micro-Insurance Regulations, 2005). Furthermore, the male 
community members were involved in the “benefit options workshops”, during which 
the packages offered in the CHAT have been developed. During the CHAT process, 
SHG members have also been given the chance to discuss the CHAT options with the 
other HH members, before the final group choice was made. Gender aspects within 
the decision process have also been taken into account in the regression models, 
through a variable controlling for women´s autonomy and decision power within the 
HH. We also do not find remarkable differences concerning the distribution of health 
care-seeking episodes among male and female community members, so that we could 
exclude a different perception of health morbidity between the female and male 
individuals.  
Another drawback in the CHAT phases might be the involvement (for practical 
reasons) of a restricted group of community representatives for the development of 
the CHAT packages during the benefit options workshops. There is the possibility that 
some representatives might have forward-spaced personal interests over community 
interests.  
The three trials have offered different and complementary insights into the decision-
making process for the selection of the preferred health insurance package. In the first 
trial, individuals were asked to choose among packages differing in price, type of 
benefits and coverage level (caps), but all within a quite low range of prices, when 
compared to the other two trials. This trial was very relevant for showing how 
individuals in developing communities trade in terms of number and type of benefits, 
coverage level and premium. Since the majority of participants have chosen the most 
inclusive and expensive package (both as individual and as group preference), we can 
infer that “value for money” has been the preferred strategy. The regression analysis 
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showed that individuals belonging to HHs with a higher number of chronically ill 
members tend to choose more inclusive package with higher insurance coverage. This 
is probably due to the higher perceived morbidity and the higher risk exposure of 
chronically ill people. Those individuals reporting a better ability to self-finance 
health expenditures opted for cheaper packages, covering a lower proportion of health 
care costs but keeping the whole range of benefits as the most expensive package.  
The second trial offered participants the chance to choose among packages only 
differing in the level of coverage (caps) of each benefit, but all including the same 
benefits. This trial showed us how people value the level of coverage against risks 
offered by each package versus the price of the package, when the number and type of 
benefits is held fixed. All participants selected the cheapest package, both as 
individual and as group choice. Thus, we can conclude that a cheaper price was 
preferred to a better risk-protection (also confirmed by the responses of the exit-
questionnaire). This differs from the strategy observed in the first trial. However, it is 
likely that the lower price range in the first trial, compared to the second trial, allowed 
individuals to select the most expensive package whose price is even lower that the 
price of the cheapest package offered in the second trial.  
In the third trial, next to pure health insurance packages, people have been offered the 
chance to select combo-packages including life and health insurance. These combo-
packages won the interest of some of the participants (mostly the wealthier ones) 
during the individual CHAT session, but preferences shifted toward pure health 
insurance packages during the group sessions.  
The results from the regression analysis show that a higher frequency of 
hospitalizations increases the likelihood to select package 2 over the cheapest package 
1, which, in fact, does not include the coverage of hospitalization costs. Women 
belonging to larger families or to HHs including chronic ill members seemed to be 
more risk-averse and willing to select a more expensive and inclusive package. 
Wealthier HHs and those with a higher proportion of children were more likely to 
select combo-packages, probably linked to the ability of wealthier HHs to pay for 
more expensive and inclusive packages and the necessity for families with children to 
protect the HH against the risk of illness or death of the breadwinners.  
The price was a common reported factor influencing the choice of packages in all 
trials, but this came quite expected, given the HH financial constraints in such low-
income settings. Peer influence among SHG members was reported playing an 
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important role in decisions, especially for less educated members. This was also quite 
expected, given the low average literacy rate of women in the community. However, 
in the qualitative questionnaires both women and facilitators reported that no women 
was pushed to make a certain choice by group members and that, instead, each 
women´s opinion was taken into account during the group discussions. Results from 
the following years of implementation of the scheme might show a growing 
confidence of CHAT participants in the decision-making. The preference transitivity 
between the different CHAT sessions let us also infer that deliberations and 
discussion have taken place, which have influenced the decisions. Solidarity with less-
wealthy members might have also played a role in the final group sessions, since we 
observe a shift of preferences toward cheaper packages in the final group sessions in 
two of the three sites. The impact of the group discussions in the decision-making 
process is also inferable by observing the number of benefits included in the group 
choices, which always significantly exceeds the number of benefits included in the 
individual choices. 
Possessing RSBY social state insurance, instead, did not show to influence decision-
making particularly. This might also be connected to the fact that this governmental 
scheme, at the time the CHAT sessions have been run, was in the early stages of roll 
out in the regions targeted by the CBHI project. 
The CHAT process has received mostly positive feedbacks from the community. 
People reported that information was clearly transmitted by facilitators and that the 
tool was easy to understand. Group sessions succeeded in stimulating discussions and 
deliberations. We can also observe some correlation between the level of 
responsiveness of the final community package to prospect clients´ perceived 
priorities (manifested mostly through the individual choices made during CHAT1) on 
the willingness to enroll in the CBHI scheme. The majority of CHAT participants 
among the three sites who thereafter enrolled into the CBHI scheme had expressed 
their personal preference for the very same package that was offered as community 
package. However, some participants reported that the unaffordability of the 
insurance plan was determinant for the non-enrollment, even in trials where the group 
agreement had fallen on the cheapest package and despite the responsiveness of the 
community package to individual preferences. It would be relevant to study 
community members´ perception of the role of health care in their hierarchy of 
priorities, for example when compared to other priorities such as education, dowry or 
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telecommunications, which, if put above health care, might reduce the willingness to 
invest the limited HH resources in health insurance. A wedding, for example, is 
reported to be the most costly event within a household (see Chapter 2), whose cost is 
much higher than the health insurance premium demanded within the CBHI scheme.  
Further motives must have played a role in the enrolment decision during this first 
year. Ahuja & Jutting (2004) explain how credit availability represents the key for the 
success of micro insurance (MI) community programs. However, in our case, given 
the possibility for SHG members to borrow some (limited) amount of money through 
the informal microcredit system within the SHGs, it is less likely that the missing 
access to credit have constrained the financing of the insurance premiums and limited 
the enrolment rates. Some dissatisfaction with the packages offered within the CHAT 
might have also influenced enrolment decisions, since the exit questionnaires report 
that the limited number of benefits included in the packages was the reason for non-
enrolling in the scheme for some of the CHAT participants. However, it must be 
remembered that packages have been designed using a participatory approach. 
Restrictions on the number of benefits and on the level of coverage had been 
necessary in order to keep products affordable. Since the benefit options workshops 
have only involved representatives from the communities, it is possible that the 
packages defined during the workshops did not satisfy all community members´ 
personal preferences. Some dissatisfaction on the insurance packages also emerged 
during the visits to the project sites in the first year of implementation of the scheme. 
During the SHG meetings, several women expressed the wish to include the coverage 
of drugs costs in the insurance package. The problem of drugs costs and availability 
is, in fact, well known in the Indian context (Kotwani et al., 2003; Kotwani et al., 
2007; Dror et al., 2008; Gitanjali et al., 2011). Even basic drugs are often unavailable 
in the public pharmacies and hospitals, so that individuals are pushed to buy drugs by 
private sellers and pay higher prices. Unfortunately, this is a very complex issue that 
cannot be easily resolved within the constrained possibilities of a community-based 
scheme. Without governmental intervention in the supply and monitoring of the 
distribution of drugs in public medical facilities, community schemes cannot be able 
to support the cost of drugs through the community pooling of resources alone. 
Members from the first trial also expressed the wish to include the coverage of 
outpatient care in the community package. In fact, this was the only site where the 
coverage of outpatient care was not included, due to a missing agreement with the 
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local medical practitioners on the cost of visits for insured. This problem has been put 
on the top of the agenda of the CBHI-project partners, which have added the benefit 
to the insurance plan during the second year. 
3.9 Conclusions 
This study has shown that members of developing communities in rural India (mostly 
illiterate and with little or no experience with insurance mechanisms) are able to make 
decisions concerning health insurance plans, when provided with adequate 
information and when using eliciting tools which are tailored to their level of literacy. 
As foreseeable in low-income settings, the price was a common relevant factor 
influencing the choice of insurance plans in all three sites. However, community 
members also showed to be able to trade between the different features of the 
products offered. “Value for money” (within affordability) was often the preferred 
strategy for selecting among the packages. Peer influence among SHG members was 
also reported influencing decisions, as well as solidarity with less wealthy SHG 
members. This came quite expected, given the low average literacy rate of the 
participants and their inexperience with insurance. Additionally, we find that factors 
like the number of children and chronically ill members in the family, a higher 
frequency of hospitalization episodes within the household, as well as better HH 
financial conditions improve the probability of selecting more expensive and more 
inclusive packages. On the other side, households reporting a better ability to self-
finance health expenditures (referring to past experiences) were more likely to select 
cheaper packages, showing a more confidence in their future capability to face health 
expenditures. Surprisingly, we do not find significant differences between the choices 
made by RSBY-insured and uninsured participants. 
In general, the CHAT procedure has been positively received and evaluated by the 
communities. This study also showed some correlation between the results of the 
CHAT sessions and the willingness to enroll in the scheme. 
The information gained through these CHAT exercises is relevant for the 
development of insurance packages in resource-poor communities. The results give 
good hope for the replicability of such eliciting methods in other communities. The 
insights presented in this study might also serve as input for both policy makers and 
commercial insurers for the development of health insurance schemes in India that are 
more aligned with developing communities´ needs and expectations.
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3.10 Appendix 
Figure 3.3 - Round version of the CHAT board (Source: Danis et al., 2007). 
 
 
Figure 3.7 - Spreadsheet of the calculator used during the benefit options workshops. 
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Figure 3.8 - Description of the phases of the CHAT method for eliciting people´s preferences for health insurance packages (to be read from the left to the 
right).   
Notes: The subscript number on the SHG-members level of the graph is indicating the number of the respective SHG the individual belongs to (reported in the previous 
level of the graph). The same holds for the subscript number on each of the individual choices. 
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Figure 3.12 - Paths of preference transitivity from the individual choices, to the first and second group choices and to the final community package (each 
respectively represented in one level of the three-graph) in the first site (Pratapgarh district).  
Notes: For reasons of space, only the choices actually selected are reported. The graph allows tracing the path of preferences from the original individual choices 
onward and from the final community package backward toward the original individual choices. Choices are presented in percentage of the total choices in each CHAT 
session. 
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Figure 3.13 - Paths of preference transitivity from the individual choices, to the first and second group choices and to the final community package (each 
respectively represented in one level of the three-graph) in the second site (Kanpur Dehat district).  
Notes: For reasons of space, only the choices actually selected are reported. The graph allows tracing the path of preferences from the original individual choices 
onward and from the final community package backward toward the original individual choices. Choices are presented in percentage of the total choices in each 
CHAT session.
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-
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-
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Figure 3.14 - Paths of preference transitivity from the individual choices, to the first and second group choices and to the final community package (each 
respectively represented in one level of the three-graph) in the third site (Vaishali district).  
Notes: For reasons of space, the third level of the three-graph has been reduced to a summarized presentation of choices (which are not directly linkable to the original 
individual choices through backward steps on the three-graph). 
Shift from first 
group choice  
to final group  
choice 
Package 1 
Package 2 
Package 3 
Package 4 
Package 5 
Package 5 
Site 3 
Individual choice package 1 
17.90 % 
Individual choice package 2 
38.30 % 
Individual choice package 3 
14.40 % 
Individual choice package 4 
17.40 % 
Individual choice package 5 
10.30 % 
Individual choice package 6 
1.9 % 
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4 INSURANCE FOR THE POOR IN INDIA: THE 
ROLE OF PRIVATE INSURERS IN THE LOW-
INCOME MARKET 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Low public health spending and a lack of financing mechanisms for health care 
expenditures are significant causes of poor health outcomes and financial burden for 
low-income households in India. Micro health insurance has emerged as a tool for 
reducing households´ vulnerability to ill-health risk in developing communities. MI 
has also a social effect on the way individuals assume personal responsibility for 
dealing with their own risk exposure. 
MI is offered through different channels. Commercial insurance companies are 
currently the major global providers of MI products, through direct or indirect 
delivery channels (Roth et al., 2007), showing a growing active role of the private 
sector in development processes. However, commercial insurers entering the MI 
market need to adapt their established processes, designed for traditional clients, to 
the requirements of the low-income market. Insurers need to recognize that not only 
the products but, instead, the whole traditional business model requires restructuring 
when serving the MI market. In return, MI must show to be a viable business, in order 
to guarantee private insurers´ commitment. 
The Indian MI market is still at its infancy and there´s a lot of growth potential, 
especially for micro health insurance (MHI). Health insurance is, in fact, found to be 
one of the most strongly expressed needs of the poor (Roth el al, 2007; Chandhok, 
2009; Devabalan &  Sundararajan, 2009). The MHI market is still highly supply-
driven and demand is not yet adequately addressed. Life insurance is by far the most 
distributed MI product, because of the simpler actuarial calculations and the lower 
risk of fraud or moral hazard. Health insurance, however, is the fastest growing 
segment and there is large unserved demand (Mukherjee, 2012).  
Concerning MI, India has valuable lessons to teach to the rest of the world. India is in 
the vanguard in terms of innovative MI regulations, which are meant to encourage the 
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development of inclusive financial services. The Indian insurance regulatory agency, 
in fact, recognizes the importance of MI for social protection and particularly 
promotes the “partner-agent model“, which combines the technical know-how and 
capital reserves of commercial insurers with the agent's proximity and trustful 
relationship to the low-income clients. 
Based on these considerations, this study is meant to analyze the challenges and 
prospects for commercial micro insurance practices in India, with a focus on the 
provision of micro health insurance products. The final objective is to identify the role 
private insurance plays for the development of inclusive insurance practices. The 
importance of MI within commercial insurers´ portfolio will be analyzed, as well as 
the extent to which a corporate social responsible attitude can be connected to a 
broader commitment to extending insurance services to the unserved population.  
The analysis included in this paper is structured as follows. First, I will present a 
background overview of the insurance market in India and describe the peculiarities 
of the commercial MI market, as well as the different implementation models. A case 
study will be used to identify successful practices for the implementation of micro 
health insurance services using the partner-agent model. I will then present an 
overview of the MHI products currently offered by commercial insurers in India. 
Finally, I will describe the challenges for commercial insurers in the MI market and 
present possible solutions for the development of the MI sector in India, taking into 
account business ethical considerations, as well as the role of market regulations. 
Conclusions will then be summarized and discussed.  
4.2 The Indian insurance scenario 
Until the late ´90s, the insurance industry in India was led by a monopoly of national 
insurance companies.  In 1956, the Indian government combined local and foreign life 
insurers to form the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), a state-run life-
insurance monopoly. In 1973, general insurance companies were integrated in the 
state-run General Insurance Corporation (GIC).  First in 1999 the insurance market 
was allowed some limited openness and competition through the entry of private and 
foreign insurance companies into the market. The government also established the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), which is responsible for 
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the regulation of the insurance and reinsurance industry. The Constitution of India 
assigns to the federal government (or Union) the responsibility for the supervision of 
the insurance sector. Insurance companies must be officially formed and registered 
under the Companies Act of 1956. Foreign companies can only own a maximum of 
26%38 of equity of an Indian insurance company and can only work in the Indian 
market if collaborating with domestic companies. The law also limits the kind of risks 
a company can insure. Insurers are not allowed to sell life and general insurance on 
the same policy, with the exception of health insurance, which can be included as 
benefit in both life and general insurance products. The structure of the Indian 
insurance industry is presented in Figure 4.1. Life insurance generally includes credit 
life, saving policies and pension annuities. General insurance includes all other 
policies not included in life insurance. Health insurance is the second most important 
segment (after motor insurance) in terms of share of total general insurance premium 
for the financial year (FY) 2012-13 (Fig. 4.2). 
Figure 4.1- Structure of the Indian insurance industry. In brackets the number of registered 
insurers (as of March 2014). 
 
Source: Own elaboration on IRDA insurers lists (as of 12.03.2014)39 
                                                            
38 There have been proposals to extend the foreign direct investments (FDI) up to 49%, in order to 
strengthen the insurance market growth. The process still requires legislative approval and has found 
strong opposition. 
39 The lists are available at: 
https://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=PageNo129&mid=3.1.9 & 
https://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=PageNo264&mid=3.2.10 
(accessed 12.03.2014). 
Government of India 
Ministry of Finance 
IRDA 
Life Insurance General Insurance 
Private (21) Private (23) 
Public (1) Public (6) 
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Figure 4.2 - Segment-wise premium for general insurance for the FY 2012-13. 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on IRDA (2013) 
 
 
The insurance industry in India is at a primitive stage, compared to many other 
countries. The liberalization of the insurance market had brought positive effects on 
the penetration of insurance in India (measured as percentage of insurance premium to 
GDP), which has grown from 2.71 percent in 2001 to 5.20 percent in 2009. Lately, 
however, the penetration rate has gone down, reaching 3.96 percent in 2012. This 
means that the growth of the insurance sector has been lower than the GDP growth 
(IRDA, 2013). General insurance currently registers a penetration lower than 1% and 
isn´t as spread as life insurance (3.8%) yet. Health insurance is the fastest growing 
segment among general insurance policies, with a premium growth of 16.57% in the 
year 2012-13 (IRDA, 2013). Table 4.1 presents the health insurance premium by 
insurance type for the FYs 2011-12 and 2012-13 and shows a positive growth of the 
health insurance segment over the last years. Public insurers contributed 61% of the 
total health insurance premium for 2012-13, private insurers 28% and stand-alone 
health insurers 11%. The public sector insurers continue to be the leading players in 
health insurance in India (Figure 4.3)40. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
40 Data do not include the four stand-alone health insurers: Star Health and Allied Insurance Co. Ltd., 
Apollo Munich Health Insurance Co. Ltd., Max Bupa Health Insurance Co.Ltd. and Religare Health 
Insurance Co. Ltd.   
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Figure 4.3 - Market share of the general insurance sector among private and public insurers in 
FY 2012-13 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on IRDA (2013) 
 
 
The IRDA has taken several initiatives in order to strengthen the development of the 
health insurance sector, among which the standardization of several procedures for 
health insurance products and the support of procedures for protecting policyholders´ 
interests (IRDA, 2013). A Health Insurance Forum was created in 2012, which 
involves representatives of all stakeholders.  
Table 4.1 - Health insurance premium (in 10 million INR units or crore). 
Notes: In brackets the growth (in percent) over the previous year. 
 
Insurer 2011-12 2012-13 
Non-Life Private 3,660.79 4,382.52 
(20.76) (19.72) 
Non-Life Public 8,148.23 9,592.15 
(17.88) (17.72) 
Standalone Health 1,659.78 1,726.21 
(8.07) (4.00) 
Total 13,468.80 15,700.88 
(17.33) (16.57) 
Source: IRDA (2013) 
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4.3 The MI market 
4.3.1 Regulations and supervision 
Understanding that the new openess of the insurance market and the derived 
competitiveness could cause the exclusion of the weaker groups of the population 
from insurance services, the IRDA issued the IRDA (Obligation of Insurers to Rural 
or Social Sectors) Regulations in 2002, which require every insurance company to 
engage with the rural and social sectors by complying with the obligation to cover fix 
determined quotas of their portfolio within the rural and social sector. The regulation 
requires that 2% (7% for life insurance) of all general insurance business must be 
generated from the rural sector during the first financial year. The percentage should 
then increase annually to reach 7% (20% for life insurance) in the 10th financial year.  
Furthermore, in order to fulfill social sector obligations, insurers must sell at least a 
certain number of so called “social insurance policies“ to vulnerable groups of the 
population, mostly those employed in the informal sector. The IRDA regulations set 
rural and social insurance targets for every company starting its business activity after 
the IRDA Act 1999. Table 4.2 shows the current quotas required within the rural and 
social sector obligations for both life and general insurers. However, the regulations 
are not very specific concerning the definition of the target clients for the rural sector. 
There is no reference to the income level or any other specific socio-economic 
condition. For the social sector the regulator offers more precise information, 
explicitly defining the target clients as those employed in the informal sector, 
economically vulnerable (but without specifying any threshold) or belonging to 
backward casts and living in urban or rural areas. 
Table 4.2 - Rural and social sector obligations. 
Notes: Amounts have been corrected following the third Amendment issued by the IRDA in 2008, 
which corrects the requirements of the Regulations issued in 2002. 
 
 Rural sector obligations 
(in % of total portfolio) 
Social obligations 
(in number of policies) 
FY of insurer´s 
operation 
General 
insurance Life insurance Life and general insurance 
1st 2% 7% 5,000 
2nd 3% 9% 7,500 
3rd 5% 12% 10,000 
4th 5% 14% 15,000 
5th 5% 16% 20,000 
6th to 10th  5 to 7% 18 to 20% 25,000 to 55,000 
Source: IRDA (2002 & 2008) 
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For insurance companies which were already active before the IRDA Act 1999 the 
IRDA shall decide on the entity of the quota, but the regulations fix that the quantum 
of insurance business in the relevant sectors shall not be less than what had been 
recorded for the accounting year ending on 31 March 2002. Insurers failing to meet 
these targets risk monetary sanctions41 and can be revoked the insurance license.  
It is still difficult to assess the effectiveness of these regulations. By pushing insurers 
to serve the low-income market, the authority has promoted innovation in the 
insurance market. Insurers have now developed new products and delivery channels 
for reaching the low-income clients. However, there´s the risk that insurers, if put 
under pressure, might dump low-quality products on inexperienced low-income 
clients in order to be compliant with the obligations (Lloyd´s and MicroInsurance 
Center, 2009).  Moreover, most insurers showed no further commitment to the social 
and rural sector than what is required by regulations. Mukherjee (2012) compares the 
number of policies sold in the FY 2010-11 by selected insurers in rural areas with the 
rural sector obligations and finds that most insurers adopted a “just achieve targets“ 
approach and stopped selling policies when reaching the mandatory quotas. However, 
the last IRDA report for the FY 2012-13 shows some new commitment of private 
insurers in the rural and social segment, since several insurers were reported selling 
slightly more policies than those required by the authority during that financial year. 
The IRDA has shown awareness concerning the importance of MI for the extension of 
social security to vulnerable groups. In the “Concept paper on need for developing 
Micro-Insurance in India“ (18 August 2004) the IRDA promotes the partner-agent 
model (described in details in the following) for implementing MI and recognizes its 
high potential for increasing insurance coverage in India. In November 2005, the 
IRDA issued the “Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Micro-
insurance) Regulations, 2005“ (or Microinsurance Act), which create a regulatory 
framework for the partner-agent model, set boundaries for the development of MI 
products and define distribution mechanisms for MI. Concerning micro health 
                                                            
41 The IRDA has filed several insurers for failing to meet the quotas. Here a few examples: TATA AIG 
General Insurance was penalized for not meeting the target rural and social quotas for the financial year 
2006-2007, Tata AIG and Iffco Tokio missed out their rural sector obligations, while HDFC Ergo 
could not meet its social sector obligations for 2007-08. Apollo Munich didn´t meet rural and social 
obligations in 2008-09. They had to lay a penalty of Rs. 5 lakh (ca. Euro 6,000). 
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insurance, the regulations specify the terms of a health insurance contract (both within 
the general and life insurance segments) as individual or family contracts, with one 
year term (until 7 years in case health insurance is offered within life insurance) and a 
coverage of Rs. 5,000 to 30,000 for individual contracts or of Rs. 10,000 to Rs.30,000 
for family contratcs (Table 4.3). The regulations also define the figure of the “micro-
insurance agent“ as “a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) or a Self-Help Group 
(SHG) or a Micro-Finance Institution (MFI), who is appointed by and insurer to act as 
a micro-insurance agent for distribution of micro-insurance products“ 42.  
Table 4.3 - IRDA parameters for micro health insurance products for the general insurance 
segment. 
Type of 
cover 
Min. cover Max. cover Min. term 
of cover 
Max. term 
of cover 
Min. age 
at entry 
Max. age 
at entry 
Health 
insurance 
(individual) 
Rs. 5,000 Rs. 30,000 1 year 1 year Insurer´s discretion 
Health 
insurance 
(family) 
Rs. 10,000 Rs. 30,000 1 year 1 year Insurer´s discretion 
Source: IRDA Microinsurance Act (2005) 
The IRDA had also released an exposure draft in July 2012 that aimed at re-
examining the definition of MI products and at restructuring the MI market. 
According to the draft, each insurer would only be allowed to market one single 
product in rural regions in order to fulfill social and rural obligations. In each state, 
only two general and two life insurers would be allowed to sell their single product 
and should cover at least 75% of rural and social obligations within that state. This 
proposal was meant to create stability and lower competition in the MI market but has 
been highly opposed by insures and consequently not been approved (Saraswathy, 
2012).  
India has been a world leader in the development of new regulations for the MI sector, 
motivating the global insurance industry to follow its example. The IRDA reports that 
in the FY 2006 (only one year after the introduction of MI regulations) more than 30 
million policies had already been sold to low-income clients (Roth et al., 2007). MI is 
more and more recognized as an important tool for reaching national human 
                                                            
42 The IRDA has issued a circular on April 3rd 2013 and extented the definition of micro insurance 
agents, which now also includes, among others: district cooperative banks, regional rural banks and 
individual owners of Kirana shops (small local retailers), of public call offices, of petrol bunk and of 
medical shops located in rural areas. 
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development objectives. Brazil followed India´s example and also introduced MI 
regulations in 2005, followed by the Philippines in 2006 and Peru in 2007 (USAID, 
2008). However, the level of compulsoriness within the MI regulations should be 
reconsidered when replicating the Indian model in other countries. Godbole and 
McCord (2007), for example, suggest a new model allowing insurers interested in 
entering the MI market to cooperate for reaching the compulsory quotas in the rural 
and social sector. The authors propose that surplus policies reached by an insurer 
could be purchased by insurers in deficit, in a sort of MI credits system. This would 
not diminish the final effect (the total number of policies issued in the rural and social 
sector). Governments could also consider other ways of motivating insurers to serve 
the low-income market, such as by offering tax benefits or co-participation in 
governmental social security schemes. The regulator should also define the role of 
community-based (or mutual) informal MI schemes within the MI market. In India, 
such schemes operate in a legal vacuum, since the IRDA hasn´t taken any clear 
position regarding their legal status yet. As non-registered insurers, such schemes do 
not need to comply with rural and social obligations and can overlook minimum 
capital requirements, but are also excluded from the advantages of getting re-
insurance. Regulated insurers define it unfair competition and call for equal 
regulation. However, the regulator should also consider the compensative role such 
schemes play in serving the vulnerable groups, where the state and commercial 
insurers have not yet arrived. 
4.3.2 MI distribution models for commercial insurers 
Private insurers can distribute MI products through two different models. The first is 
the agent model, which is the standard insurance model used by private insurance 
companies and which implies the direct sell of policies through the insurance agency 
offices. The insurer is alone responsible for the design and marketing of the products, 
as well as for pre- and post-contract services. Clients come into direct contact with the 
insurer when buying an insurance policy. The second model is the partner-agent 
model. This model implies a partnership between a formal insurer and an agent, which 
is in close contact with the community and which sells insurance products on behalf 
of the insurer, thus allowing decentralizing the insurer´s financial services to remote 
and rural areas. An agent is commonly an NGO, a Microfinance (MF) organization or 
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a local retailer (for example a fertilizer supplier in rural areas). This is the model that 
is currently mostly used within MI. The agent is retributed by the insurer through a 
commission or fee on the policy sold. This distribution system enables insurers to 
come into contact with the low-income customers and to reduce transaction costs, 
since it utilizes the agent´s established networks within the community. The agent 
supports the marketing of the product, collects premiums and has an important 
monitoring function. The insurer absorbs all the insurance risks and is responsible for 
the design and pricing of the products, as well for the claim-settlement procedures.  
Private insurers can also offer MI products through public-private partnerships, by 
collaborating in governmental schemes, such as the RSBY health insurance. Such 
schemes are subsidies-dependent and therefore not comparable with market-based 
models. These schemes are not further discussed because out of the scope of this 
study. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the main pros and cons of both agent and partner-agent models. 
The main advantage of the partner-agent model resides in the combination of both 
partner´s and agent´s strenghts in their core activities. The model benefits from both 
the technical know-how and capital reserves of the former insurer and from the 
agent´s networks, vicinity and trustful relationship to the local communities. 
However, possible conflicts of interest might arise between the agent´s social goals 
and the insurer´s business objectives. Agents do not want to put at risk the credibility 
and trust gained within the communities where they operate. They might tend to be 
more légere in claim-settlement issues, in order to reduce clients´ dissatisfaction. 
Insurers, on their side, expect to compensate their upfront investments and can only 
guarantee their commitment if there´s a perspective of profitability in the business, 
which is only possible when the scheme reaches scale and a large pool of 
policyholders is created.  
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Table 4.4 - Summary of pros and cons of the agent model vs the partner-agent model. 
 
Distribution 
model 
Pros Cons 
Agent model  Formally recognised MI 
model; 
 technical insurance know-
how and capital reserves; 
 can formally get re-
insurance; 
 agents are part of the staff 
of the insurance company 
and adequately trained in 
respect of the business 
objectives of the principal; 
 no coordination with 
partners necessary. 
 High transaction costs; 
 internal agents necessitate 
extensive training for learning the 
different MI setting; 
 offices are usually distant and 
diffcult to be accessed by poor 
people (physical distance); 
 clients might also be scared away 
by the formality of the insurance 
offices; 
 difficult to get trust of  poor 
customers without a local partner 
guaranteeing for the insurer´s 
good purposes; 
 agents might be more interested in 
quick selling than informed sales 
and clients satisfaction. 
 
Partner- 
agent model  
 
 Formally recognised MI 
model which operates 
under the insurance law; 
 the model combines both 
partner´s and agent´s 
potential and expertise in 
their core activities; 
 formal insurer offers 
stability through solid 
financial reserves and the 
possibility of getting re-
insurance for the scheme; 
 lower transaction costs by 
using the agent´s networks 
within the communities; 
 reduced information 
asymmetries thanks to the 
agent´s close contact with 
the community; 
 closer monitoring system 
against fraud; 
 the close contact with the 
community allows for 
direct clients´ feedback 
and helps the re-design of  
products for increasing 
clients´satisfaction.  
 Difficulty in individuating the 
adequate partner; 
 agents often need insurance 
training (minimum training is also 
required by the IRDA in the 
`Concept Paper on 
Microinsurance`); 
 local partners (mostly NGOs and 
MFIs) are dependent on external 
funding from donors and are 
therefore less reliable in the long-
term; 
 many NGOs and MFIs are often 
already involved in exclusive 
partnership and there are often 
difficulties for insurers building 
connections in the desired target 
region; 
 possible conflicts of interest 
between the social scope of  the 
agent and the business interests of 
the insurer. 
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4.3.3 Developing innovative MI models: An empirical analysis 
This section presents a case study that is used to empirically identify successful 
features and challenges of an innovative MI implementation model. The case 
presented is relevant for two reasons: It represents a best practice in terms of 
innovation of product features, organizational structure and procedures, but it also 
shows some obstacles which could also be encountered by other MI schemes.   
Within the partner-agent project “Insure Lives and Livelihoods” (ILAL), a response 
program for the coastal communities in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry (following the 
tsunami disaster in 2004), the NGO CARE India (an affiliate of CARE International) 
implemented a very innovative micro health insurance program43, together with the 
insurance company Bajaj Allianz General Insurance (a joint venture between Bajaj 
Finserv Limited and the German Allianz SE). The case study is based on information 
gained trough semi-structured qualitative interviews44. Additional information is 
extracted from project brochures and project publications, together with the 
documentation from a mid-term review of the project45. Here the main features of the 
micro-health insurance program: 
Organizational structure: The program is based on a partnership between a private 
insurer and an international development organisation and is locally supported by 
partner NGOs active at the project sites. It consists of three health mutual schemes (in 
the Cuddalore, Kanyakumari and Nagipattinam districts in Tamil Nadu), with Bajaj 
Allianz playing the role of co-insurer and supporting the financial viability of the 
program by settling claims at the high end of the spectrum in exchange for one third 
of the insurance premium. Two thirds of the premium is kept at the mutual level for 
managing smaller claims. 
Target population: A feasibility study confirmed the need of health insurance in the 
targeted regions. The good health care infrastructure in the regions was recognized as 
                                                            
43 The microinsurance program also included two life and two general insurance plans. These are not 
discussed, beacuse not relevant for this study. 
44 Interviews were conducted during my research stay in India in September and October 2011 with 
contact persons from CARE India and Bajaj Allianz, respectively Mr. Devabalan Raja (technical 
Manager at CARE India) and Dr. Ashok Patil (Head of Rural Business at Bajaj Allianz). 
45 The review was commissioned by the partners in 2010 and conducted by consultants from the Micro 
Insurance Academy (Delhi). The report is available on request upon authorization of the interested 
parties. 
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favourable to the program. Target groups have been well defined on the base of needs 
and vulnerability. Target clients belonged to coastal fisher communities and rural poor 
families in tsunami-affected districts. The program was also aiming at including 
marginalized groups of the community, such as backward casts. 
Choice of the partner: Bajaj Allianz considered the advantage of a partnership with an 
organization such as CARE and knew that the association could guarantee enormous 
outreach, given the large network of CARE´s partner-NGOs, which would offer 
access to large amount of SHGs. CARE reports that “Bajaj Allianz saw the business 
proposition at the bottom of the pyramid“ (Devabalan & Sundarajan, 2009). Bajaj 
Allianz, on the other side, represented a good commercial partner, thanks to its 
technical know-how and the financial capability to provide upfront investment for the 
product design and the start-up of the program. Both partners had already experience 
with MI. The ILAL program had already been tested and implemented in Andhra 
Pradesh in 2006, in collaboration with Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance, before 
extending it to Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. The project´s original partner-NGO 
Kodi Trust already had a long experience with programs in the area of health 
promotion, through which it had earned considerable trust in the communities. 
Table 4.5 - Main features of the micro health insurance product. 
Age for proposers  
Age for family members 
18-70 years 
(3months-70 years) 
Term 1 year 
Premium Rs. 392 (€ 4.70/family of four) 
Sum insured 
 
 
Surgeries 
Diseases 
Day care 
Max Rs. 10,000/family 
Mutual  Bajaj Allianz 
Rs. 5,000 
Rs. 2,500 
Rs. 1,000 
 Rs. 5,001- Rs. 10,000 
Rs. 2,501- Rs. 5,000 
- 
Other services Outpatient treatment at subsidized cost, medicines at subsidized rate, 
quality care at concession from the network hospital. 
Exclusions One year waiting period for pre-existing diseases; treatment for 
alcoholism/drug abuse; sterilization and other ailments requiring tertiary 
care. 
Source: CARE India (n.d). 
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The product: Using information obtained through a baseline study (aiming at 
assessing people´s specific needs, risk exposure and ability to pay for insurance), 
Bajaj Allianz cooperated with CARE in the development of a specifically designed 
product, against its initial proposition to use the existing products designed for 
fulfilling the social and rural obligations. The product was first piloted in the 
Kanyakumari district in December 2007 and then officially marketed in 2008, in 
partnership with the local NGO Kodi Trust. It was thereafter extended to the other 
sites. Table 4.5 presents the highlights of the product. Given the existence of a good 
network of public hospitals in the project region, the products have been designed to 
include benefits complementing the RSBY national scheme by offering cashless 
tertiary care.  
Voluntary enrolment: Despite the risk of low demand, enrolment was offered on a 
voluntary basis (instead of as compulsory linkage to savings or credit schemes), with 
the conviction that people would be more likely to put value and trust into programs 
offering them the chance to choose for themselves. Thus, in the first place, the project 
needed to reach a sufficient demand and, subsequently, to reach a fast scaling up, in 
order to guarantee the financial sustainability of the scheme. 
Educational and communicational tools: Effective educational programs and 
insurance awareness campaigns had been developed for the whole ILAL program, in 
order to spread information about the relevance and functioning of the insurance 
program. Appropriate communication strategies have been developed for the 
communities, such as visual materials (posters, flip charts, brochures), folk programs 
(puppet shows, street plays) and group meetings (e.g. SHG meetings). The 
educational programs were very comprehensive and included risk education, 
insurance education, product education and product logistics issues (e.g. premium 
payment and claim settlement). The ILAL educational scheme was recently described 
as a best practice in an ILO´s study (Burns & Dalal, 2010).  
Monitoring: Local NGOs have promoted mutual committees to govern and monitor 
the mutual schemes locally. Qualified doctors have also been appointed for the 
provision of outpatient care and for controlling against overutilization of services. The 
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program had also selected network of trusted hospitals which would offer quality 
health care services at concession prices. 
Program outreach and challenges for success: 46After two years of operations, a mid-
term review was commissioned by CARE and Bajaj Allianz, in order to assess the 
achievements and to learn from the first experiences. The review was meant for 
identifying successful practices for replication and for suggesting improvements, 
whenever required. The Micro Insurance Academy was engaged for the review. The 
parameters used for the evaluation were: social goals, operations and management 
(key performance indicators, process mapping, distribution, innovation, management 
and strategy), intermediation, monitoring and evaluation, capacity building, 
coordination and claim management. In general, the health mutuals were considered 
offering an “important and interesting opportunity for providing quality, low-cost 
family health coverage“. Positive also the evaluation of the project´s governance, 
which had been “consistently addressed“. However, low renewal rates and falling 
membership numbers were registered in the Kanyakumari site during the second year 
of operations (the other sites had just completed their first year of operations and 
renewal data were not available). As of March 2010, the program was still financially 
sustainable but with little hope to further grow, against the target required by the 
partner-insurer. Consultants suggested conducting a due diligence of the project, 
before any further investment was made. The program had proven to be innovative in 
several different ways, from the product features to the organizational structure of the 
scheme. The product had also been designed to effectively meet local needs. 
However, the scheme had an average turn-around time of claims of three months, 
which was likely to create dissatisfaction among clients. 
Since the start of the program, several new challenges had emerged due to external 
factors: 
o The government of Tamil Nadu had started a national pilot scheme offering 
free insurance coverage for critical illnesses and its outreach was spreading 
very fast (ca. 30,000 families as of beginning of 2010). Free coverage 
distracted clients from the fee-based mutual program. 
                                                            
46 This section is based on Dror & Donodovan (2010). 
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o A new tsunami in 2008 brought huge amount of donors´ funding and 
governmental grants to the region where the mutual schemes were developed. 
Clients started to lose interest for the fee-based mutual schemes. 
o Consequently, clients started to pretend reimbursement of part of premium 
when they did not claim. 
Table 4.6 presents data about the outreach of the program compared to the yearly 
targets. 
Table 4.6 - Yearly program outreach in terms of new enrolments and renewals (expressed in 
No. of families) vs yearly project targets. 
Year of operations No. enrolments/renewals 
(families) 
Project target 
Year 1 (as of June 2008) 1,100 families  
(3,872 individuals) 
1,500 families 
Year 2  292 renewals (18%) 
767 new families enrolled 
3,000 families 
Year 3 (as of March 2010) 97 renewals (9%) 
501 new families enrolled 
7,000 families 
Source: CARE India (n.d.) 
During the first year (as of June 2008), 1,100 families were enrolled in the scheme. 
Enrolment had then declined of 1,632 units during the second year, with only 292 
renewals (18%) and 767 new families. In the third year, renewals were only 97 (9%) 
and the new families enrolled only 501. The annual target of 5,000 families was still 
far away. In September 2011, Mr. Devabalan reported that Bajaj Allianz would leave 
the scheme starting from December 2011 and that, therefore, a new partner was 
needed in order to maintain the scheme alive. 
Reasons for failure: The interviews conducted with representatives of both project 
partners helped getting some insights into the factors that have mined a MI program 
that was based on a very good structure. Mr. Devabalan reported that when Bajaj 
Allianz first approached CARE in 2006, the idea of a common MI scheme was not in 
the air. Bajaj Allianz had collected a considerable sum of money through a social 
responsible employee-project and wanted to donate this sum to CARE in order to 
support the victims of the tsunami in south India. It was CARE convincing Bajaj for a 
broader commitment into a common MI project aiming at benefiting the community 
in a sustainable way. However, no formal agreement was signed concerning the 
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length of the commitment. Later on, the scheme started to be challenged by low 
enrolment and renewal rates. The insurer pushed to extend the schemes to new areas 
but CARE found it difficult to implement the scheme in new settings and didn´t 
manage to create the expected new demand for the program. In the meantime, a 
change in the management took place at Bajaj Allianz. The new management team set 
new priorities while restructuring the company´s investments and distribution 
strategies. The MI scheme was not in the new management´s interests anymore, since 
it was not likely to scale and bring profits. Bajaj Allianz considered that the new 
subsidized governmental program would not offer any chance for the outreach of the 
mutual schemes in the region and, consequently, abandoned the scheme in December 
2011. 
Dr. Ashok Patil claimed that the change in the management was not relevant for the 
decision to abandon the scheme. The main reason was, instead, the incapability for 
CARE to make the scheme financially viable. Since the product was well designed, “it 
had to scale”. The scheme was not financially self-sustainable. The upfront 
investment made by the insurer did not suffice to cover all transaction costs and the 
further extension of the program. CARE demanded frequent new funding from the 
insurer, which made the scheme become too expensive for Bajaj Allianz.  
Additionally, Bajaj Allianz had started distributing a new MI product called “Micro 
Care“47. This accident insurance product was much easier to administer than the 
health insurance product and its outreach was much faster, thus very profitable and 
preferable to the health insurance one. To summarize, Table 4.7 contains the main 
successful features of the scheme and the challenges met in the implementation. 
The lesson learned: Within a partner-agent model the local organizations (agents) are 
challenged by the difficulty to reach the target objectives and profitability goals of the 
commercial partner. The commitment of a commercial insurer to MI schemes is 
strictly related to the management´s commitment, which depends on the prospects of 
profitability that the scheme can offer. 
 
                                                            
47 Details on the product are available at: 
https://allianz.com/v_1380546675000/media/responsibility/documents/microinsurance_product_pool_o
ctober_2013#page=39 (accessed 12.11.2013). 
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Table 4.7 - Summary of successful features and challenges of the CARE-Bajaj Allianz mutual 
scheme. 
Successful features   Challenges  
 Good distribution network through 
CARE & NGOs; 
 Competition of governmental 
programs; 
 Technical know-how and experience of 
Bajaj-Allianz; 
 Low renewal rates; 
 Low outreach; 
 Good organizational structure, 
governance and monitoring; 
 Management commitment (partner 
insurer); 
 Good educational and 
communicational strategies; 
 Financial sustainability;  
 Replicating the scheme in new settings. 
 Customized product;  
 Voluntary enrolment;  
 Good health care infrastructure in the 
region; 
 
 Contracting with health care providers 
(reduced costs of claims). 
 
Reaching scale is the guarantee needed for the company´s management to justify 
investments in MI, since low-premium contracts can only bring returns when a large 
number of policies are issued. Many external factors can also influence the success of 
such schemes. For example, subsidized governmental schemes represent a big 
challenge for the uptake of fee-based MI schemes. It is therefore necessary to create 
alternative insurance plans, complementing the state-run subsidized schemes. 
Furthermore, an adequate health infrastructure is a fundamental issue for guaranteeing 
the attractiveness and effective utilization of a health insurance policy. 
4.3.4 Micro health insurance products offered by commercial insurers 
Though the low number of officially registered MI products at IRDA (only 23 
products filed by insurance companies since the MI regulations in 200548), there are a 
lot of non-registered MI products offered by commercial insurers in India. The 23 
products currently registered are offered by life insurers. Most of these policies are 
sold through MFIs as compulsory policies in combination with credit services. None 
of these policies includes health insurance coverage. Mukherjee (2012) estimates that 
as of 2012 approximately 64 products were offered by private life and general insurers 
which were not registered as MI products at IRDA. Furthermore, 40 schemes (mostly 
concentrated in southern India), offered MI products in collaboration with local NGOs 
or MFIs. However, these estimates do not allow to infer the prevalence of health 
insurance schemes and products. Several other studies have attempted to track record 
                                                            
48 The list of MI products registered at IRDA is available at: 
http://www.irda.gov.in/ADMINCMS/cms/NormalData_Layout.aspx?page=PageNo271&mid=26.2 
(accessed 16.10.2013). 
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on the distribution of MI products in India but, given the fast and continuous changes 
taking place within the sector, they are not up-to-date with the current sector 
developments and most of the products indicated in these studies are not offered 
anymore. A study conducted by ILO (2005a) identified 83 MI products filed by 19 
insurance companies in India as of 2005. Of these products, 42 were life insurance 
products and 41 were general insurance products, of which 14 were health insurance 
products (10 covering hospitalization costs and 4 covering critical illnesses - mostly 
excluding coverage of costs related to maternity and HIV/AIDS). Another study by 
ILO (2005b) reported that other 51 products were sold by MFIs, cooperatives, health 
mutuals and health care providers in partnership with insurance companies.  
This section presents an up-to-date overview of the micro health insurance products 
currently offered by private insurers doing business in India. Table 4.8 lists all micro 
health insurance products currently available. Details are obtained from insurers´ 
websites and reports, public disclosures, as well as scientific references. The table 
reports the name of the product and the insurer (a link to the website with information 
on the product is provided), the risk insured, whether it is an individual or group 
policy, the premium (when available) and policy exclusions. The last column shows 
the classification of the product as reported by the insurer (distinguishing between 
products which explicitly target the rural and social sector and those that are classified 
as micro insurance products) and the distribution channels used to market the products 
(when reported). 
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Table 4.8 - Micro health insurance products offered by commercial insurers as of March 2014 
 
Product name & insurer Risk insured 
and benefits 
Type of policy Premium (year) Exclusions 
and 
restrictions 
Classification  
and distribution channels 
Gramin Aarogya Nidhi  
HDFC ERGO49 
 
Available at: 
http://www.hdfcergo.com/rural-
insurance/gramin-arogya-nidhi.html 
 Patient 
hospitalization (due 
to accident or 
sickness) 
 personal accident 
benefits 
 
 Both 
individual 
and family 
floater 
 (not reported)  Pre-existing 
diseases (first 4 
years) 
 HIV/AIDS 
 mental disorder 
or insanity 
 Under the voice 
“Rural sector“ 
but targeted at 
“rural, suburban and 
social sectors“ 
 Channels: public-
private partnerships 
and collaboration 
with NGOs and 
MFIs 
Family health insurance Plan 
ICICI Lombard  
 
Available at: 
https://www.icicilombard.com/rural-
insurance/Health-insurance.html# 
 Patient 
hospitalization  in 
network hospitals 
(bed charges max. 
Rs. 600 per day) 
 pre-hospitalization 
up to 30 days 
 post-hospitalization 
up to 60 days 
 selected daycare 
procedures 
(dialysis, cataract, 
radiotheraphy,…) 
 
 
 Familiy 
floater 
(eligibility 
91days 
until 60 
years) 
 (not reported- 
premium varies 
with sum insured) 
 No-claim discount 
(5% on renewal) 
 Pre-existing 
diseases (first 4 
years) 
 Rural insurance 
                                                            
49 Information about the MI segment at HDFC ERGO are partly obtained from the Munich Re website: 
 http://www.munichre.com/corporate-responsibility/en/solutions/primary-insurance/microinsurance/default.aspx. 
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Product name & insurer Risk insured 
and benefits 
Type of policy Premium (year) Exclusions 
and 
restrictions 
Classification  
and distribution channels 
(No name) 
CHOLA MS General Insurance 
 
Available at:  
www.cholainsurance.com/rural-
insurance.aspx 
 Health insurance 
(no specification) 
 Critical illness 
insurance 
 Family 
floater 
 individual 
 (not reported) 
 
 (not reported)  Rural insurance 
Future Sampoorna Suraksha-  
Micro Insurance Product 
Future Generali 
 
Available at: 
http://www.futuregenerali.in/GeneralIns
urance/PDF/Sampoorna%20Brochure_8
%20x%2016.pdf 
Includes a health insurance 
section covering: 
 hospital cash benefit 
(max 30 days) for 
each continuous and 
completed period of 
24 hrs of 
hospitalization due 
to accidental bodily 
injury or sickness  
 
 Individual 
policy 
(group 
policy also 
possible, 
conditions 
not 
presented) 
 Age 
eligibility:
6 months-
70 years 
Plan A: Rs. 175 for Rs. 175 
daily hospitalization benefit 
Plan B: Rs. 280 for Rs. 250 
daily hospitalization benefit 
Plan C: Rs. 340 for Rs. 300 
daily hospitalization benefit 
 Eclusive of service 
tax 
 Max coverage 30 
days (subject to 
one day 
deductible) 
 Pre-existing 
adversities (2 
years waiting 
period) 
 Further 
exclusions in 
policy wording 
(section 1, 1. 
(ii)) 
 Rural sector 
Rural Hospital Cash 
Insurance 
Royal Sundaram General 
Insurance 
 
Available at: 
http://www.royalsundaram.in/rural-
social-sector/rural-hospital-cash-
insurance.aspx 
 Hospital cash 
benefit for each 
continuous and 
completed period of 
24 hrs of 
hospitalization due 
to accidental bodily 
injury or sickness 
for a maximum 
period of 21 days  
 
 Individual, 
spounce or 
family 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Silver policy:  
Rs. 400 for  
Rs. 500 daily 
hospital cash 
 Gold policy:  
Rs. 650 for  
Rs. 1,000 daily 
hospital cash 
 
 
 
 
 Pre-existing 
diseases  
 AIDS 
 Pregnancy 
 Mental 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 Rural sector 
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Product name & insurer Risk insured 
and benefits 
Type of policy Premium (year) Exclusions 
and 
restrictions 
Classification  
and distribution channels 
Shakti Health Shield 
Royal Sundaram General 
Insurance 
 
Available at: 
http://www.royalsundaram.in/rural-
social-sector/social-sector-sakthi-
shield.aspx  
 (not reported)  Individual 
(SHG 
women) or 
family 
policy 
 (not reported)  (not reported)  Social sector 
Personal Accident Plus 
“Micro Care“ 
Bajaj Allianz General insurance  
 
Available at: 
https://www.allianz.com/v_1398674893
000/media/responsibility/documents/All
ianz_SE_-
_Microinsurance_Product_Pool_3_7_-
_20140502_-_MH.pdf 
 Hospital cash 
benefit for illness 
(within accidental 
death and disability 
policy) 
 Individual  Rs. 150-300  (not reported) 
 
 Rural and “financial 
inclusion“ segment 
 Channels: Banks and 
MFIs 
 
Jan Kalyan Bima 
IFFCO-Tokio General 
Insurance Co.Ltd. 
 
Available at: 
Available at: 
http://www.iffcotokio.co.in/micro-rural-
insurance 
 
 
 Critical illness 
combined with 
other benefits (fire, 
robbery, personal 
accident) 
 
 
 Individual 
or group 
policy 
 
 
 Rs. 450 
(individual) 
 
 
 Hospitalization  
due to illness 
during first 90 
days 
 
 Microinsurance and 
rural sector 
 Channels: 
Cooperative 
societies, Micro- 
insurance agents, 
Cooperative banks, 
Bima Kendras 
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Product name & insurer Risk insured 
and benefits 
Type of policy Premium (year) Exclusions 
and 
restrictions 
Classification  
and distribution channels 
Kisan Suvidha Bima 
IFFCO-Tokio General 
Insurance Co.Ltd. 
 
Available at: 
http://www.iffcotokio.co.in/micro-rural-
insurance 
 Hospitalization due 
to critical illness 
combined with 
other benefits (fire, 
robbery, personal 
accident, tractor 
insurance) 
 Individual 
and/or 
family 
members 
 Age 
eligibility: 
5-65 years 
 (not reported)  (not reported)   Microinsurance and 
rural sector 
 Channels: 
Cooperative 
societies, Micro- 
insurance agents, 
Cooperative banks, 
Bima Kendra 
Swasthya Pratham Micro 
Insurance Product 
MAX Bupa Health Insurance 
 
http://www.maxbupa.com/customer-
care/DownloadAllFrom/Swasthya%20P
ratham%20Policy%20Wording.pdf 
 Hospitalization, 
selected day-care 
procedures, pre and 
post hospitalization,  
medical treatment 
due to illness or 
accident (additional 
benefits for 
outpatient care, 
maternity care, 
transportation, wage 
loss can be added) 
 Individual 
or group 
 Age limit 
18-65 
years  for 
main 
member 
and 
3months-
65years 
for family 
member 
 (not reported)  HIV/AIDS and 
several other 
exclusions 
 pre existing 
conditions for 
first 2 years 
 30 days waiting 
period 
 
 Microinsurance 
Rural Micro Health Insurance 
Star Health and Allied 
Insurance Company Ltd. 
 
Available at: 
http://www.starhealth.in/rural.php 
 Health insurance: 
hospitalization for 
more than 24h, 
surgery, ambulance 
transportation 
 (not 
reported) 
 Age 
eligibility: 
5months-
65years 
 (not reported)  pre-existing 
diseases (2 years 
waiting time) 
 children insured 
only with at least 
one  parent 
 Rural and 
microinsurance 
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The IRDA offers no clear information concerning the differences between the micro 
insurance products defined by the IRDA regulations (2005) and the social and rural 
insurance products required by the 2002 obligations for the rural and social sector. 
Therefore, there´s no clear distinction between micro insurance and social and rural 
insurance. None of the products presented in Table 4.8 has been officially registered 
at IRDA. Few insurers classify their products under MI. Most of the reported insurers 
classified the products as “rural products“, probably because they are especially meant 
to comply with the rural obligations. However, no reference is made to the social 
sector. Thus, MI and rural products are generally considered distinct entities, with 
rural products being the most prevalent kind of product. Insurers have not embraced 
the concept of micro insurance as defined by the IRDA through the MI regulations 
and the number of MI products registered per year at IRDA is even declined in the 
last years. Only one product of the 23 registered products has been registered in 2009-
10 and no new product has been registered ever since. Apparently, offering such MI 
products as defined in the IRDA regulations is not a priority for insurers, when 
compared to the necessity of fulfilling the rural and social sector obligations. This 
might be due to the difficulty for insurers to distribute products with features fitting 
with the parameters defined by the IRDA. Many insurers claim, in fact, that the 
restrictions on the level of coverage within MI products (see Table 4.3) are inadequate 
and that products with such features would be even unattractive for low-income 
clients (Rajalakshmi & Indira, 2013).  
Analyzing the features of the products listed in Table 4.8, another tendency can be 
identified among the products. The majority of the products offer coverage limited to 
hospitalization costs. Most commercial insurers opt for a one-fits-all product, 
indifferentiated and mostly limited to the coverage of high-cost and low-frequency 
risks such as hospitalizations. In Chapter 2, findings from three rural sites show that 
the main ill-realated financial burden for HHs in rural areas is represented by low-cost 
but highly frequent medical costs, such as those connected to chronic illnesses. These 
figures are also confirmed by other authors in other regions in India (Dror et al., 2008; 
Binnendijk et al., 2011) and nationally by IRDA50 national analyses. The burden 
                                                            
50 (Now ex-) IRDA-chairman Hari Narayan held a presentation on „Health and Health Insurance in 
India “within the Session „Health Insurance Regulation and Health System Performance: The 
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created by these frequent medical costs is further increased by the continuous inflation 
of medical expenditures (IRDA, 2011). Private insurers should enter the MI market by 
creating an added value, thus offering other products than those offered by the 
government or by other organizations. The RSBY subsidized scheme is a huge 
competitor for private insurers offering MI products covering hospitalization costs 
only. Private insurers should therefore create a complementary market, for example 
by focusing on preventive and outpatient care.  
In general, I found that little information on MI products was made available by 
insurers. Premiums are often not reported, as well as the delivery channels. An 
exception is Alliance SE, which was the only company publishing detailed 
information on the MI activities and on the way the company develops new business 
models and extends its spectrum to new countries51. It was very difficult to get 
information concerning insurers´ costs, investments and revenues/losses derived from 
the MI segment. The only information publicly available are the “short term and long 
term investment in social sector“, included in some companies´ financial disclosure, 
and (rarely) the number of policies sold within the rural and social sector and the total 
premium collected. It was not possible to isolate information on micro health 
insurance products. Without a clear definition of MI products and with only 
disaggregated data available for micro insurance businesses, it is difficult to compare 
performances among providers and different schemes. 
4.4 Challenges for commercial insurers in the MI market 
Insurers that want to expand into this sector face several challenges. The lack of 
sectoral statistical data and performance indicators, as well as the lack of information 
on MI clients´ needs and on their level of risk exposure, creates insecurity among 
insurance suppliers, given the difficulty in developing and pricing MI products. For 
the development of health insurance products, detailed information on the clients´ 
health status and morbidity are necessary, in order to apply actuarial pricing methods. 
While this information is easily available within the standard insurance business, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Imperative Link “of the 8th World Congress on Health Economics in Toronto on July 13, 2011. The 
presentation is available upon request from the author. 
51 Detailed information on the products is available at: 
https://allianz.com/v_1380546675000/media/responsibility/documents/microinsurance_product_pool_o
ctober_2013#page=39 (accessed 12.11.2013) 
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very costly and difficult to be obtained within the low-income segment. Insurers need 
to develop new ways of quantifying new risks and in absence of adequate 
information. Furthermore, products must be simple and use simple procedures. The 
low premium and the comparatively high transition costs make the business in this 
segment very difficult for commercial insurers. Finding appropriate and new non-
traditional delivery channels to reach the low-income clients represents another big 
challenge for insurers, together with the need to develop new monitoring systems for 
the claim settlement. Some of the main problems affecting the penetration of 
commercial micro insurance are now discussed in details. 
4.4.1 Defining target customers 
In order to be able to develop an appropriate product, the insurer must primarily 
identify the target clientele. Though affordable, micro insurance products are not for 
free (when excluding fully subsidized governmental schemes). Clients must be able to 
pay the insurance premium; thus, they must be involved in some kind of income-
generating activity and have a minimum level of income. Swiss Re (2010) and Allianz 
SE (2012) identify the target group for commercial MI in the group of individuals 
which are located above the $1,25/ day poverty line (based on 2005 PPP) and up to an 
income of $4/day (Figure 4.4). Those individuals situated above the $4/day threshold 
are more likely to be able to afford classic insurance products and are usually the main 
target for commercial insurance products. Those individuals located below the 
$1,25/day threshold are the extremely poor and barely able to afford basic necessities, 
thus considered incapable of paying for commercial insurance premiums. Swiss Re 
(2010) also claims that private MI implementation cannot be an effective solution for 
this segment of the population. Social protection schemes, such as subsidized health 
insurance premiums guaranteeing free access to health care, could offer some sort of 
risk protection to these extremely poor people (Ahuja & Jütting, 2004). Commercial 
insurers very often limit their commitment with the very poor and low-income groups 
to philantrophic or “corporate social responsible” initiatives. This issue will be further 
discussed in the next section.  
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Figure 4.4 - World population classified according to the income level and the corresponding risk 
protection schemes. 
 
Source: Allianz SE (2012) 
However, insurers offering appropriate MI products might be able to serve BPL 
clients, as showed through the implementation of CBHI schemes. Though more 
profitable in the short term, “cream skimming” strategies (by purposely selecting 
high-premiums clientele) might not be a good strategy for insurers in the long term, if 
they are interested in extending their business and in remaining competitive in a 
market like India, where the bulk of unserved clientele belongs to the low-income 
segment of the population.  
4.4.2 Developing the right product 
Classical insurance products provided by commercial insurers in India are developed 
on a top-down approach. Such products cannot be simply scaled down and applied to 
the MI market.  MI products must, instead, be properly prioritized for target groups, 
since MI clients differ from standard wealthier insurance clients. Furthermore, MI 
clients´ priorities and ability to pay are very context specific. Therefore, it is not 
possible to rely on a one-fits-all model for serving the MI market. Products and 
procedures must be adapted to the local context. Needs assessment surveys and 
baseline surveys are necessary to understand the specific MI setting. In general, 
products should be simple, the insurance policy should be easily written and cover 
relevant risks and the premium should be affordable. The pricing of the products 
should be as transparent as possible, allowing clients to compare offers. As compared 
to standard insurance products, MI products can only offer a limited coverage against 
risks. Caps and benefits compensation are lower and usually high risks (such as 
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HIV/AIDS) are excluded. In MHI products, exclusions usually contemplate the type 
of health care benefit (hospitalization and/or outpatient care and/or drugs, etc.) or the 
providers (e.g. only coverage of costs at selected providers). Exclusions are generally 
necessary to keep products affordable and for the sustainability of the schemes. 
However, insurers must be extremely clear and transparent in explaining policy 
conditions before the policy is issued, in order to avoid clients´ dissatisfaction. In 
general, the claim settlement process should be easy, without the requirement of 
submitting too many documents, and possibly cashless. Inclusion is also a 
fundamental issue in MI. Generally, commercial insurers tend to use a risk-rated 
premium calculation for health insurance policies, which use risk factors (e.g. age, 
gender, medical history, occupation, etc.) to determine individual risk ratings. A 
higher risk rating will be transformed in a higher premium. This procedure is highly 
discriminative, since it makes it impossible for the the very needy (e.g. the elderly and 
severly ill people) to afford expensive insurance premiums. Insurers should, instead, 
consider adjusting standard insurance procedures to the new setting. By applying a 
community-rated premium (without medical underwriting or any kind of risk rating), 
insurers would be able to pool high and low health risks and to avoid the exclusion of 
some high-risks groups from the insurance coverage. However, this procedure is not 
free of challenges. Since most of the MI programs are voluntary, prices might be 
considered unfair by low-risk individuals, so that the insurance plan would only 
attract high-risk clients. Compulsory insurance (for example making the access to 
microcredit conditional to a health insurance policy) could guarantee an efficient 
pooling of risks in this case. 
4.4.3 Financial sustainability 
Next to the affordability of the products, financial sustainability is determinant for the 
success of MI schemes. Adequate pricing methods should prevent the company´s 
exposure to losses due to underpriced risks. The pricing of the MI products is usually 
done by private insurers using the same actuarial formula as for traditional insurance. 
The price derives by combinig the cost of claims expected to occur (obtained by 
multiplying the probability of an event with the expected cost of covered benefits), the 
administrative costs, a security margin (in order to cover uncertainties such as 
covariate risks - e.g. epidemics - and/or possible actuarial miscalculations) and the re-
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insurance costs (if applied). In order to obtain the probability of claims, specific data 
on the target clients are necessary. Concerning health insurance, national databases 
(including actuarials tables) and WHO statistics are available for the standard 
insurance market. Such databases do not exist for the low-income market. Specific 
surveys are necessary in order to learn about low-income clients´ risk level. These are 
very expensive surveys, which would increase insurers´ costs and, thus, the premiums. 
MHI is particularly challenged by the level of transaction costs, compared to other 
insurance types, because of the higher number of interlocutors involved in the 
transactions (e.g. TPAs52 and health providers). Insurers´ estimates of administrative 
costs are usually derived from a cost plan including all possible expenses for the 
administration of policy issuing and distribution processes. Because of the fragmented 
structure of the MI market, keeping track of all the financial transactions is very 
complex. Processes are mostly decentralized and partly delegated to agents (e.g. 
NGOs). Thus, developing an efficient record system for all MI transaction and 
management costs is extremely important. The IRDA allows insurers to outsource 
some administrative activities to the Third Party Administrators (TPAs), whose 
commission cannot exceed 15% of premium. Using TPAs would allow keeping part 
of the administrative costs under control. 
Concerning security margins, insurers tend to charge higher margins for MI products 
than for standard products, because of the higher level of uncertainty concerning the 
frequency and distribution of risks in the low-income settings. Including MI in larger 
risk pools, together with the high-premiums insurance portfolios, would create 
diversification of risks and reduce the mean variation of annual costs, thus reducing 
the need of high security margins. Re-insurance could also be a valuable solution for 
MI, since it would allow transferring part of the risk of loss to the re-insurer (Dror, 
2006; Biener & Eling, 2012). Re-insurance would also be charged on premiums, but 
the increase of premium when including re-insurance would still be lower than the 
effect on price given by the need of loading on premia and capital retention (Dror, 
2006). Furthermore, re-insuring the MI portfolio would not particularly destabilize 
                                                            
52 Third Party Administrators are new figures introduced by IRDA in order to ensure better services to 
health insurace policyholders. The TPAs manage claims and the reimbursment procedure and arrange 
for cashless hospitalizations for the policyholders. TPAs are separate entities coordinating insurance 
companies, policyholders and health care providers. TPAs are usually functioning as back-office 
administrators for private health insurers (Bhat & Babu, 2004). 
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private insurers´ finances, since the MI portfolio represents on average only 1% of 
insurers´ total exposure (Allianz AG, GTZ & UNDP, 2006).  
4.4.4 Creating awareness and getting people´s trust 
Despite the continuous improvements in the MI sector, insurance is not very spread as 
risk protection mechanisms for the poor yet (Dercon, 2000; Dercon & Krishnan, 
2003; Collins et al., 2009; Kruk et al., 2009). Chapter 2 showed how poor households 
in rural India still rely on strategies such as borrowing (mostly from friends, informal 
credit systems or moneylenders), using savings and selling assets in order to cope 
with health care-related expenditures. MI clients are generally low-income and low-
educated people and with very little knowledge about insurance. The development of 
appropriate awareness campaigns is fundamental for getting people´s attention on the 
functioning and value of insurance. Educational programs must be tailored to low-
educated and illiterate people. The lack of trust in commercial insurers is a barrier for 
the penetration of commercial MI products. Especially for health insurance, trust must 
be created both at the health care provision level (in the patient-provider relation) and 
at the insurance level. Insurers can build reputation of trustworthiness by 
demonstrating expertise and responsiveness to consumers´ needs. At the same time, a 
minimum quality and availability of health care infrastructure is necessary in order for 
the clients to benefit from the insurance. Despite the development of good products, a 
lack of adequate medical services could challenge the success of an insurance product, 
since the insured expect to be offered quality care. Unfortunately, the weak and 
obsolete public health infrastructure, especially in rural and remote areas, has a 
deterrent effect on potential clients´ willingness to buy insurance policies. The private 
health infrastructure doesn´t have the capacity to serve the mass of unserved patients. 
Furthermore, the use of private medical services would push insurance prices much 
above the capacity to pay of MI target-clients. 
The terms of the insurance contract should also be extremely transparent and claim 
settlement easy and fast, in order to avoid disappointment among the clients and 
losing people´s trust. Insurers should also contemplate the creation of organs for 
consumer assistance close to the communities. Decentralized organs offering 
assistance for claim settlement or grievance could create more commitment to using 
insurance services. Low-income clients could, in fact, be scared away by the formality 
101 
 
of the insurance business, while involving local agents (such as NGOs in the partner-
agent model) could lower the physical distance between insured and insurers. 
4.4.5 Moral hazard, adverse selection and fraud  
Moral hazard behavior, according to which insured individuals would behave 
differently than people exposed to risks, is often associated with MI. In health 
insurance, moral hazard behavior refers to the fact that insured people are more likely 
to use health care53. However, it is important to remark the difference between a 
changing health care seeking behavior and the excessive unneeded use of care. 
Through health insurance people might be incentivated to excessively use health care, 
since they do not have to pay the full marginal cost of care (Jacob and Lundin, 2005). 
However, this behavior should not be confused with the normal change in health care 
seeking behavior induced by MI. The objective of MI should be, in fact, offering poor 
people the chance to get high-value care, which they couldn´t afford without 
insurance. Insurers should therefore only concentrate on fighting hazards that put the 
sustainability of the scheme at risk. A back-log effect at the start of the MI 
implementation is, instead, quite inevitable, which creates a high concentration of 
claims right at the beginning of the MI scheme. This is the result of poor people´s 
long-time under-use of (valuable) health care. When these people are finally able 
(through insurance plans) to access valuable health care, they will clog up the 
insurance system right at the beginning. Insurance schemes only covering 
hospitalization costs are less challenged by this effect, because of the acute and 
unexpected nature of the event, as confirmed by Dr. Nishan Jain54 (GIZ) concerning 
the RSBY scheme. The back-log effect is, instead, more visible when MI programs 
include benefits such as outpatient treatment, as reported by Mr. Devabalan Raja 
(CARE India).55 One possible solution against the excessive use of care could be 
including a coinsurance (requiring the insured to pay some part of the costs out-of-
pocket). However, this would reduce risk protection (together with excess utilization) 
                                                            
53 However, it is rather difficult and subjective to identify episodes when care is “really” needed or not. 
54 Dr. Nishan Jain is Deputy Programme Director at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Delhi and Advisor to Government of India on national health insurance 
programmes. Dr. Nishant Jain kindly reported information on the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) state-run insurance program during the Summer School: “Micro Health Insurance in 
Developing Societies – Protection for the Poor? The Example of India” organized by the University of 
Cologne in Delhi in September 2011. 
55 Mr. Devabalan Raja kindly reported information about CARE´s micro insurance programs during an 
interview in September 2011. 
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and would contrast with the original scope of MI to mitigate the risk exposure of the 
poor. In alternative, using local agents (like in the partner-agent model) could create a 
peer monitoring mechanism against hazards and fraud (such as faking claims). 
Another risk for voluntary MI programs is the so called “adverse selection“ risk, 
which occurs when individuals (very usual in poor settings) only undertake insurance 
when in immediate need of health care. Adverse selection usually happens in 
combination with low general demand, thus creating a situation of inefficient pooling. 
Technically, implementing compulsory insurance schemes, where only all community 
members at once can get insured, would be the most direct remedy. However, this 
solution is not ideal in poor settings, where HHs need to prioritize between several 
basic necessities. Another solution could be including a waiting time in the health 
insurance policy, so that the insurance coverage would not start at the issue of the 
insurance policy, but some time later (usually six months or one year later). Such a 
policy would, however, undermine clients´ trust in the insurance scheme. Other 
corrective methods often used by insurers are policy exclusions and/or pre-medical 
tests assessing prospect clients´ risk level (thus charging higher premiums for severely 
ill clients). Despite the severity of the adverse selection risk for the sustainability of 
MI schemes, this sort of risk is intrinsically connected to serving low-income groups 
and, therefore, cannot be eliminated without undermining the effectiveness of micro 
insurance as a financial protection tool for the poor. 
4.5 Extending health insurance to the poor: A business 
ethical issue?  
With the aim to respond to emerging social, environmental and economic issues, an 
increasing number of corporate leaders are promoting companies´ sense of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). CSR is now considered as an integral part for the process 
of wealth creation, next to conventional profit generating business activities. 
Companies´ new attention to social responsible issues is driven by several factors. On 
one side, the arisen concern of consumers and investors on social and environmental 
issues. On the other side, the faster communication and information technologies push 
toward more transparency in business activities (EU Commission, 2001). Some 
companies see CSR as a strategic investement in quality improvement, some other as 
a cost for beneficial marketing. 
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This section aims at analyzing the extent to which Indian insurance companies 
connect the concept of CSR with micro insurance and at understanding whether 
insurance companies´ CSR attitudes could be favourable for creating an inclusive 
insurance business for the poor. The findings are based on research about the CSR 
activities undertaken by insurance companies active in India, which are obtained 
through companies´ websites, reports, press releases and other public disclosures. 
Table 4.9 presents an overview of the CSR activities declared by the main commercial 
insurance companies active in India. Some companies did not report any information 
on CSR activities and have not been included. In general, no or very elusive 
information was available about inputs and outputs of companies´ CSR involvement. 
Column two in Table 4.9 reports the social initiatives reported under CSR for the FY 
2012-13. Column three reports whether insurance and/or micro insurance are included 
within such CSR activities. It emerges that insurance companies´ CSR activities 
mostly include philantrophic social initiatives in the area of education, child welfare, 
health, environment and social inclusion. Companies mostly make donations to 
organizations, which then deliver the social benefit. This way CSR remains 
disconnected from the company´s core business and is not included in the company´s 
business model, as the original meaning of CSR would claim. The leading question 
behind companies´ CSR should be instead: “How does the company affect society?”. 
Social responsible companies should then behave accordingly. Since insurers´ core 
business consists in offering risk protection plans, creating an inclusive insurance 
service for the poor would appear to be the most obvious social responsible activity to 
undertake. Excluding few exceptions, the majority of Indian insurers do not include 
MI within their CSR activities. One exception is ICICI Lombard, which reports on the 
website: “At ICICI Lombard investing in rural markets is seen as a keen social 
responsibility. The protection provided to the rural class is specified and customized 
according to their needs”. Thus, the company´s vision of corporate social 
responsibility encompasses serving the undersupplied rural segment by offering 
appropriate insurance products. 
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Table 4.9: Overview of the CSR activities undertaken by commercial insurers active in India in the FY 2012-13 
 
Insurance company Social initiatives listed under CSR 
FY 2012-13 
CSR activities include 
insurance / microinsurance 
HDFC Ltd 
(HDFG ERGO General and 
HDFC Life insurance) 
“HDFC has undertaken development oriented work and supported several social initiatives in the 
areas of education, child welfare, medical research, welfare for the elderly and the handicapped 
among several others“ 56 
Yes, but only within life 
insurance and no specific 
information on products available 
ICICI Lombard 
 
 
“Rural Development Initiatives”57, including the micro insurance activities. 
Further philantrophic activities through employee-driven campaigns (including medical camps, 
nutritional support, mother and child care, etc.) 
Yes, under rural development 
initatives 
 
CHOLA MS Health care, educational and other developmental philantrophic services through the  AMM 
Foundation of the Murugappa Group58 
Special safety initiatives during religious festivals in Mumbai. 
No 
Future Generali 
 
Developmental programs through Future Group, including: 
-Enviromental programs 
-Inclusive growth, community-driven and sustainable development (no specific information on 
projects) 
No clear information available 
AVIVA Life Insurance Initiatives facilitating education for underprivileged children, providing life skills training and 
linkages to vocational training opportunities, health and hygiene campaigns and early childhood care. 
 
 
No 
                                                            
56 The HDFC´s Social Initiatives Annual Report for 2008 included social programs partially involving health insurance practices. Whithin the “income housing and 
microfinance“ segment of social activities, HDFC Ltd. was collaborating with the NGO Malanadu Development Society on a microcredit plus system which also included the 
possibility to connect health insurance to microcredit.  Prachodhan, an initiative of the Evangelical Social Action Forum (ESAF) in central and north india, was reported 
collaborating with HDFC Standard Life and HDFC ERGO for providing both life and non-life insurance to their SHG members. However, such programs are not listed 
anymore within the social activities currently involving HDFC Ltd. (These contents are available at:  http://www.hdfc.com/others/social_initiatives.asp (accessed 
10.01.2014)). 
57 Detailled information on the “Rural Development Initiatives” is available at: https://www.icicilombard.com/about-us/career-corporate-policy/Rural_Development.html 
(accessed 10.01.2014). 
58 The Murugappa Group is the business group including CHOLA MS General Insurance Ltd. Information on the Group CSR activities available at: 
http://www.murugappa.com/community/overview.htm (accessed 10.01.2014). 
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Insurance company Social initiatives listed under CSR 
FY 2012-13 
CSR activities include 
insurance / microinsurance 
Bajaj Group (Bajaj Allianz 
General and Life Insurance) 
Several philanthropic and rural development initiatives including: 
-health, family welfare, immunisation, supply of potable drinking water, sanitation and  
alternative source of renewable energy, health check-up camps 
-Employment Generation Programmes, awards, support of higher education centers 
No 
TATA Group (TATA AIG 
General & TATA AIA Life 
Insurance) 
Philatrophic initiatives including: 
-Employees volunteering programs 
-programs aiming at creating equal opportunities for disadvantaged casts 
-community programs on education, health, sports, rehabilitation 
-environmental programs 
No 
Bharti Axa  
 
Several philantrophic activities including59: 
-programs promoting reduction of carbon footprint, fitness and health 
-risk education program for women and self-defence program 
-going green campagne for reducing paper and plastic use 
-health camps with free check-up and medicines for underspriviledged women 
-blood donation an health awareness program 
-diversity and inclusion program 
-underpriviledged girl education program 
No 
IFFCO-TOKIO General 
insurance 
Activities within the insurance core business aiming at reaching growth and development of the rural 
and social sector60 (no specific information on activities or products) 
Yes 
Apollo Hospitals Group 
(Apollo Munich Health 
Insurance) 
Health initiatives, inclusive medical services, rural school programs61 
 
 
No 
Max India Group 
(Max Bupa Health Insurance) 
Health, childern and environmental programs62 No 
                                                            
59 Full details on these and other CSR activities are avilable at: http://www.bharti-axagi.co.in/corporate-social-responsibility (accessed 10.01.2013). 
60 Direct information available at: http://www.iffcotokio.co.in/csr (accessed 10.01.2014). 
61 Details on the programs available at: http://www.apollohospitals.com/initiatives-corporate-social-responsibility.php (accessed 10.01.2014). 
62 Details available at: http://www.maxindia.com/csr.html (accessed 10.01.2014). 
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Most of the insurers observed in this study tend to prefer one-time or periodical 
financial grants for charitable activities to long-term commitments. This way CSR 
appears to be “neither strategic nor operational but cosmetic“ (Porter and Kramer, 
2006) and could even have a negative impact on ethical business, since it offers “bad“ 
companies the chance to cover the negative social effects of their business strategies 
through philantrophic activities. Laura Donovan, expert in CSR and MI in India, 
claims that companies´ committment to MI as a socially responsible part of their 
business portfolio is striktly connected to corporate benchmarks63. Without returns in 
the medium-long term insurers will not guarantee a commitment to MI and will prefer 
other kinds of commitment for their socially responsible activities. 
The recently issued Companies Act (2013) makes an effort to introduce the culture of 
corporate social responsibility in Indian firms by requiring solvent companies64, 
including insurance companies, to spend at least 2% of the average net-profits of the 
immediately preceding three years on CSR activities. Companies failing to comply 
with this requirement are expected to compile a report justifying their shortcoming 
(see section 135 of the Act). There have been mixed reactions to this compulsory 
approach with respect to CSR among Indian and foreign companies active in India. 
These regulations show again the Indian authorities´ intent to promote a growing 
involvment of the private sector for solving social issues. As much as for the social 
and rural obligations for insurance companies, it might take a while until companies 
digest the compulsority of this regulation and absorbe CSR as a culture. Furthermore, 
CSR activities are not specified enough within the Act, so that it is not possible to 
infer what kind of projects could be undertaken in order to fulfill the regulations65. 
The definition of CSR in the Companies Act encompasses mostly philantrophic 
                                                            
63 Mrs. Laura Donovan, ex senior consultant at the Micro Insurance Academy and ex Chief 
Executive at Partners in Change (PIC), a Delhi-based not-for-profit society dedicated to promoting pro-
poor CSR, kindly reported information for this study during my research stay in Dehli in September 
2011. More information about PIC can be found here: http://www.picindia.org/whoweare.html 
(accessed 08.09.2013). 
64 Information about companies excluded by this compulsority are included in Section 135 of the Act, 
available at: http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/182013.pdf (accessed 19.11.2013). 
65 Schedule VII of the Companies Act describes CSR activities as: (i) activities aiming at eradicating 
extreme hunger and poverty; (ii) activities promoting education; (iii) activities promoting gender 
equality and empowering women; (iv) activities aimed at reducing child mortality and improving 
maternal health; (v) activities aimed at combating human immunodeficiency virus, acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome, malaria and other diseases; (vi) activities aimed at ensuring environmental 
sustainability; (vii) activities supporting the acquisition of employment enhancing vocational skills; 
(viii) social business projects; (ix) contribution to governmental funds for socio-economic development 
and relief. 
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activities, so that MI could only be included under the voice “social business projects“ 
and, thus, when considered a separate entity compared to the standard for-profit 
business activities.  
Several studies try to identify common features of companies engaging in corporate 
social responsible activities. One finding is that the company´s engagement is closely 
related to the management´s commitment to social responsible business (Sood and 
Arora, 2006). Mishra & Suar (2010) claim that responsible business practices can be 
profitable and beneficial to Indian firms, showing that managers´ favorable perception 
towards CSR is associated with an increase in financial and non-financial 
performance. Karnani (2011), instead, claims that “doing well by doing good” is an 
illusion, since companies´ social responsible activities are simply a cost for them. He 
therefore concludes that CSR is not the appropriate tool for achieving large social 
goals and that “business gurus exhorting companies to incrase their profits while 
solving big social problems have fallen into a logical fallacy”. He supports his 
proposition by describing three possible scenarios (Figure 4.5) in which private profits 
and public interests can be combined. In the zone of opportunity (left) both private 
and public interests are satisfied66. The opposite happens in the zone of disaster. 
Critical is the zone of tradeoff, where social benefit is obtained at the cost of private 
profits. 
Figure 4.5 - Possible scenarios for private profits vs public interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration on Karnani (2011) 
 
Karnani uses the example of wind farms for this last scenario. Wind farms are a 
socially beneficial way of producing energy but they are not competitive in a free 
                                                            
66 The inclination of the curve could vary depending on the case in analysis. 
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market, given the higher costs connected to the production. The majority of social 
problems lie in this zone, which represents a situation of market failure. According to 
the author, when the market fails and problems reside in the trade-off zone, neither 
free market forces alone, nor CSR will solve the problem. In order to solve long-term 
social problems, constraints on firms behaving exclusively in their self-interst are 
necessary, which can take the form of voluntary constraints (spontaneously accepting 
a loss in profitability) or regulations (governmental or within the firms industry).  
I will now use these considerations and apply them to the Indian insurance scenario.  
Indian insurers´ approach toward CSR tends (apart from few exceptions) to keep a 
distance between core business activities and CSR activities, which are instead 
interpreted as a direct or indirect involvement of the company in social benefical 
activities (not encompassing insurance activities). Also the definition of CSR 
provided by the regulator in the Companies Act does not explicitely push for the 
absorption of CSR within the companies´ business model. We can then conclude that, 
in this current scenario, CSR is not likely to be the solution for the extension of 
insurance services to the excluded groups in the Indian society.  
The insurance industry regulations issued by the IRDA can, instead, represent the 
right impulse for insurers to experiment a new market approach and extend their 
portfolio to the low-income market. It remains to understand the extent to which 
insurers have started to look at the MI market as a potentially profitable market (thus 
moving from a trade-off scenario to a zone of opportunity). This issue is discussed in 
details in the next section. 
4.6 Gains and risks for commercial insurers entering MI 
business 
The insurance market in India is a typical example of market failure. There is enough 
unserved demand, especially for health insurance, but demand and supply are not yet 
efficiently meeting, especially concerning the low-income segment of the population. 
Until the IRDA´s intevention through rural and social obligations, insurers in India 
neglected the low-income market and concentrated their business on the middle to 
high-premiums market. Sector regulations and public expectations are now pushing 
for more inclusion within the for-profit business. 
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Figure 4.6 - The classification of inclusive business in regard to for-profit and social business 
 
 
 
Promoted by governments and international development cooperation, a new 
definition of development as market-based processes is taking the lead. Serving the 
poor is not anymore reserved to philantrophy and social business, but is instead 
becoming integral part of the for-profit business. Financial inclusion - defined as the 
process of facilitating the access to the formal financial system (including insurance 
services) of those segments of the population which are denied these facilities 
(Karmakar et al, 2011) - can therefore be considered an issue concerning both pure 
social business and standard for-profit business (Figure 4.6). In order to identify 
possible solutions for the extension of the MI market, it is important to first isolate the 
role and responsibilities of the for-profit insurance industry. Insurers in India, as 
profit-oriented entities, are interested in maximizing short term revenues. It is 
therefore important to understand the business relevance of the low-income MI 
market for private insurers. Are commercial insurers in India still looking at the 
relationship between corporate success and social welfare as a zero-sum game? 
Prahalad (2011) claims (in his renowned work “The fortune at the bottom of the 
pyramid”) that the unserved low-income market has a high business potential for 
companies who learn how to serve it. He is against the top-down idea of development 
through aid, which tends to see the poor as victims in need of help, and he also does 
not see CSR as the solution to the problem, claiming that serious commitment from a 
firm cannot be based on philantrophy (or CSR). He supports the crucial importance of 
involving the private business for eradicating poverty, but claims that low-income 
markets must first “become integral to the success of the firm in order to command 
senior management attention and sustained resource allocation”. Has this potential of 
the low-income market been overlooked by Indian insurance companies? If there is a 
FOR‐ PROFIT 
BUSINESS 
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lot of potential for profits in the low income market, then serving this untapped 
market would be a win-win solution for both insurers and the community (such as in 
the scenario in the zone of opportunity). However, in a competitive market, if there 
were easy ways to make profits, some companies would have already exploited these 
opportunities (Karnani, 2011). The difficulty of entering a new unknown market 
might have kept insurers away, rather than low expectations on profitability alone. 
The MI market is not a market for high short-term profits and requires investing in 
restructuring business processes and in innovation. Insurers have to overgo several 
challenges in order to be successful, as previously discussed. The MI market requires 
long-term commitment and a willingness to properly serve a new clientele. These 
reasons might also explain insurers´ first reluctance to accept the IRDA social and 
rural regulations, whose effects start to be visible in the increased insurers´ 
willingness to extend their share of portfolio in the rural and social sector beyond the 
compulsory quota (IRDA, 2013). 
Indian insurers might decide to enter the MI market for several reasons. First of all, 
the high competition on the standard insurance market is reducing profits on contracts 
at the minimum. Thus, they might be interested in the low-income market in order to 
explore a new untapped market or for diversification purposes. The same holds for 
foreign insurance companies, since western markets are already saturated. Entering 
MI could also be useful for fulfilling social expectations and promote the company´s 
brand. Furthermore, with a MI market size estimated at Rs. 62.30 to 84.27 billion per 
year, with Rs. 13.42 to 17.89 billion for health insurance alone (UNDP, 2009), there is 
a high potential for market growth, given the large unserved population. Companies 
might therefore be interested in securing a first-mover advantage in the fastest 
growing market while the market is still in a development phase. Investing in low-
income clients now could also guarantee a larger market share for tomorrow, since 
today´s low-income clients can be tomorrow´s middle class. Some insights into 
insurers´ motivation for their involvement in MI could be inferred from companies´ 
reports and other public disclosures. Allianz SE´s Annual Report (2012) explains that 
social benefits and business advantage, such as driving innovation and cost efficiency, 
branding opportunity and “reasonable profits“, are the drivers for the company´s 
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commitment to MI in India67. The report presents a growth in the company´s MI 
portfolio but, unfortunately, no information about the profitability of the company in 
the MI segment. Angove et al. (2012) report very positive revenues ($100m) for 
Allianz SE in India from the marketing of a savings life MI product. The Munich RE 
group  reports on its website that the involvement of HDFC ERGO General Insurance 
Company Ltd. in MI “allows to combine social commitment with an investment in a 
growing market which the United Nations estimates has currently reached only 5% of 
its potential“. Andreas Matthias Kleiner, responsible for Asia at ERGO International 
AG, claims that “Microinsurance will strongly gain in significance in emerging 
countries over the next few years. International demand is estimated at €1.5bn to €3bn 
and insurance companies expect a growth rate of 100% in the next four to five 
years”68. IFFCO Tokio manifests social responsible objectives in engaging in MI, 
such as “the growth and development of the rural and social [insurance] sector“. In 
order to make the business viable, the company has engaged a specialized rural team 
which develops business strategies for overcoming challenges in the MI segment, 
including “high distribution and development costs and low profitability“. Future 
Generali Insurance managing director and chief executive KG Krishnamoorthy Rao 
claims that “the penetration of insurance in rural markets is dismally low, far lower 
than the national average of 4 percent (life insurance and non-life insurance put 
together). It presents a huge untapped opportunity, which can be leveraged with 
suitable products customised for these markets. We are confident that this 
comprehensive product and its viable price will make a compelling proposition, which 
will help our partners attract many first-time buyers […]“69. 
Coydon & Molitor (2011) investigated the experiences with MI of 24 top commercial 
insurance companies, eight of which active in India and, among these eight ones, two 
offering micro health insurance products. The main self-reported motivations for their 
                                                            
67 The full report is available at: 
https://www.allianz.com/v_1364465843000/media/responsibility/documents/Allianz_Microinsurance_
Business_Update.pdf (accessed 12.11.2013). 
68 HDFC ERGO is the 4th largest private sector general insurance company in India and is a joint 
venture between the Indian HDFC Ltd and ERGO International AG (Munich Re Group) 
The full article is available at: http://www.munichre.com/corporate-responsibility/en/solutions/primary-
insurance/microinsurance/default.aspx (accessed 12.11.2013). 
69The full article is available at:  http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-07-
03/news/32523960_1_generali-group-future-generali-india-insurance-insurance-and-non-life-insurance 
(accessed  12.10.2013). 
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involvement in MI was the desire to invest in new markets and the financial profits 
expectations, followed by CSR and benefits for the brand´s image. Only 4.17% of 
respondents think that MI won´t become profitable in the short-term. These results 
show that commercial players recognize both financial revenues and brand 
recognition as added values offered by entering MI. However, the study also reports 
that, despite the good expectations concerning the future viability of the MI market, 
most insurers declared their current inability of writing MI on a profitable basis. 
Respondents did not perceive the initial financial investment in MI as an obstacle but 
reported that the high costs of development for the low-premium contracts, when 
compared to the low returns, represent a challenge for the financial sustainability of 
the MI portfolio. The interviewed insurance companies were mostly offering MI in 
India, because of the large size of the market and the better development of the MI 
market infrastructure, compared to other countries. Interviewed insurers not involved 
in MI mentioned as reasons the insufficient size of the market, the lack of expertise in 
the sector and a priority in standard markets.  
Research on the profitability of MI for commercial insurers is very limited (Angove & 
Tande, 2011; Koven et al., 2013). The impossibility of accessing financial data 
concerning the MI activities of commercial insurers represents a big challenge for the 
analysis of the performance of this new market. My analysis of insurers´ financial 
disclosures did not allow extracting the share of MI from the overall insurance 
portfolio. It is therefore impossible to estimate the profitability of the insurers´ MI 
activities through the information provided by the insurers. Tracking record of the 
many transactions and the relative costs involved within the MI activities is very 
challenging for the insurers themselves, since most of the insurers adopt the partner-
agent MI model and collaborate with different local organizations (mostly NGOs and 
MFIs), whose activities are difficult to be recorded. Financial returns from MI are per 
definition generally limited, compared to the standard insurance market, and insurers´ 
risk exposure much higher, mostly depending on the missing statistical databases. In 
the case of health insurance, the low clients´ health capital, mostly depending on the 
low quality of care recived and on missing preventive measures, represents a further 
burden for the sustainability of insurance schemes. In order to generate profits from 
low-premium contracts, insurers must be able to scale up quickly and reach a MI 
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portfolio commensurate to the risk and upfront investments. However, it is difficult to 
estimate the number of contracts necessary for insurers to break even from the 
information currently available. 
4.7 Discussion 
The process of incorporation of low-income clients in the Indian commercial 
insurance system is still at an embryonic stage. However, both insurers and the Indian 
government see positive prospects for the future.  
Companies´ commitment to CSR does not seem to be a short-term solution for the 
creation of inclusive insurance services in India. The impact of the new Companies 
Act (2013) will only be visible in 2 years, when the three-year term for the companies 
to comply with the regulation will expire. However, since the definition of CSR 
provided by the Act does not explicitly encompass the companies´ core business 
activities, but rather philantrophic activities, little hope is reserved on the effect these 
regulations will have on the extension of insurance services to the excluded groups. 
Commercial insurers still have to see the advantanges of  “doing well by doing good”, 
since responsible business practices have shown to be advantageous for firms as well, 
not only for customers and the society. Meeting the modern customers´ expectations 
for a more equitable corporate behavior could, in fact, increase the firm´s 
competitiveness, from which not only social, but also financial benefits would derive. 
The insurance industry regulations for the rural and social sector issued by the IRDA 
had given the right impulse for insurers to experiment a new market approach and 
extend their portfolio to the low-income market. The IRDA strongly believes in the 
importance of micro insurance and supports the role of private insurers for generating 
inclusive insurance business for rural and social groups. India can be therefore 
considered a leading example in terms of regulatory framework and support for the 
MI sector. It remains to understand the extent to which insurers have started to look at 
the MI market as a potentially profitable market.  
Market analyses estimate a huge growth of the Indian MI market, in particular the 
health insurance segment, over the next years. These estimates are mostly based on 
the high potential of the huge unserved population, when compared to the highly 
saturated western markets. However, entering this market is not without challenges 
for insurers. The success of commercial insurers in the MI market depends on the 
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commitment of the company to effectively serve a new clientele that differs in many 
aspects from the standard insurance clientele. Innovating products and restructuring 
business processes is necessary. The poor and obsolete public health care 
infrastructure represents the main challenge for the penetration of private health 
insurance. Clients paying for private insurance expect quality care in return. 
Furthermore, cost-efficient models are necessary in order to reach affordability and 
financial viability. Reducing transaction costs is one of the main challenges for MI 
business. New distribution channels must also be found. MI products cannot be down-
scaled versions of standard insurance products. New demand-driven products must be 
designed, taylored to people´s needs and priorities. Claims should also be possibly 
cashless (indemnity insurance) instead of reimbursement-based. The use of TPAs 
could help to make health insurance claims cashless. 
Insurers that are not yet willing to invest in innovation and to adequately serve the 
low-income market but, instead, only use MI to comply with the rural and social 
obligations, risk to fall into the “zone of disaster”. The distribution of inadequate 
products, in fact, is not likely to be neither a successful business, nor effective in 
protecting clients against risks. Favourable financial regulations and fiscal incentives 
could be the drive for insurers´ commitment.  
Among the different MI implementation models, the partner-agent model has the 
potential to both effectively serve the low-income clientele, given the close 
relationship of local agents with the communities and the technical know-how of the 
partner, and to be a cost-efficient model, thanks to the lower transaction costs 
compared to the pure commercial model. Furthermore, the agents´ closeness to the 
insured could build more trust for the scheme within the community (which is likely 
to increase the willingness to be insured) and could also allow to better monitor 
against fraud and hazards. Joining forces with local organisations (usually NGOs or 
MFIs) could therefore help to overcome some of the main challenges to the spread of 
commercial MI. The parner-agent model is also officially recognized as MI 
implementation model by the IRDA, which supports it with ad-hoc regulations. 
However, the CARE- Bajaj Allianz case study has shown some of the challenges that 
such a model could face. For example, it is relevant to develop a strong coordination 
between the partners and to offer support to the local organisations (also in terms of 
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capacity building). Furthermore, creating a network of agents (local organizations) 
could help the outreach of the schemes. The scheme should guarantee a certain 
outreach in order to be financially sustainable, which is necessary to guarantee the 
insurer´s commitment. Furthermore, it is important to create cost-efficient 
transactions, as well as to develop a good costs plan and monitoring system for all 
financial issues. In order to reduce the cost of claims, agreements with local medical 
providers (bargaining a lower cost of selected services for insured), as well as 
linkages with the pharmaceutical industry could create a healthy competition between 
providers and, thus, it would also lower costs. Insurers should offer products that 
complement the products already available in the MI segment. This means 
concentrating more on low-cost but high-frequency services (such as outpatient care), 
instead of focusing on hospitalization coverage only.  
One of the problems emerged in this study is the lack of specific information on the 
MI products and their performance. There´s the need to create a standardized 
monitoring system for the MI market, with insurers regularly collecting and sharing 
information on the distributed products and on the outreach of the insurance plan. The 
availability of such relevant data is fundamental for the development of efficient 
business models. The creation of a separate body monitoring the MI sector, under the 
supervision of the IRDA, could possibly serve as incentive for a more structured MI 
market.  
It is a matter of fact that without a perspective of profitability commercial insurers 
will not show the proper commitment necessary for offering effective insurance 
services to the poor. Private insurers need time to experiment and see the business 
case within MI, before the market can successfully evolve. A business case is also 
fundamental for attracting investments into the MI market. However, one could argue 
whether the amount of revenues satisfying insurers´ expectations would be plausible 
(or even ethically acceptable) within MI, which is a low-premium business segment.  
Some cross-subsidization in the insurers´ portfolio would let low-income clients pool 
their resources with the other standard clients, so that the larger pooling could lower 
the average loss ratio. MI clients represent a too homogeneous group for developing 
effective risk-sharing strategies since “pooling the poor with the poor is poor pooling“ 
(Dror, in Radermacher & Brinkmann, 2011). 
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4.8 Conclusions 
To conclude, the trend shows a growing involvement of commercial insurers in the 
low-income segment of the Indian population. The private MI market, in particular 
the health insurance segment, is estimated to grow exponentially in India over the 
next years. 
Commercial insurers are starting to be interested in the new MI market and could 
become important players for the massification of insurance services, with the support 
of the central government, which particularly encourages the involvement of the 
private sector in social issues.  However, insurance companies´ interest still needs to 
be guided toward the development of an effective inclusive insurance system, which 
adequately serves the low-income clientele, and for creating cost-efficient models that 
guarantee financial viability. The partner-agent model is a very promising model, 
which has the potential to be both effective and efficient.  
The new Companies Act has met public expectations demanding more attention to 
social issues within the private business. However, as long as insurance companies do 
not absorbe CSR as corporate culture and recognize it as an added value to the own 
business model (with potential beneficial effects on both the financial and non-
financial performance), business ethical strategies are not going to be effective in 
creating inclusive insurance services in India. 
Concerning the health insurance segment, in particular, there is a huge unmet need for 
micro health insurance products. Private insurers should find their niche and offer 
complementary insurance services than those offered by the government and other 
organizations. The RSBY scheme represents a big challenge for the penetration of 
private insurance. However, little hope is put in the effectiveness of both private 
health insurance and government-financed insurance schemes in creating equitable 
access to health services, as long as the Indian government is not willing to invest 
more resources in the improvement of the public medical insfrastructure. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This thesis has analyzed how ill-health affects low-income groups in rural India and 
the way health insurance products could be developed which effectively serve this 
specific segment of the Indian population, by considering low-income people´s 
specific needs and financial possibilities. In particular, community-based approaches 
and market-based approaches have been taken into analysis, next to a presentation of 
current governmental approaches. The studies presented in this thesis are motivated 
from the fact that health care is still mainly financed through out-of-pocket payments 
in India, which exposes low-income groups to severe hardship or forces them to 
forego seeking health care altogether.  
The first study (Chapter 2) was based on a case study in northern rural India and 
focused on studying the prevalence and types of ill-health episodes, their effects on 
household welfare and the health care financing strategies used by low-income groups 
in rural India. Furthermore, ill-health events have been compared to other adverse 
events afflicting rural communities (e.g. natural disasters, job loss or weddings), in 
order to identify the relevance (in terms of prevalence and costs) and the possibility 
for HHs of recovering from ill-health episodes, relatively to other adverse events. The 
results show that ill-health represents a high economic burden for households in 
northern rural India. Ill-health was the second most common threat, after natural 
disasters which, however, are more likely to hit richer HHs, compared to ill-health. 
Only a quarter of individuals from the studied population were able to recover from 
health-related expenditures. The study also shows the high prevalence of chronic 
conditions (and of non-communicable diseases in general) among the population and 
the importance of the costs for outpatient care (particularly the cost of drugs). These 
findings indicate that approaches aiming at reducing families´ hardship derived from 
ill-health conditions should not only focus on inpatient care (which is very costly but 
less frequent) but should, instead, put more effort in protecting households from 
health-care expenditures which are more frequent and often distributed over a long 
period of time. Households were mostly likely to use their savings, sell assets and 
borrow money in order to finance health care-related expenditures in the short term. 
These strategies are very corrosive and entail long-term consequences for households´ 
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welfare. A substantial share of households even reported foregoing seeking 
healthcare, which can have severe consequences on their productivity capacity and, in 
the long term, on the community´s health capital. This study contributes to the 
existing literature comparing different shocks affecting developing communities in 
other countries, since none of the existing studies analyzed the case of India. 
Furthermore, this study adds important insight into the very limited research on the 
conduits through which ill-health affects households´ living standard in rural India. 
The information gained in this study might be relevant for the development of 
adequate pre-financing strategies for rural communities in India, by highlighting 
Indian rural communities´ specific needs and vulnerability, as well as the relevant 
challenge related to the increasing importance of chronic and, in general, non-
communicable conditions. 
The second study (Chapter 3) presents a case study exploring a bottom-up approach 
for the development of health insurance products for communities in rural India. The 
aim of this study is shedding light on communities´ preferences for health insurance 
plans in rural India, as well as on the factors influencing these preferences. The study 
is motivated from the necessity of understanding people´s preferences in order to be 
able to develop insurance products that effectively meet low-income groups´ 
expectations and priorities. The CHAT (Choosing Health plans All Together) tool was 
used to elicit SHG members´ preferences using a participative approach. The tool 
showed to be effective and was also positively evaluated by the communities. The 
study shows that even individuals with low education or illiterate and with little or no 
previous experience with insurance are able to make decisions on health insurance 
plans, if provided with basic insurance information and when using eliciting methods 
tailored to their level of literacy. As foreseeable in resource-poor settings, people gave 
much weight to the price of the different insurance options. However, people often 
opted for a “value for money” choice, thus showing the ability to trade between the 
several features of the insurance products. Peer influence among SHG members was 
also often reported influencing decisions. Surprisingly, possessing RSBY insurance 
card did not show to influence choices. This study also finds some level of correlation 
between the path of choices during the CHAT exercises and the willingness to enroll 
into the community insurance scheme. This study contributes to the existing literature 
by analyzing consumers´ preferences for health insurance plans in developing 
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communities, since the almost totality of research on this topic has so far concentrated 
on consumers´ preferences in developed countries. The results of this study might 
serve as input for the development of effective health insurance plans that are 
specifically tailored to resource-poor communities´ needs and expectations.  
The third study presented in this thesis (Chapter 4) analyzes the role of private 
insurers in the Indian micro insurance market and the challenges and prospects for the 
creation of an inclusive insurance market. The study is motivated by the growing 
involvement of the private insurance sector in the low-income market, also supported 
by the Indian insurance authority (the IRDA), which has given a first important 
impulse for the insurers (through the introduction of social and rural obligations) to 
experiment new market approaches and to develop specific products for low-income 
clients. The study shows that most insurers are currently offering micro health 
insurance products that, however, are only aimed at reaching the targets imposed by 
the IRDA. Business ethical strategies are also not likely to be the right incentive 
pushing toward more inclusive insurance services in the near future, since most of the 
insurers taken into analysis do not currently relate their CSR program to micro 
insurance but are, instead, mostly involved in the funding of philanthropic activities.  
Despite the huge unmet demand for micro insurance, in particular health insurance 
products, private insurers have not been able to develop an adequate business strategy 
to serve this new market yet. This study shows the potential of the partner-agent 
model for the creation of effective and efficient insurance services for the low-income 
segment. However, the case study taken in analysis underlines how the good 
functioning of such a partnership model (which uses the strengths of both business-
oriented private insurance models and of development-oriented local organizations) 
can be challenged by the different approaches taken by the partners or by conflict of 
interests, as well as by several external factors. 
Insurers are slowly starting to see some potential in the MI market and are more 
willing to invest in innovation, but not without prospects of profitability. The lack of 
information released by the insurers on the MI products offered and on the 
performance of their MI portfolio hindered the possibility of making an accurate 
forecasting of this market. It is therefore necessary to create a standardized monitoring 
system for the MI markets. Information regularly collected and shared by insurers 
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would be very relevant for the development of an effective and efficient MI business 
model. 
There are still several challenges for private insurers entering the MI market that need 
to be addressed. First of all, the new RSBY scheme is quickly serving the main part of 
the low-income clients with a fully subsidized product covering inpatient care. Private 
insurers need to find their niche in the low-income market, for example by creating 
complementary products for the coverage of outpatient care. Furthermore, insurers 
need to develop a cost-effective model in order to be able to offer affordable MI 
products and be financially sustainable. However, the main challenge for the success 
of both governmental and private health insurance plans for low-income groups 
remains the low quality of the public medical infrastructure, especially in rural areas. 
The healthy competition between public and private medical providers created by the 
RSBY scheme has the potential to push both sides to improve the medical 
infrastructure, if they want to attract more patients and get access to the governmental 
funding. 
To conclude, this thesis provides important insight into the reality around health care 
costs and financing mechanisms for low-income groups in India. This information 
might serve as input for the creation of health care financing strategies that allow a 
more equitable access to health care for the low-income households in India. 
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